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Abstract
The rapid growth of firms worldwide causes that relationships in supply chains
become more complex, the competition between firms become stronger and
customer ask for more demanding products and services. All these changes
trigger that a firm looks for opportunities to get more from their scarce resources
or to use resources that are beyond its direct control. Thus, a firm can achieve
competitive advantages by setting partnerships with other supply chains in
order to increase its production capacity, by adapting its operations and pricing
strategies to the requirements of the market, and by differentiating between
customers according to necessities and willingness to pay for its offered products.
We start by studying how firms with similar supply chain roles can collaborate in
their operations. Through this collaboration, the firms can mutually benefit from
the synergies of pooling operations. A successful collaboration should be efficient
in reducing the global cost of the firms. Ne...
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Abstract
The rapid growth of firms worldwide causes that relationships in supply chains be-
come more complex, the competition between firms become stronger and customer
ask for more demanding products and services. All these changes trigger that a firm
looks for opportunities to get more from their scarce resources or to use resources that
are beyond its direct control. Thus, a firm can achieve competitive advantages by set-
ting partnerships with other supply chains in order to increase its production capacity,
by adapting its operations and pricing strategies to the requirements of the market, and
by differentiating between customers according to necessities and willingness to pay
for its offered products.
We start by studying how firms with similar supply chain roles can collaborate
in their operations. Through this collaboration, the firms can mutually benefit from
the synergies of pooling operations. A successful collaboration should be efficient in
reducing the global cost of the firms. Nevertheless, the willingness of each firm to
collaborate may also depend on the fairness of the global cost allocation.
In order to guide joint operations, we propose a novel approach that gives priority
to the firm that tends to benefit less from the collaboration. In particular, our approach
balances the global cost reduction and the inequalities of allocating such cost. More-
over, when analyzing the effect of the uncertainty on the collaboration, our approach
shows a high efficiency in reducing risk in comparison to other approaches.
We continue by studying how a firm can coordinate its pricing strategy and produc-
tion and inventory decisions in order to compete with other firms in terms of the prices
offered to the customers. We propose a framework for simultaneously planning prices
and operations of a firm. We model the operations of the firms as a Lot sizing prob-
lem, so computing equilibrium between the prices becomes a time demanding task.
We reduce significantly the computational time by providing bounds for the profits
that firms can achieve by selecting a pricing strategy. Also, we show the convenience
for the firms of using dynamic pricing strategy instead of static pricing strategy, and
we show the negative effects that may arise when increasing production capacities.
i
We also study how a firm can gain from differentiating the demand of their cus-
tomers based on profits and manufacturing requirements. Our study is motivated by
the case of a firm that faces two types of demand: on the one hand there are the so-
called regular orders that have a relatively long lead time; on the other hand there are
urgent orders, whose delay is much shorter but their margins are higher. We study the
order acceptance problem for a firm that serves two classes of demand over an infinite
horizon. The firm has to decide whether to accept a regular order (or equivalently how
much capacity to set aside for urgent orders) in order to maximize its profit. We for-
mulate this problem as a multi-dimensional Markovian Decision Process. We propose
a family of approximate formulations to reduce the dimension of the state space via
aggregation. We show how our approach can be used to compute bounds on the profit
associated with the optimal order acceptance policy. Finally, we show that the value
of revenue management is commensurate with the operational flexibility of the firm.
ii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The main objective of a firm is to create value by utilizing its resources efficiently.
Such value creation and efficiency allow the firm to maximize profits and/or minimize
costs. With this in mind, the success of a firm is linked to good planning of its internal
operations and actions. Moreover, a firm should take its business environment into
consideration. Indeed, in the last years we have been witness of how the links between
firms have strengthened as a consequence of the advances in managing information,
the ability to transport larger volumes faster and the necessity of designing products
across firms to satisfy the more specific customers requests. Also, the firm faces
more competitive environments, which arise from the specific requirements and high
standards expected by the customers together with the global proliferation of firms.
Hence, the decisions of a firm are more dependent on the actions of its competitors.
In the last decades, diverse studies in Supply Chain Management (SCM) focus on
modeling the relations between different firms. SCM combines two research subjects:
Microeconomics and Operations Management. On the one hand, Microeconomics is
the traditional perspective to study the inter-relations between firms, however, the fact
that microeconomic approaches are based on simplified production functions, which
constitutes a barrier for the implementation of such models in practice. On the other
hand, firms organize their production activities by implementing models of Opera-
tions Management. In general, Operations Management methodologies study the op-
erations of a firm in isolation from its business environment. Nevertheless, the recent
advances in the Operations Research techniques (e.g. Mathematical Programming
and Simulation) permitted to join the internal operations planning with the linking of
firms.
From a SCM perspective, the interactions between the entities belonging to the
same supply chain (SC) are referred to as vertical relationships. The connections
between different supply chains (SCs) have been classified as horizontal relationships.
Here, we describe such relationships and discuss the main challenges related to them.
1.1 Horizontal Relationships in Supply Chains
Horizontal relationships involve business interactions between entities that have sim-
ilar roles in different SCs. The horizontal relationships occur between two types of
2 1. Introduction
entities: competitors and non competitors. To demonstrate the difference, we con-
sider the case of two publishers belonging to different SCs that print different books
or journals. If the the publishers offer their items in the same geographical region, a
competitive relationship arises naturally between them, in which each publisher fights
to get a larger proportion of common potential customers. Also, the publishers may
compete when the raw materials (ink, paper, etc.) utilized to manufacture their items
are provided by a common supplier. A case that illustrates the horizontal relationship
between non competitors is when publishers offer their books or journals in different
geographical regions, countries or even continents, as their potential customers consti-
tute mutually exclusive groups. In general, this phenomenon occurs when the entities
offer products that point to different market segments.
Horizontal relationships between competitors has been largely studied in the liter-
ature on Microeconomics. The goal of the microeconomic approaches is to determine
the quantities and characteristics (e.g. price, quality, lead time, etc.) of the items or
the services offered by different firms, that would lead to a market equilibrium. From
a SCM perspective, the microeconomics approaches are reinforced by including ex-
plicitly the operations planning of the firms thus the offers of a firm are linked with
the actual availability of products, the production flexibility for promising lead times,
quality of the items, etc.
Regardless of the competitive or non competitive nature of the firms involved in
a horizontal relationship, when entities have the same kind of roles in different SCs,
there is an opportunity to exploit the synergies arising from the similarities of the ac-
tivities that they carry out. The presence of such potential synergies motivates entities
belonging to different SCs to pool their business activities, in such a way that they
mutually benefit. This type of agreement is classified as horizontal collaboration. By
horizontal collaboration the firms can increase revenues, decrease costs, expand geo-
graphical coverage, etc. For instance, if the agreement between the book publishers
considers sharing the fleet of vehicles for the delivery of the items, the publishers may
reduce the size of such fleet, decrease transportation costs and cover larger geographi-
cal regions. Also, the publishers can agree to pool their stocks of final products or raw
materials, that may lead to a larger availability of items and a reduction of the total
holding costs. Furthermore, the publishers can pool their production lines, in such a
way that they gain from the economies of scales arising from reducing fixed produc-
tions costs and increasing the flexibility of the manufacturing activities. In addition,
when the operations of the publishers are subject to uncertainty, pooling operations
can bring benefits in terms of reducing the risk of the firms (the well known risk pool-
ing effect).
Even though the entities that decide to collaborate may be non competitors, collab-
oration has a competitive dimension born of the conflicting objectives of the partners.
In our example, even when the two publishers offer their items in different geographi-
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cal regions, they will compete for the utilization of the shared resources if they decide
to pool their production lines. The biggest challenge in horizontal collaboration is to
address simultaneously the collaboration and the competition between partners. In-
deed, the success of horizontal collaboration depends on how the agreement ensures
the efficiency of the shared actions while taking into account the interests of each
partner.
1.2 Vertical Relationships in Supply Chains
Vertical relationships cover the traditional linkages between entities belonging to the
same SC, i.e. the interactions between suppliers and customers. Although, creating
value by offering the right products or services to a final customers is a common
objective across a SC, the different echelons of the SC may have conflicting objectives.
Addressing such conflicting objectives constitutes one of the main interests of the
literature on SCM. An example of conflicting objectives is the lead time of the orders
that a retailer demands from a manufacturer. Shorter lead times will impact positively
on the operations of the retailer (e.g. reduction of stocks, operations flexibility), while
the manufacturer will face more restricted operations. Another example is the price
that a manufacturer demands for the items that it sells to the retailer. Higher prices
may increase the profit of the manufacturer, while they impact negatively on the profit
of the retailer.
A manufacturer should make two important decisions that may affect its relations
with retailers. First, the manufacturer should make decisions that exploit the particu-
larities of the demands of the retailers. Specifically, the demands may differ in terms
of value, urgency, quality, etc., hence the manufacturer can capture larger surpluses
by offering items adapted to the expectations of each retailer. consider the case of
a publisher (manufacturer) that receives two types of orders: best-sellers, which are
characterized by a high rotation, and regular books, for which orders are less demand-
ing in terms of delivery times and volumes. The publisher can ensure quick delivery
for the best-sellers, but given the high demand for best-sellers at bookstores, the will-
ingness of bookstores to pay higher prices for quick delivery of such books is higher
than for the regular books. Thus, the publisher can charge a premium for the best-
sellers. Second, the manufacturer should fulfill its agreement with the retailers ensure
that the expectations of the retailers are effectively met. Once the manufacturer defines
its offer, its priority should be to meet the retailer expectations. This results in stronger
loyalty of the retailers, and consequently, it may lead to a competitive advantage for
the manufacturer. Thus, the publisher plans its operations in order to maximize its
revenue while taking into account the promised quantity and delivery times agreed
with a bookstore.
4 1. Introduction
1.3 Scope of the Thesis
Taking an SCM perspective, the main objective of this thesis is to study how firms
should plan their operations when taking into account the relations with agents of its
own supply chain or entities belonging to other SCs. We focus on operations planning
based on the following observations:
• Despite the progress in the subject of SCM, there still exist gaps between prac-
tice and the theoretical models for addressing the interaction among firms. For
example, the benefits of collaboration are largely discussed in the literature, but
little research focuses on how to implement horizontal agreements in practice.
We expect to bring the collaboration to real environments through providing
frameworks that help firms to simultaneously plan their operations in collabo-
rative initiatives. We observe the same gap in competitive environments. Many
works address the relationship of competition from a pure microeconomics
point of view, but few of them model in detail the operations of the firms.
• Even though a well structured relationship at the strategic level or at the tactical
level may show a clear equilibrium between firms in the long term, the imple-
mentation and evolution of a decision will depend on the results of a firm in
the short term. For instance, a group of firms can ensure the reduction of its
operational costs by working together in the long term, but if each firm cannot
perceive reduced costs in the short term, the willingness to continue working
together may be weak.
• A firm should coordinate the decisions of its different departments in its op-
erations planning. For example, the marketing department decides the prices
and quantities of items in order to compete with other firms, but verifying the
costs of making available such offer requires coordination with the operations
department. So, making an offer has to be studied by both departments.
Our goal is to lessen this gap by providing models that help firms to plan their op-
erations in a collaborative environment, both competitive and non-competitive. Since
we focus on the operations of the firms, we utilize quantitative approaches based on
Operations Management and Operations Research, such as Mathematical Program-
ming, Markov Decision Process (MDP) and Simulation. The results of our analytical
models allow us to propose managerial insights that can enlighten and promote the
collaborative actions between firms. Further, our results can be used by managers and
researchers in order to understand the effects of competition on the operations of a
firm. Also, we show how a firm can increase its revenues by differentiating between
the expectations in terms of price and delivery time of its customers.
This thesis is divided into three parts, each of them covering a different aspect
of the vertical and horizontal relationships in SCs. In the first part, our objective is
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to provide a general framework for pooling operations between firms. We propose
analytical models for implementing horizontal collaboration between different SCs.
The second part addresses the competitive relationships between SCs. Specifically,
our aim is to provide an analytical model that addresses simultaneously the pricing
decisions and the operational planning. In the third part, our goal is to provide algo-
rithms for solving the problem of a manufacturer that must decide whether to accept
or reject orders from retailers. Explicitly we consider a vertical relationship in which
a manufacturer offers different lead times and prices to the retailers.
1.3.1 Fairness in Operations Pooling
In this part of the thesis, we focus on horizontal collaboration initiatives in which two
firms pool their operations. These firms play similar roles in different SCs, and they
point to markets that are mutually exclusive (non competitors).
The motivation of this study is born from the fact that independent firms may
benefit from collaborative alliances by reducing their costs and risks. Particularly in
operations, different firms can gain from economies of scale by pooling their produc-
tion resources. We summarize the core idea of this part of the thesis in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1: Fainess in Operations Pooling.
Even though there may be a significant reduction of the overall cost, the success of
a partnership may depend on the fairness of the agreement. With this in mind, the firms
can utilize transfer payments to balance the benefit allocation. The implementation
of such payments, however, could be difficult in practice, because of the presence of
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legal constraints or additional contracts that make such agreements more complicated.
Therefore, the partners should jointly plan operations taking into account the trade-off
between efficiency and fairness.
In the problem that we study, we model the operations of the firms as a Capacitated
Lot Sizing Problem (CLSP). The firms need to agree on a collaboration scheme before
the operations are carried out. Once demands are realized, the CLSP is used for jointly
planning the operations of the firms.
We propose a novel methodology to guide joint operations based on Rawls’ theory
of justice, in which we prioritize improving the firm that tends to benefit less from the
collaboration. We show that our proposed methodology is effective in reducing the in-
equalities in the results of the partners while the efficiency is not significantly affected.
Moreover, when firms make the agreement under uncertainty, our methodology has a
positive impact on reducing the risk of the firms. In particular, our proposed method-
ology outperforms other collaboration schemes in terms of balancing risk, efficiency
and fairness.
1.3.2 Pricing and Operations Planning Under Competition
Here, we study the horizontal relationship between two firms that produce items which
are offered to the same retailers or customers (see Figure1.2). The motivation for this
study lies in the fact that the pricing decisions that a firm makes with the aim to
compete with its opponents are mutually linked to the operations planning of the firm
and its opponents.
Again, we assume that the operations of the firms are modeled as a Lot Sizing
Problem (LSP). In terms of the pricing decisions of the firms, we assume that each
firm sets a unit selling price for each period of production, and there is a discrete set
of prices that a firm can choose from for each period. Furthermore, we assume that
the pricing decisions can influence the demands, i.e. demands are price sensitive.
In contrast to the problem studied for horizontal collaboration agreements, here
each firm makes its own operations planning. Nevertheless, such planning should
take into account its own pricing decisions and the prices chosen by its opponent.
Hence, the pricing decisions and the operations planning of the firms correspond to a
Nash Equilibrium (NE).
Given that the LSP is a discrete problem and each firm chooses prices from discrete
sets, the computational effort required to calculate a NE may be large when the plan-
ning horizon reaches a certain length. We propose a framework consisting of Mixed
Integer Programming formulations that provides a NE. This framework reduces the
computational time by characterizing pricing strategies that firms will potentially use
at equilibrium.
Our numerical results provide new managerial insights about the sensitivity of the
pricing decisions to changes in the characteristics of the firms, such as the level of
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Figure 1.2: Pricing and Operations Planning Under Competition.
substitution between their items and the seasonal effects of the demands. When the
operations of the firms have capacity constraints, i.e. when we model the operations
as a CLSP, increasing the production capacity may be self-defeating for the firms.
1.3.3 Planning Operations for Revenue Maximization Under Lead
Time Constraints
In this part of the thesis we study how the operations of a firm should be adapted
to the prices and lead times promised downstream in the SC. In particular, our study
is motivated by the case of a firm manufacturing industrial equipment that faces two
types of demand. On the one hand there are the so-called regular orders for installation
or refurbishing of existing facilities, these orders have a relatively long lead time. On
the other hand there are urgent orders mostly related to spare parts required when a
facility has a breakdown. The delay in such a case is much shorter but higher margins
can be obtained.
We study the order acceptance problem for a firm that serves two classes of de-
mand over an infinite horizon. The firm has to decide whether to accept a regular
order (or equivalently how much capacity to set aside for urgent orders) in order to
maximize its profit, as we show in Figure 1.3. We formulate this problem as a multi-
dimensional MDP.
Given that solving the problem through the MDP formulation may require a large
computational effort, we propose a family of approximate formulations to reduce the
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Figure 1.3: Planning Operations for Revenue Maximization Under Lead Time Constraints.
dimension of the state space via aggregation. Moreover, the aggregated formulation
provides bounds for the profit associated with the optimal order acceptance policy.
1.4 Outline of the Thesis
In Chapter 2 we study the operations pooling between SCs. We give special attention
to the definition and characterization of the fairness of a collaboration agreement,
which is the key for the success of the collaboration. Chapter 2 is based on Lamas and
Chevalier (2013).
In Chapter 3 we continue studying horizontal relationships between SCs, but now
we focus on the competition between different SCs. Here, we explain the linkage
between the pricing decisions and the operations planning of the firms in competitive
environments.
In Chapter 4, we describe the operations planning of a manufacturer that aims to
maximize revenues when there are lead time constraints. The main focus of the chap-
ter is to provide heuristic methods for making capacity allocation decisions quickly.
This chapter is based on Chevalier et al. (2015).
Finally in Chapter 5 we present the main conclusions and contribution of this
thesis. Also, we provide some ideas for the extensions of this thesis for future research.
Chapter 2
Fairness in Operations Pooling
2.1 Introduction
This work is motivated by the operations of two manufacturers that produce LCD
panels. As the panel types have similar technical specifications, the manufacturers
can gain from the economies of scale that arise from utilizing interchangeably their
production lines. For instance, if a line has slack capacity in a production period, the
full production of another firm in this period can be allocated to this line, so only one
of the lines is active, and the manufacturers reduce their total set-up costs. Further, a
manufacturer can utilize the capacity slack of another line to produce panels as late
(early) as possible, in such way its total holding (backordering) cost is reduced.
Although pooling operations may bring significant gains to the manufacturers,
there exist some impediments for setting up this initiative. Such impediments are re-
lated to the conflicting objectives between the manufacturers. We can say that a stress
between partners arises naturally from operations pooling, because once the manu-
facturers decide to pool their operations, they will compete for utilizing the common
production resources. So, the manufacturers should reach a consensus on how to
jointly plan their operations, otherwise, the success of the operations pooling may be
in jeopardy. The consensus has to be materialized as an agreement between manufac-
turers in which the allocation of resources takes the individual interests of each partner
into account.
Given that future partners will share the benefits of the operations pooling, larger
benefits of the association increase the attractiveness of sharing. In other words, as
setting up the operations pooling requires a significant effort by the future partners,
larger global gains make it more likely to surpass such efforts. Hence, when setting up
the agreement, one of the essential challenges is to answer the question: ‘How do we
expand the pie of benefits between collaborative parties?’(Jap, 1999). We denominate
efficiency as the measure of the overall benefit achieved through pooling operations.
Another aspect that partners should address in their agreement is the allocation of
the gains. Reaching a consensus on how to divide the gains is crucial for prevent-
ing conflicts between partners. In this sense, the future partners expect to reach an
agreement in which the allocation of gains is fair. The notion of fairness may be the
key element of the success of the operations pooling. Although the relevant role of
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fairness in alliances is widely discussed in the literature, there are multiple defini-
tions for such notion, see e.g. Nash (1950a), Rawls (1971), Kalai and Smorodinsky
(1975), Camerer and Thaler (2010), Bertsimas et al. (2011). Several behavioral ex-
periments illustrated that partners might prefer a self-destructing behavior to unfair
agreements. The partners can desist from working together, even though each of them
could improve its performance compared to the stand-alone situation. An example is
the experiment of the ultimatum game, in which a proposer offers some allocation of
money between himself and a responder, who can decide to accept it or not. Con-
trary to the expected rational behavior, if the offered proportion is strictly positive,
but smaller than a certain value, the responder tends to reject the offer (Camerer and
Thaler, 2010, Jap, 2001). Motivated by this behavior, recent literature shows that the
expectations of participants to economic relations are complex, and they also involve
the relative results between firms.
Maximizing efficiency while meeting fairness is a challenging goal for the agree-
ment between future partners. The difficulty to reach such goal is impacted by the
existence or not of transfer payments between partners. If utility can be transferred
between partners through monetary payments, the feasibility of the maximum effi-
ciency is independent of the allocation of gains. Indeed, the partners can always
implement the decision that leads the maximum efficiency, and then determine the
adequate payments that meet the fairness criteria. Nevertheless, firms are generally
reluctant to transfer payments, because the collaboration takes into account several
intangible costs (for example, holding and back-ordering costs) which are difficult to
evaluate even when the production plan is carried out in isolation. Moreover, the re-
quirements of contracts between partners and/or the presence of legal restrictions are
additional impediments for the implementation of transfer payments. This has been
widely reported in the literature, see e.g. Granot and Sosic (2005), Makadok (2010).
In the absence of such payments, implementing the globally optimal operations may
be incompatible with the fairness conditions established in the agreement. Thus a
trade-off exists between the fairness and the efficiency dimensions of the agreement.
Given that the operations will directly determine the shares of the benefits when pay-
ments are not possible, the management of operations is crucial for dealing with such
trade-off.
Further, the agreement should also address the fact that the partners must be suffi-
ciently confident in advance in the convenience of the operations pooling. Thus, one
more aspect that may influence the success of the operations pooling is the risk of the
agreement. This risk arises from the uncertainty faced by the firms when making the
agreement. For example, the manufacturers of LCD panels will set the rules for their
operations pooling before they have a full information of their future demands. So,
although manufacturers are interested in minimizing their costs, each of them expects
also to control the variability of its cost. Thus, controlling the risk resulting from the
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operations pooling helps to prevent conflicts between partners.
Given the conditions that facilitate a consensus on how to pool operations: fair-
ness, risk reduction and absence of transfer payments, we propose a methodology for
jointly planning operations in order to overcome such hurdles. Our methodology is
characterized as follows. On the one hand, we model the production line of each
manufacturer as a Capacitated Lot Sizing problem (CLSP), a well-known production-
inventory problem that establishes when and how much to produce in order to mini-
mize set-up, production, holding and back-ordering costs (see Wolsey (1995), Karimi
et al. (2003), Brahimi et al. (2006) for an extended literature review of this prob-
lem). The formulation of the CLSP is consistent with the practical case that motivates
our work, where the manufacturers can gain from the economies of scale resulting
from pooling operations. On the other hand, we address the conflicting objectives of
the manufacturers by proposing agreements inspired on the Rawlsian notion of fair-
ness, i.e., the agreement between partners prioritizes the improvement the partner that
is least well off (Rawls, 1971). Moreover, we measure the effect of the proposed
methodology on the risk of each firm in comparison to other types of agreements.
Our work contributes to the scientific discussion by providing a methodology for
operations pooling that combines games or group decisions, multi-criteria approaches
and production-inventory problems. In general, the traditional approaches for oper-
ations pooling assume that the willingness to participate on a partnership initiative
depends solely on the individual rationality of the firms (i.e. the operations pooling
does not hurt the performance of any partner). Although some approaches assume
that partners may prefer fair agreements, those approaches also assume the possibility
of transfer payments between partners. We extend traditional approaches for pooling
operations by both including a sophisticated notion of fairness and lifting the transfer
payments assumption. We also provide a novel analysis for the link between fair-
ness and risk of the operations. Therefore, our methodology corresponds better to the
interest of firms in real applications.
From a managerial point of view, this research may inspire the implementation
of operations pooling in real environments, because the proposed methodology helps
the firms to jump hurdles for collaboration (e.g. fairness, risk or absence of transfer
payments). So, we contribute to shorten the gap between the theory of operations
pooling model and the implementation of collaborative practices in practice.
The Chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2.2 we highlight the literature
related to our research. Section 2.3 describes the problem of firms when they jointly
plan their operations. In Section 2.4 we present and discuss the measure and criteria
for the efficiency, the fairness and the risk of a collaborative agreement. In Section 2.5
we introduce schemes leading to decisions that make a balance between the differ-
ent dimensions of a collaboration problem. We introduce our numerical analysis in
Section 2.6 and we present the main conclusions of this Chapter in Section 2.7.
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2.2 Literature Review
The initiative of pooling operations between firms corresponds to what has been clas-
sified as a horizontal collaboration. In general, horizontal collaborations establish
joint activities between different supply chains, enabling similar parties to collabo-
rate on a particular business function (Stadtler, 2009, Erhum and Keskinocak, 2007).
There is another type of collaboration in supply chains, the vertical collaboration,
which focuses on a single supply chain and it is out of the scope of our work. In prac-
tice, horizontal collaborations may be advantageous to the partners, however there are
difficulties in implementing it.
We start by discussing the advantages of the horizontal collaboration. Corbett
and de Groote (2000) and Simatupang and Sridharan (2002) suggest that the essential
advantages lie in the improvements in comparison to an initial solution (stand-alone
situation). According to Crujissen et al. (2007), such improvements arise from re-
ducing the costs of operations and increasing the productivity of the firms. Note that,
there may be other advantages such as improving the service level (lead times, ge-
ographical coverage, reliability, etc.) and better competitive position of the firms in
their markets, however, these are in general secondary objectives to the cost reduction.
For such reason, our study focuses on the effect of collaboration on the costs of the
firms.
We continue by describing the impediments for implementing horizontal collabo-
rations. The main difficulty in implementing such practice is the division of the gains
(Crujissen et al., 2007). Brandenburgger and Nalebuff (1996) emphasize that collab-
orations should prioritize the maximization of the overall benefit of the companies,
but it is essential to take into account that the different parties will compete for such
gains. To handle the stress resulting from such competition, the partners must per-
ceive that the collaborative agreement is fair. Indeed, Bertsimas et al. (2011) suggest
that in many environments fairness is more important than optimality. Further, the au-
thors propose that when different parties collaborate, a decision may not be practically
implementable, because some of the parties might consider it ‘unfair’.
Although the relevance of fairness is clear in collaboration, the meaning of such
concept is ambiguous and vastly discussed in the literature. Nevertheless, most of
the existing notions of fairness compare the relative results achieved by the partners.
In this line, Camerer and Thaler (2010) suggest that participants do not care about
the other’s welfare per se, but desire some type of equity. Thus, participants may
even prefer self destructing behaviour to unfair collaborations. In order to implement
such notion of fairness, Fishburn and Sarin (1994), Boiney (1995), Brams and Taylor
(1995) utilize the concept of equity, which establishes that each partner must receive
the same proportion of the gain resulting from collaboration. Alternatively, many
authors follow the Rawlsian notion of fairness (Rawls, 1971), in which the collabo-
ration focuses efforts to the party that is least well off. With the aim of establishing
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common criteria for collaborative agreements, Nash (1950a) proposes an axiomatic
characterization of fairness, which is extended to more general problems by Kalai and
Smorodinsky (1975) and Kalai (1977). Note that, the cost allocations derived from
the axiomatic characterization of Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) and Kalai (1977) is
of the Rawlsian type. However, no notion in the literature satisfies simultaneously the
whole set of fairness axioms. Any collaborative initiative should, therefore, be based
on a notion that covers the maximum number of axioms. In this work, we are devoted
of the axiomatic characterization proposed Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) and Kalai
(1977), because the Rawlsian notion of fairness is consistent with the expectations of
partners in business environments (Kumar, 1996).
The existing formulations for addressing fairness in collaboration can be divided
into two categories depending on the existence, or not, of transfer payments between
the firms. When such payments are possible, the problem of collaboration can be
divided in two stages: first, the firms make decisions in order to achieve global op-
timality; based on such decisions, the resulting benefits are divided between firms.
Note that, the globally optimal decision is always feasible, since transfer payments
lead to an equilibrium between the interests of the different parties. The problem of
collaboration with transfer payments is largely studied in the literature of coopera-
tive games with transferable utility (TU-game), see e.g. von Neumann and Morgen-
stern (1943), Shapley (1959), Gillies (1959), Myerson (1991). In the same line, but
more related to our work, Fiestras-Janeiro et al. (2011) review the most relevant ap-
proaches dealing with collaboration in the context of production-inventory problems.
A first group of such approaches focuses on the case where demand is continuous
and constant, so that firms collaborate in an economic order quantity (EOQ) envi-
ronment. Meca et al. (2004), Federgruen and Zheng (1992), Anily and Haviv (2007)
deal with the EOQ problem with multiple firms. The authors propose a formulation,
in which once the firms minimize their joint inventory cost, the costs are allocated
between firms by utilizing a game theory approach. Another group of approaches fo-
cuses on dynamic demand problems, whose game theory formulations are known as
production-inventory games. Guardiola et al. (2009) deal with this type of problem,
but in contrast to our case, their problem ignores the fixed ordering costs, so the anal-
ysis omits the economies of scale resulting from collaboration. van den Heuvel et al.
(2007) study what they call Economic-lot sizing game, in which the operations of the
firms involve fixed ordering costs. The authors model the operations as an Uncapci-
tated Lot-sizing problem, but the game associated to the cost allocation between firms
has a non-linear cost structure caused by the presence of such costs. Sambasivan and
Yahya (2005), Drechsel (2010), Drechsel and Kimms (2011) extend the problem to its
capacitated version. Sambasivan and Yahya (2005) proposes a Lagrangean relaxation
based heuristic to solve the problem, but the authors do not address the allocation of
costs between firms. Drechsel (2010) addresses the allocation problem through a max-
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min formulation such that the difference between the maximum relative reduction of
costs of the firms is minimized. This work is in many aspects close to this current
investigation, but there are two essential differences: (i) their formulation considers
transfer payments between firms, and (ii) their performance measurement is different.
There are practical difficulties related to collaborations that arise in both calcu-
lating the exact benefits of each firm (consequently difficulties on determining the
amount of side payments) and possible legal restrictions (Granot and Sosic, 2005).
Moreover, when two competitors decide to collaborate, their transfer payments are
likely to be reviewed by the antitrust authority. Thus the absence of such payments
facilitates such agreements. The problem of collaboration in the absence of payments
is studied in the literature as non-transferable utility games (NTU-game), see e.g. Au-
mann (1961), Myerson (1991), Borm et al. (1992). The main difference in comparison
to the TU-games lies in the fact that the operational decisions of the firms directly de-
termine the allocation of gains. Then, if the firms make agreements taking the fairness
dimension into account, the efficiency of the collaboration in the NTU-games is poten-
tially reduced in comparison to the TU-games (Jain and Mahdian, 2007). Bertsimas
et al. (2011) study the inefficiency in NTU-games when fairness considerations are
introduced. The authors propose upper bounds for such inefficiency under different
notions of fairness. However, the bounds are only valid for convex utility sets, we try
in this article to determine decision rules that implement different notion of fairness in
the framework of production planning where the utility set is typically not convex. In
the same vein, Drechsel (2010), Frisk et al. (2010) propose a cost allocation method-
ology for the operations of firms based on the Rawlsian notion of fairness. In their
case the absence of transfer payments has only a limited impact on the efficiency of
the decision, because they use a linear model for operations.
As we discuss in Section 2.1, the collaboration may have an effect on the risk of
the operations. Similar to fairness, risk is a concept widely discussed in the literature,
but it also has multiple definitions. One of the most utilized measures of risk is the
value at risk, however, Artzner et al. (1999) show the weakness of such measure.
Alternatively, the authors introduce an axiomatic characterization for risk measures.
The risk measures satisfying such axioms are classified as coherent. Rockafellar and
Uryasev (2000) introduce a coherent risk measure known as conditional value at risk.
Such measure has become common in the literature of risk and in real life applications,
therefore, we utilize it for measuring the risk of the collaboration between firms.
Our work contributes to the scarce literature on horizontal collaboration in opera-
tions by proposing a methodology that prioritizes the fairness of the agreement, whose
implementability is independent of the existence of transfer payments between firms.
Furthermore, although there are operations management approaches for controlling
the conditional value at risk (Ahmed et al., 2007, Choi and Ruszczynski, 2008, Chen
et al., 2009), to the best of our knowledge, our work represents the first study including
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risk in operations when multiple firms pool their production resources.
2.3 Problem Description
Consider two self-interested and risk-averse firms, Firm 1 and Firm 2, that can operate
interchangeably their production lines. The firms aim to jointly plan their production
lines in order to take advantages of potential costs savings. Thus, the firms must agree
on the rules that will govern their joint operations.
When setting up the agreement, the firms spend time and resources in the bar-
gaining process, building trust, adapting operations, etc. Therefore, if the advantages
related to the agreement do not remain valid in the long run, such effort may not
be worthwhile. Consequently, we focus on long-term agreements, where the firms
learn gradually their demands for a certain interval of time, we will call this interval
a planning block. Thereby, firms plan operations repeatedly as reliable information of
demand becomes available for a planning block. Thus, the decision in each planning
block depends on the realization of demand for that interval. We say that D ∈ R2×T
represents the random variables of the demands faced by the firms in each planning
block, where T is the number of periods in a planning block. Also, we say that d is a
realization of D.
The set of rules upon which the firms will jointly plan operations for a planning
block will be called a collaboration scheme. Once the firms carry out the planned op-
erations for a production block, they make a new joint plan for the next block based on
the same scheme. Note that, determining a collaboration scheme is the main decision
involved in the agreement.
In the reminder of this section, we explain the different aspects of the problem of
setting a collaboration scheme.
2.3.1 Operations
We model the operations of each line during a planning block as a CLSP. Thus, there
is a holding cost for units produced in advance of demand and a back-order cost for
units produced late. Also, there are fixed production costs each period a production
line is used and a unit production cost. Finally, we suppose that demand is known with
enough accuracy to build a reliable production plan for a planning block consisting of
T periods in advance. The parameters of the problem are d, f , p,h,b,CAP ∈ R2×T ,
where
di,t : demand faced by firm i for period t
fi,t : fixed production cost for the production line of firm i in period t
pi,t : unit production cost of firms i’s line in period t
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hi,t : unit storage cost of firm i in period t
bi,t : unit back-ordering cost of firm i in period t
CAPi,t : production capacity of firm i’s line in period t
The decision variables of the problem are x∈R2×2×T , s,w∈R2×T and y∈{0,1}2×T
, where
xi, j,t : amount produced on firm j’s line in period t, which is destined to firm i.
yi,t : 1 if firm i’s production line is in use during period t; 0 otherwise.
si,t : stock level of firm i at the end of period t.
wi,t : back-ordered units of firm i at the end of period t.
We can model the joint operations of the production lines in a planning block by
the following constraints.
si,t−1+ xi,1,t + xi,2,t +wi,t = di,t + si,t +wi,t−1 ∀t = 1, ..,T ; i = 1,2 (2.1)
x1,i+ x2,i ≤CAPi · yTi ∀i = 1,2 (2.2)
x,w,s≥ 0,y ∈ {0,1}. (2.3)
Constraint (2.1) establishes the product flow conservation and constraint (2.2) is
the capacity restriction in each period.
In the rest of the work, we denote by Xd to the set that contains all the planning
decisions x that satisfy constraints (2.1) - (2.3) when the demand for a planning block
corresponds to d.
2.3.2 Cost allocation
Given that the firms are self-interested, they should agree on a collaboration scheme
that addresses their individual objectives. In this sense, the imputation of costs plays
an important role in planning the operations pooling. Moreover, the aim of the agree-
ment we are studying is to pool the production activities while keeping the firms as
independent as possible. We reflect this in our model through the following assump-
tions:
• each firm supports the holding and back-ordering costs for its products,
• the fixed production costs are supported by the owner of the production line,
independently of the firm for whom the products are made,
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• for the unit production costs we consider two cases, either these costs are sup-
ported by the owner of the line, independently of the product, or this cost is
supported by the firm for whom the product is made. The first case would cor-
respond to a situation where the production costs are difficult to isolate (work-
force drawn from the common pool of the plant, utilities where it might not be
easy to determine the real cost of steam, energy, etc.). The second case will
be more adequate if the direct production costs for the jointly operated line are
easily determined. The general idea is that our methodology is flexible in terms
of the firms’ imputation of unit production costs.
Based on our cost imputation assumptions, the cost of Firm i is f Ti ·yi+ pTi ·(xi,1+
xi,2)+ hTi · si + bTi ·wi, when the unit production costs are supported by the owner of
the line, and f Ti · yi + pTi · xi,i + pTj · xi, j + hTi · si + bTi ·wi, when the unit production
costs supported by the firm for whom the product is made. In both cases, we say that
the function Cd(x) provides the pair (Cd,1(x),Cd,2(x)), which corresponds to the cost
allocated to each firm when x∈Xd is implemented and the demand is d, (note that, the
variables y, s and u are not required for computing the costs of the firms, because we
can deduce them from x and d). In the rest of the work, we utilize Cd ∈ R2 to denote
the set of all cost allocations that can be obtained from the setXd , when the demand
in the planning block corresponds to d, i.e. , Cd = {(C1,C2) : C1 = Cd,1(x)∧C2 =
Cd,2(x)∧ x ∈Xd}
2.3.3 Bargaining
As we mentioned earlier, the firms should decide a collaboration scheme that will rule
their joint operations. Given that future partners will compete for using their shared
resources, there may be a conflict between the individual objectives of the firms. So,
the success of the operations pooling depends on how the collaboration scheme agreed
by the firms balances these objectives.
The basic motivation of firms when entering to a partnership is to improve its
situation with respect to working in isolation. So, the firms should agree on a scheme
that minimizes the joint costs of the firms. We call this dimension of the operations
pooling efficiency.
Nevertheless, the conflict in operations pooling may depend on other factors. We
explain this by an example. Let us assume that the firms can choose between three
collaboration schemes. The common costs resulting from implementing such schemes
are $100, $70 and $60. At first sight, the third scheme seems to be the most interesting
for the firms. However, each firm will be more interested in the scheme that minimizes
its own cost, which may not be the third scheme. Let us assume that the allocation
of costs is $45 for Firm 1 and $55 for Firm 2 in the first scheme, $60 for Firm 1
and $10 for Firm 2 for the second scheme, and $10 for Firm 1 and $50 for Firm
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2 for the third scheme. Given such allocations, Firm 1 may be more interested in
implementing the third scheme, but Firm 2 may be more interested in the second
scheme. Moreover, implementing scheme 2 and scheme 3 are more efficient than
scheme 1, but the allocation of costs is unbalanced between between firms, this could
make a firm to dismiss the option of pooling operations.
So, another dimension of operations pooling is related to the apprehensions of the
firms with respect to the allocation of costs. The firms should agree on a collaboration
scheme with a consensus on such allocation. This consensus will mean that each firm
perceives the allocation of costs as fair. This dimension of the problem is what we call
fairness.
Another aspect of operations pooling is uncertainty. As the firms agree on a
scheme with no certainty about their future demands, the operations of each firms are
subject to risk. Given that the firms are risk-averse, each of them expects to agree on
a collaboration scheme that controls its risk derived from jointly planning operations.
In the next section, we propose how to model the aspects of the bargaining problem
associated to the problem of jointly planning operations.
2.4 Evaluation Criteria for a Collaboration Scheme
Aiming to address the conflicting objectives of future partners, we model the problem
of agreeing on a collaboration scheme as a bargaining problem. In order to character-
ize the problem we utilize the following definition:
Definition 2.1. Given the realization of demand d, the set X (d) and the function
of costs Cd(x), let Cod ∈ R2 be the minimum costs that firms can achieve by working
separately, i.e, Cod,i = min{Cd,i(x) | xi j = 0,∀i 6= j∧ x ∈X (d)}.
We characterize the bargaining problem by the pair (Cd ,Cod), i.e. given the realized
demand for the planning block, the firms make decisions considering their individual
cost functions and the feasible solutions for such demand (which are implicit in Cd),
and the opportunity cost of working separately. Based on this characterization, we
give the following definition for a collaboration scheme:
Definition 2.2. Given the bargaining problem (Cd ,Cod), let C
F(Cd ,Cod) ∈ R2 be the
allocation of costs derived from implementing collaboration scheme F.
In the reminder of this section, we discuss the measures and criteria for determin-
ing the efficiency, the fairness and the risk related to cost incurred by the partners in a
collaboration scheme to pool operations.
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2.4.1 Efficiency Measures
Before discussing our proposed efficiency measures, let us introduce a definition to
facilitate the presentation of our propositions.
Definition 2.3. Given the realization of demand d, the set X (d) and the function of
costs Cd(x), let C∗d ∈ R be the minimum joint cost that firms can achieve by pooling
operations, i.e., C∗d = min{Cd,1(x)+Cd,2(x) | x ∈Xd}.
On the one hand, C∗d constitutes a benchmark for the joint costs derived from
implementing a collaboration scheme, because it corresponds to the minimum of the
sum of the costs of the firms when pooling operations during a planning block when
the realized demand is d. On the other hand, Cod represents the opportunity cost of
the operations pooling, because if the firms discard the operations pooling, then they
carry out their production by working separately. Based on such indicators, a natural
benchmark for measuring the efficiency of collaboration scheme F is as follows:
εF = ED
[
CF(Cd ,Cod)− (Cod,1+Cod,2)
C∗d − (Cod,1+Cod,2)
]
. (2.4)
In other words, collaboration scheme F is efficient if its associated expected cost
reduction is similar to the maximum achievable reduction, i.e., εF = 1.
2.4.2 Fairness Criteria
A set of axioms has become common in the literature of bargaining problems, where
each of them represents some dimension of fairness. Based on the descriptions on
Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975), Kalai (1977) and Bertsimas et al. (2011), we give a
formal definition of such axioms for the studied problem.
The satisfaction of the following axioms in a planning block can be extrapolated
to the whole horizon of the operations pooling. This is a consequence of the indepen-
dence between the decisions of the different planning blocks. Thus, if a collaboration
scheme meets an axiom in a planning block, we say that the operations pooling meets
such axiom.
Axiom 2.1. Individual Rationality. Collaboration scheme F is individual rational if
each firm reduces its cost compared with its situation in the absence of the agreement,
i.e.
CF(Cd ,Cod)≤Cod . (2.5)
This axiom establishes that no firm is hurt by the implementation of the operations
pooling.
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Axiom 2.2. Pareto-optimality. Collaboration scheme F is pareto-optimal if no firm
can be made better off without making another firm worse off, i.e. 6 ∃C ∈ Cd such that
C ≤CF(Cd ,Cod) and C 6=CF(Cd ,Cod).
The pareto-optimality imposes that any joint planning decision must avoid un-
necessary losses for the firms. Clearly, the planning that minimizes the sum of the
costs of the firms meets this criterion, but such planning may be incompatible with
other axioms of fairness when transfer payments are not allowed (for example Axiom
2.1). In such case, when a collaboration scheme ensures other axioms of fairness, the
pareto-optimality discriminates favourably towards most efficient solutions.
Axiom 2.3. Symmetry. Let T : R2 → R2 be the permutation operator defined by
T ((a1,a2)) = (a2,a1). Then, T (CF(Cd ,Cod)) =C
F(T (Cd),T (Cod)).
The symmetry implies that the fair planning decisions cannot be affected by how
the firms are named. Consequently, the axiom imposes that firms with identical char-
acteristics should get identical outcomes.
Axiom 2.4. Invariance with respect to affine transformations of costs. Let A : R2→R2
be an affine operator defined by A(a1,a2) = (A1(a1),A2(a2)), with Ai(a) = αi ·a+βi
and αi ≥ 0. Then A(CF(Cd ,Cod)) =CF(A(Cd),A(Cod)).
This axiom establishes that the cost allocation must be invariant to the way that
each firm measures the cost of its operations. Nevertheless, there are some criticisms
to the pertinence of this axiom in practice. Nydegger and Owen (1974) carried out
experiments which show that Axiom 2.4 is frequently violated by subjects. Nydeg-
ger and Owen (1974) explain this phenomenon by the fact that subjects, whenever
possible, try to effect an interpersonal comparison of utility. Thereby, Kalai (1977)
proposes a weak version of Axiom 2.4, which is known as homogeneity.
Axiom 2.5. Homogeneity. Let H : R2→ R2 be the homogeneity operator defined by
H(h1,h2) = (α ·h1,α ·h2) and α≥ 0. Then H(CF(Cd ,Cod)) =CF(H(Cd),H(Cod)).
The homogeneity requires that the planning decisions remain identical if the cost
of the firms are linearly modified by the same factor. Thereby, the planning decisions
of the firms are independent of the unit used to measure the costs. This axiom sim-
plifies Axiom 2.4 (both costs should be modified by the same factor), but it eases the
comparison between firms since the measure of the costs is identical for the firms.
Axiom 2.6. Independence of irrelevant alternatives. If Cd ⊆C ′d and CF(C ′d ,Cod)∈Cd ,
then CF(Cd ,Cod) =C
F(C ′d ,C
o
d).
This axiom states that preferring a planning decision over another one is indepen-
dent of other available options. Nevertheless, there are objections to this axiom in the
literature (see Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975)), which leads to the following alternative
axiom.
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Axiom 2.7. Monotonicity. Given the sets Cd and C ′d such that min{C1 | (C1,C2) ∈
Cd} = min{C1 | (C1,C2) ∈ C ′d}, if for any cost associated to the operations of Firm
1 the cost cost that Firm 2 can obtain simultaneously is smaller or equal in C ′d , then
CF2 (Cd ,C
o
d)≥CF2 (C ′d ,Cod).
The monotonicity establishes that if, for every cost resulting of the operations of
Firm 1, the minimum cost that Firm 2 can obtain simultaneously is reduced, then the
fair planning decision should imply a reduction of the cost of Firm 2.
The goal of any collaboration scheme should be the satisfaction of the described
axioms. Nevertheless, no scheme exists that simultaneously meets all of them (see
Nash (1950a) and Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) for more details). Aiming to cover
as many axioms as possible, a vast literature on fairness studies two approaches for im-
plementing collaborative initiatives. The first one is the proportional fairness approach
(Nash, 1950a), that leads to a cost allocation in which the percentage decrease in the
cost of one firm is larger than the percentage increase in cost of the other firm. This ap-
proach satisfies Axioms 2.1 - 2.6. Given the criticisms to Axiom 2.4 and Axiom 2.6 in
terms of their pertinence for comparing the relative results between firms, Kalai and
Smorodinsky (1975) proposes the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. The essence of this
second approach is derived from the Rawls’ theory of justice, in which the agreement
prioritizes the firm that is least well off. This approach satisfies Axioms 2.1 - 2.3, 2.5
and 2.7. The Rawlsian theory of justice fits well with the expectations of fairness of
partners in business environments. In such environments the success of the partner-
ship is based on building a trusting relationship, where the key is to treat the weaker
partner fairly (Kumar, 1996). So, the collaboration schemes that we propose in this
research are derived from the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.
An alternative to the axiomatic characterization of fairness is introduced by Fehr
and Schmidt (1999). The authors introduce an utility function to describe the pref-
erences of the partners. This utility of a partner is a parametric function of a firm’s
own and the imbalance between firms. We adapt the Fehr and Schmidt function to our
bargaining problem, so the utility per unit obtained by Firm i is as follows.
uFi (Cd ,C
o
d) =− cFd,i(Cd ,Cod)−βi · [cFj (Cd ,Cod)− cFi (Cd ,Cod)]+
− γi · [cFi (Cd ,Cod)− cFj (Cd ,Cod)]+,
(2.6)
where cFd (Cd ,C
o
d) ∈ R2 denotes the unit costs corresponding to CFd (Cd ,Cod), i.e.,
cFd,i(Cd ,C
o
d)=C
F
d,i(Cd ,C
o
d)/∑
T
t=1 di,t ; βi≥ 0 measures the impact of a disadvantageous
inequality on the utility of Firm i; γi ≥ 0 measure the loss from advantageous inequal-
ity. So, βi and γi measures the inequality aversion of a firm. The values of these
measures are constrained by two conditions. First, βi ≥ γi, i.e. negative deviations
from the reference outcome count more than positive deviations. Second, γi ≤ 1, on
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the contrary Firm i is prepared to throw away one dollar in order to reduce his advan-
tage relative to Firm j which seems very implausible.
In our problem, the demand is unknown when firms agree on the collaboration
scheme, so we propose the following indicator to compare the impact of the fairness
and the efficiency:
UFi = ED
[
uFi (Cd ,C
o
d) ·
T
∑
t=1
di,t
]
. (2.7)
Clearly, implementing operations pooling based on the Fehr and Schmidt function
may be difficult because such function is highly dependent on the capability of finding
the exact values of βi and γi. However, we can utilize indicator UFi for evaluating
the relative performance of collaboration schemes under different levels of inequality
perceptions. So, we can determine whether the operations pooling should be based on
one scheme or another according to the values of βi and γi.
2.4.3 Risk Measures
When future partners aim to address the risk of operations pooling, the first step is to
agree on the risk they would like to control. Since the demand in a planning block is
uncertain, the firms faces two types of risk: the market risk, which is inherent to the
demand; and the operational risk, which is related to the per unit cost resulting of the
production activities carried out to satisfy the demand. Since the firms cannot control
their market risk in the short term, the risk of operational pooling should isolate the
operational risk from the market risk. Thus, we propose that firms focus on their
average unit costs when measuring the risk of operations pooling.
The firms also have to reach a consensus on how to measure their risks. Artzner
et al. (1999) propose a set of axioms that a risk measure might have. If a risk mea-
sure satisfies such axioms, then it is called a coherent risk measure, this concept has
become common for problems of portfolio optimization. We adjust those axioms to
operations pooling. To this end, we say that the function ρ(F) ∈R2 measures the risk
of implementing collaboration scheme F , where ρi(F) is the risk of Firm i.
Axiom 2.8. Monotoniciy of risk. Given two collaboration schemes F and F ′, if
cFd,i(Cd ,C
o
d)≤ cF
′
d,i(Cd ,C
o
d) for any realization of the demand d, then ρi(F)≤ ρi(F ′).
This axiom establishes that if the unit cost of Firm i under scheme F is smaller than
under scheme F ′ for all the possible scenarios, then the risk of Firm i under scheme F
is smaller than under scheme F ′.
Axiom 2.9. Positive homogeneity. Given two collaboration schemes F and F ′, if
cF
′
i (Cd ,C
o
d)= k ·cFi (Cd ,Cod) for any realization of demand d, then ρi(F ′)= k ·ρi(F),∀k>
0.
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The positive homogeneity states that if the unit cost of Firm i resulting from
scheme F is doubled by scheme F ′, then the risk of Firm i derived from implementing
scheme F ′ is the double of the risk when implementing scheme F .
Axiom 2.10. Translation invariance. Given two collaboration schemes F and F ′, if
cF
′
i (Cd ,C
o
d) = k+ c
F
i (Cd ,C
o
d) for any realization d, then ρi(F
′) = k+ρi(F).
In general, the risk measure represents the amount of money that a firm has to add
to its position in order to make it acceptable.
Axiom 2.11. Risk subadditivity. Given three collaboration schemes F, F ′ and F ′′, if
the scheme F ′′ consists of utilizing F with a probability p and F ′ with a probability
1− p, then ρi(F ′′)≤ p ·ρi(F)+(1− p) ·ρi(F ′),∀i.
This axiom establishes that the risk of combining two schemes cannot get any
worse than the weighted sum of the two risks separately. This axiom is coherent
with the diversification principle commonly used in portfolio problems, however, such
principle has a limited compatibility with collaboration problems.
A widely used measure of risk in portfolio problems is the value at risk. This
measure computes a threshold value for a given probability level α, such that the unit
cost of a firm exceeds this value with a probability α. In the context of operations
pooling, we define the value at risk implementing collaboration scheme F as:
VaRFi (α) = inf
{
c ∈ R | P[cFd,i(Cd ,Cod)≤ c]≥ α} (2.8)
The value at risk satisfies Axioms 2.8 - 2.10, but it may not respect Axiom 2.11,
therefore, this indicator is not a coherent measure of risk. Another limitation of the
value at risk is that omits the impact of the costs exceeding the threshold value c. In
other words, the tail end of the distribution of costs is not assessed by this indicator.
Aiming to overcome the shortcomings of the value at risk, Rockafellar and Urya-
sev (2000) introduce the conditional value at risk. Although the formulation of this
measure is similar to the value at risk, the conditional value at risk computes the ex-
pected cost of the scenarios in the tail of the percentile. Moreover, this measure of risk
also satisfies the Axiom 2.11, therefore, it is a coherent risk measure. In the context
of operations pooling, we define the conditional when implementing scheme F as:
CVaRFi (α) = E
[
cFd,i(Cd ,C
o
d) | cFd,i(Cd ,Cod)≥VaRFi (α)
]
(2.9)
Both indicators, value at risk and conditional value at risk, may be useful for mea-
suring the risk in operations pooling. In particular, firms can utilize these measures to
control the fluctuations of the cost resulting from pooling operations.
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2.5 Collaboration Schemes
As we discussed in section 2.2, launching agreements thqt do not require transfer
payments is in general easier for the firms. But the absence of payments makes it
more complicated to combine efficiency and fairness. Indeed, efficient solutions may
violate some fairness criteria, in particular, individual rationality. Therefore, the firms
are searching for a collaboration scheme that meets fairness criteria, while avoiding to
loose too much efficiency.
In this section we propose two collaboration schemes, Max-min Normalized Sav-
ings Scheme (NS) and Min-max Unit Cost Scheme (UC). Both schemes are based on
the Rawlsian notion of fairness, i.e. their fundamental premise is to accept inequali-
ties on the allocation of costs only if such inequalities benefit the worst-off member
in society. Thus, Scheme NS and Scheme UC aim to improve the partner that is least
well off.
2.5.1 Individual Rationality Scheme
This scheme assumes that the individual rationality is a necessary condition for imple-
menting a collaborative initiative between partners. The partners minimize the global
cost subject to constraint 1.5. Thus, CIRd (Cd ,C
o
d) corresponds to the solution of the
following model.
min
{
C1+C2 |Ci(Cd ,Cod)≤Cod,i∀i = 1,2∧ (C1,C2) ∈ C (d)
}
. (2.10)
Even though this scheme is weak in terms of satisfying the discussed fairness
criteria, it is a good benchmark for other schemes, because it satisfies the minimum
conditions that makes the collaboration attractive for the firms (the collaboration does
not hurt partners).
2.5.2 Max-min Normalized Savings Scheme
In order to utilize an scale that is common for both firms, we measure the proportional
reduction of costs by the ratio between two values: (i) the reduction of costs with
respect to working in isolation, i.e. (Cod,i−CNSd,i (Cd ,Cod)) and (ii) the largest potential
reduction that a firm can achieve by implementing the operations pooling, i.e. (Cod,i−
C¯d,i), where C¯d,i = min{C1 |Ci ≤C∗d,i,∀i = 1,2∧ (C1,C2) ∈ Cd} (the minimum cost
that Firm i can achieve by implementing pooling while Individual Rationality Axiom
is satisfied). As we are in the line of the Rawlsian notion of fairness, the objective of
Scheme NS is to maximize the minimum ratio of cost reduction of the firms. Thus,
CNSd (Cd ,C
o
d) corresponds to the solution of the following model.
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max
{
φ | φ≤ C
o
d,i−Ci
Cod,i−C¯d,i
,∀i = 1,2∧ (C1,C2) ∈ C (d)
}
. (2.11)
Given that Cd is the mapping of the costs allocations resulting from Xd , we can
obtain the solution of problem (2.11) by solving 6 MILP problems: first, we solve the
two single CLSP linked to Cod,1 and C
o
d,2; second, we solve the two MILP related to C¯d,1
and C¯d,2; third, we solve the MILP formulation associated to problem (2.11); without
loss of generality, let us assume that Firm 1 obtained the minimum ratio; finally, as
firms aim to avoid potential inefficiencies, we solve a MILP that minimizes we the
cost of Firm 2, but assuming that the planning decisions for Firm 1 are fixed.
2.5.3 Min-max Unit Cost Scheme
In this scheme we utilize the average unit cost to measure the performance of a firm.
Utilizing the unit cost as a performance measure is consistent with the discussion
about the risk of pooling operations (see Section 2.3), decision makers can isolate
as much as possible the risk of the operations pooling from factors that they cannot
control, such as demand uncertainty.
As our purpose is to follow the Rawlsian notion of fairness, implementing Scheme
UC leads to minimizing the maximum unit average cost among firms, while satisfying
the individual rationality conditions. Thus, through applying this scheme, the opera-
tions pooling focuses on helping the firm facing the more critical situation in terms of
its average unit cost. Thus, CUCd (Cd ,C
o
d) corresponds to the solution of the following
model.
min
{
ψ | ψ≥ Ci
∑Tt=1 di,t
,∀i = 1,2∧Ci ≤C∗d,i,∀i = 1,2∧ (C1,C2) ∈ C (d)
}
. (2.12)
As for Scheme NS, we can obtain the joint production plan derived from Scheme
UC by solving several MILP problems: first we solve the two MILP problem asso-
ciated to Cod,1 and C
o
d,2; second we avoid inefficiencies by solving lexicographically
problem (2.12).
When setting up operations pooling based on Scheme UC, some difficulties may
arise if there exists a significant difference between the magnitude of cost of the firms.
However, when firms are aware in advance of natural differences between their unit
average costs, the proposed formulation can be easily adjusted to include such dif-
ferences. Thus, the properties in terms of fairness of the proposed scheme will not
be affected. For instance, if the firms expect that the unit cost of Firm 1 is system-
atically kc times higher than the unit cost of Firm 2, then we replace ψ ≥ C2∑Tt=1 di,t by
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ψ≥ kc · C2∑Tt=1 di,t in problem 2.12.
2.5.4 Efficiency, Fairness and Risk of Collaboration Schemes
Given that the operations resulting of implementing Scheme NS and Scheme UC are
always feasible solutions for model (2.10), we can easily conclude that the efficiency
of Scheme IR is higher than for Scheme NS and Scheme UC, i.e. εIR ≥ εNS and
εIR ≥ εUC.
Although implementing Scheme IR is more attractive for the firms in terms of the
efficiency of the operations pooling, Scheme UC is efficient in reducing the inequali-
ties that may arise as a result of pooling operations. In order to explain the advantages
of Scheme UC, we measure the attractiveness of a scheme by the utility function in-
troduced in equation (2.7).
Theorem 2.1. Let F be a scheme that satisfies the individual rationality and the sym-
metry axioms. Also, let Firm 1 and Firm 2 be identical firms, i.e., their operations are
characterized by identical parameters and their demands are identically distributed.
Thus,
1. for any inequality aversion of the firms, if Scheme F is less efficient than Scheme
UC, then the utility level that the firms achieve by implementing Scheme F is
lower than for Scheme UC, in other terms, εF < εUC =⇒ UFi <UUCi ;
2. there exists an equality aversion level βF,UCi such that for any inequality aver-
sions lower than βF,UCi , if Scheme F is more efficient than Scheme UC, then the
utility level that the firms achieve by implementing Scheme F is higher than for
Scheme UC; also, for inequality aversions greater than or equal to βF,UCi , if
Scheme F is less efficient than Scheme UC, then the utility level that the firms
achieve by implementing Scheme F is lower than for Scheme UC.
Proof. We start by expressing UFi as the sum of three terms: U
F
i =−ED[CFd,i(Cd ,Cod)]−
βi ·UFi,1− γi ·UFi,2, where UFi,1 = ED
[
[cFj (Cd ,C
o
d)− cFi (Cd ,Cod)]+ ·∑Tt=1 Di
]
and UFi,2 =
ED
[
[cFi (Cd ,C
o
d)− cFj (Cd ,Cod)]+ ·∑Tt=1 Di
]
.
Our interest is to find the conditions of βi such that UUCi −UF
′
i ≥ 0, i.e., βi ≥
ED[CUCd,i (Cd ,C
o
d)]−ED[CF
′
d,i(Cd ,C
o
d)]
UF ′i,1−UUCi,1 +ki·(UF
′
i,2−UUCi,2 )
, where we assume that γi = ki ·βi.
Given that the solution of Scheme UC corresponds to the individual rational and
pareto-optimal operations that minimizes the difference between the average cost of
the firms, UF
′
i,1 −UUCi,1 ≥ 0 and UF
′
i,2 −UUCi,2 ≥ 0, so UF
′
i,1 −UUCi,1 + ki · (UF
′
i,2 −UUCi,2 )≥ 0.
On the other hand, if Scheme UC is more efficient than F , then ED[CUCd,i (Cd ,C
o
d)]−
ED[CF
′
d,i(Cd ,C
o
d)] < 0, so any βi ≥ 0 satisfies UUCi −UF
′
i ≥ 0. If Scheme UC is not
2.6. Numerical Experiments 27
more efficient than F , ED[CUCd,i (Cd ,C
o
d)]−ED[CF
′
d,i(Cd ,C
o
d)]≥ 0, so (ED[CUCd,i (Cd ,Cod)]
−ED[CF ′d,i(Cd ,Cod)])/(UF
′
i,1 −UUCi,1 + ki · (UF
′
i,2 −UUCi,2 ))≥ 0.
Theorem 2.1 leads to interesting conclusions about how efficiency and fairness
determine the attractiveness of Scheme IR, Scheme NS and Scheme UC. From the first
part of Theorem 2.1, we conclude that firms should pool operations based on Scheme
UC instead of Scheme NS when the efficiency of this last scheme is lower than for
Scheme UC. The second part of the theorem leads to conclude that Scheme UC is the
most attractive when the firms have high inequality aversions. Moreover, the relative
attractiveness of Scheme UC and Scheme IR is characterized for a threshold value in
terms of the inequality aversion. This behavior can be extrapolated to the comparison
between Scheme NS and Scheme IR, when the efficiency of this last scheme is greater
than for Scheme UC.
Further, the firms can get advantages from implementing Scheme IR, Scheme NS
or Scheme UC in terms of their risk. This idea is summarized by Theorem 2.2.
Theorem 2.2. If Firm 1 and Firm 2 are identical firms and Scheme F satisfies indi-
vidual rationality and symmetry axioms, then:
1. the risk resulting from pooling operations is equally allocated between firms,
2. the risk resulting from pooling operations is lower than or equal to the risk of
working in isolation.
Proof. Given that the firms are identical and Scheme F satisfies the Axiom of Sym-
metry, the implementation of such scheme implies that the unit cost of the firms are
identically distributed. Therefore, VaRF1 (α)=VaR
F
2 (α), and CVaR
F
1 (α)=CVaR
F
2 (α).
Further, since Scheme F satisfies the Axiom of Individual Rationality, the imple-
mentation of such scheme implies that the unit costs of both firms are decreased for
any demand scenario. Consequently, VaRFi (α)≤VaRoi (α) and CVaRFi (α)≤CVaRoi (α),
∀i = 1,2.
In addition to the results of Theorem 2.2, in Section 2.6 we show through numer-
ical experiments that Scheme UC is in general more efficient in reducing the risk of
the firms than other schemes. This is a result of the reduction on the dispersion of the
results of each firm when implementing Scheme UC, because its objective function is
based on the min-max of the average cost of the firms.
2.6 Numerical Experiments
With the aim of studying the effects of pooling operations, we develop numerical
experiments that provide evidence of the advantages and disadvantages of the collab-
oration schemes introduced in Section 2.5. Specifically, we analyze the efficiency,
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the fairness and the risk associated with those schemes. Further, our numerical ex-
periments help to glimpse the characteristics of the firms which are potentially more
advantageous when pooling operations.
We represent different characteristics of the partners by setting instances of their
production parameters. We use the following assumptions for building such instances:
• The firms are identical, i.e., their cost parameters, production capacities and
probability distribution of their demands are identical.
• The cost parameters and the production capacity of a firm do not vary with
periods, i.e. fi,t = f , pi,t = p,hi,t = h,bi,t = b,CAPi,t =CAP,∀i, t.
• The demand that a firm faces in a period is i.i.d. such that Di,t ∼ Γ( d¯CV 2 , ·CV 2),
in which d¯ and CV are the average value and the coefficient of variation of the
demand in a period, respectively.
• We assume that the firms face three demand loads: low, medium and high. We
derive such levels from the ratio between the expected demand and the pro-
duction capacity per period, what we call capacity tightness (CT ). Therefore,
CT = d¯CAP and we set the three levels of demand load to CT = 0.2,0.5,0.8.
In order to explore different scenarios of operations pooling, we vary the param-
eters of the firms. Each scenario is constructed from a Base set of parameters (see
the second column of the Table 2.1), and we modify each parameter according to the
third column of Table 2.1. For each scenario, we generate randomly 2,000 demand
instances in such way we obtain reliable values for the studied measures of efficiency,
fairness and risk.
Parameter Base Set Range of Values
T 10 {1,2, ...,10}
f 100 100
CAP 100 100
p p = f · kp, kp = 0.1 kp = {0.1,0.2, ...,1.0}
h h = p · kh, kh = 1.5 kh = {0.5,1.0, ...,5.0}
b b = 2 ·h b = 2 ·h
CT {0.2,0.5,0.8} {0.2,0.5,0.8}
CV 0.4 {0.2,0.4, ...,2.0}
Table 2.1: Parameters of the Problem.
In terms of the cost structure of the firms, we denominate CS1 the cost structure in
which the unit production cost is supported by the firm for whom the product is made
and CS2 the cost structure in which the unit production cost is linked to the production
lines.
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2.6.1 Efficiency.
We know that Scheme IR is more efficient than Scheme NS and Scheme UC, but
we cannot conclude in advance about the relative efficiency between schemes. Our
simulations provide evidence about such relative efficiency and show the impact of
the cost structure on the efficiency of the operations pooling. Figure 2.1 summarizes
the observed efficiency for the instances considered.
(a) Scheme IR. Cost Structure CS1. (b) Scheme IR. Cost Structure CS2.
(c) Scheme NS. Cost Structure CS1. (d) Scheme NS. Cost Structure CS2.
(e) Scheme UC. Cost Structure CS1. (f) Scheme UC. Cost Structure CS2.
Figure 2.1: Observed Cost Efficiency of Different Collaboration Schemes and Cost Structures.
The main insights we can derive from Figure 2.1 are the following:
• As we could expected, Scheme NS and Scheme UC are less efficient than
Scheme IR, but their efficiency is still high. The efficiency of Scheme UC is
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greater than 90% in most of the observed instances under the cost structure
CS1. The efficiency of this scheme decreases with the cost structure CS2, but
the efficiency is below 80% in less than 1/6 of the observations. The efficiency
of Scheme NS goes below 80% in a few scenarios. Moreover, under the cost
structure CS2, the efficiency of Scheme NS is similar to the efficiency of IR.
• Scheme UC is more efficient than Scheme NS under the cost structure CS1.
The inverse relation occurs under the cost structure CS2. Under the cost struc-
ture CS1, εUC ≥ εNS in 89.1% of the simulated scenarios. εNS ≥ εUC in all the
scenarios under CS2.
• The collaboration schemes are less efficient under the cost structure CS2. This
loss of efficiency is born of the difficulties of achieving a balanced allocation
of cost when the firms operate under such cost structure. Indeed, under cost
structure CS1 the firms can allocate their unit production costs to minimize their
inequalities without affecting the efficiency, however, such reallocation is not
possible under the cost structure CS2.
2.6.2 Fairness
We use the Fehr and Schmidt utility function to study the inequality arising from im-
plementing a collaboration scheme. In particular, we measure the observed normal-
ized gap between the Fer and Smith inequality derived from a collaboration scheme
and the Fer and smith inequality when minimizing the joint costs. In other words, we
keep track of ED
[
1− βi·[c
F
j −cFi ]++γi·[cFi −cFj ]+
βi·[c∗j−c∗i ]++γi·[c∗i −c∗j ]+
]
. Larger values of this indicator implies
that the inequality reduction achieved by implementing Scheme F is has a high impact
on the utility of the firms. Figure 2.2 shows the value of this indicator for different
level of inequality aversion. Note that, we have set βi = 0.1 and γiβi = 0.5.
We obtain the following insights from Figure 2.2:
• Scheme UC becomes more convenient than Scheme IR as the inequality aver-
sion of the firms grows. This emphasizes the result of Theorem 1, i.e. when
the fairness concerns are high, firms should plan their operations pooling by
utilizing Scheme UC.
• Scheme NS is dominated by Scheme NS and Scheme IR under the cost struc-
tures CS1 and CS2, respectively. On the one hand, the results related to effi-
ciency and inequality aversion shows that UNS ≤UUC for cost structure CS1.
On the other hand, the efficiency and the fairness derived from Scheme IR and
Scheme UC are almost the same for the cost structure CS2.
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(a) Scheme IR. Cost Structure CS1. (b) Scheme IR. Cost Structure CS2.
(c) Scheme NS. Cost Structure CS1. (d) Scheme NS. Cost Structure CS2.
(e) Scheme UC. Cost Structure CS1. (f) Scheme UC. Cost Structure CS2.
Figure 2.2: Observed Fehr and Schnidt Utility for Different Inequality Aversions, Collabora-
tion Schemes and Cost Structures.
• The impact of fairness is stronger under the cost structure CS2. This phe-
nomenon occurs because the low divisibility of the costs when firms pool op-
erations under the cost structure CS2. Thus, the globally optimal solution may
result in unbalanced allocation of costs. This unbalance is reduced by imple-
menting collaboration Scheme IR, and in particular, by implementing Scheme
UC.
Further, we are interest to study the characteristics of the operations pooling that
make the implementation of Scheme UC worthwhile for the firms. With this in mind,
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we track the observed value of βIR,UCi in our simulations. Figures 2.3 - 2.6 summarize
the relation between the characteristics of the firms and βIR,UCi . Here, we provide an
analysis for each parameter of the firms.
Planning block length. Figure 2.3 shows that the efficiency of Scheme UC is sig-
nificantly reduced when the operations pooling is planned for a short planning block.
In such scenarios, the Scheme UC will be attractive for the firms only if the inequality
aversion of these firms is high.
In particular, since the efficiency is significantly reduced under the cost struc-
ture CS2, the inequality reductions may not be sufficient attractive to compensate the
loss of efficiency. Also under the cost structure CS2, βIR,UCi ∼ 0 for T = 1,2. This
phenomenon occurs because the operations derived of implementing Scheme IR and
Scheme UC are similar, and therefore, Scheme UC does not bring additional benefits
from balancing the cost allocation.
(a) Cost Structure CS1. (b) Cost Structure CS2.
Figure 2.3: Observed Values of βIR,UCi For Different Values of T .
Coefficient of variation of the demand. As we can observe in Figure 1.4(a), the
attractiveness of Scheme UC decreases when the variability of the demand is high
or low. In such scenarios the Scheme UC will be attractive for the firms only if the
inequality aversion of these firms is high. This is caused by two facts: on the one
hand, the efficiency of Scheme UC is decreasing with the CV ; on the other hand,
implementing Scheme IR results in more unbalanced cost allocations when the CV is
high.
The effect of the demand variability on the impact of the inequality aversion on the
relative attractiveness between Scheme IR and Scheme UC is less significant under the
cost structure CS2. This is because implementing Scheme IR under such cost structure
leads to highly unbalanced cost allocations.
Production cost. As we observe in Figures 2.5 - 2.6 In general the convenience
of Scheme UC compared to Scheme IR is stable to changes on the costs of the firms.
βIR,UCi becomes higher for low values of kp and kh, because in such scenarios the
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(a) Cost Structure CS1. (b) Cost Structure CS2.
Figure 2.4: Observed Values of βIR,UCi For Different Values of CV .
fixed production costs are relatively higher than other production costs, and therefore,
a balance cost allocation is less likely.
(a) Cost Structure CS1. (b) Cost Structure CS2.
Figure 2.5: Observed Values of βIR,UCi For Different Values of kp.
Capacity tightness. We can clearly observe in Figures 2.3 - 2.6 that the value of
βIR,UCi is higher when the capacity tightness is low. This relation is explained by the
fact that the efficiency gap between Scheme IR and Scheme UC is higher when the
demand is low, since the production is more sporadic and the cost reductions from
operations pooling are more related to the fixed production costs. Thus, balancing the
allocation of costs by implementing Scheme UC may be not attractive for the firms,
at least the fairness concerns become higher.
2.6.3 Risk of the collaboration.
We use the conditional value at risk to study the risk of operations pooling based
on different collaborations schemes. In particular, we measure the proportion of the
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(a) Cost Structure CS1. (b) Cost Structure CS2.
Figure 2.6: Observed Values of βIR,UCi For Different Values of kh.
risk achieved by a collaboration scheme (CVaRFi (α)) with respect to the the risk of
working in isolation (CVaRoi (α)) for α = 95%. In other words, we keep track of
CVaRFi (α)
CVaRoi (α)
. Figure 2.7 shows the value of this indicator indicator CVaR
F
i (α)
CVaRoi (α)
. Note that,
we exclude Scheme NS from the analysis, because such scheme is clearly dominated
by Scheme IR and Scheme UC in terms of efficiency and fairness.
(a) Scheme IR. Cost Structure CS1. (b) Scheme IR. Cost Structure CS2.
(c) Scheme UC. Cost Structure CS1. (d) Scheme UC. Cost Structure CS2.
Figure 2.7: Observed Risk for Risk Level=95%, Collaboration Schemes and Cost Structures.
The main conclusions from Figure 2.7 are as follows:
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• As we expect from Theorem 2.2, the firms reduce their risk by pooling oper-
ations. We obtain that CVaRIRi (α) < CVaRoi (α) and CVaRUCi (α) < CVaR
o
i (α)
for all the analyzed instances.
• In general, the operations derived from implementing Scheme UC are less risky
for the firms in comparison to Scheme IR. Under the cost structure CS1, the
condition CVaRUCi (α)≤CVaRIRi (α) is satisfied for all the scenarios. Under the
cost structure only 3 instances provide higher risk by implementing Scheme
UC, but the gap with respect to Scheme IR is not significant.
2.7 Summary and Conclusions
In this Chapter we studied the collaboration initiatives in which firms pool their oper-
ations. The firms should reach a consensus on the scheme by which they will jointly
plan operations. this scheme must ensure that the joint gains of the firms will surpass
the effort of implementing it. However, the sustainability of the collaboration depends
also on that the gains are fairly allocated between firms.
Traditional approaches for collaboration in operations assume that partners can
make transfer payments to balance the allocation of gains. We propose collaboration
schemes which are flexible in terms of the existence of such payments. Thus, a trade-
off between efficiency and fairness arises, and consequently, there is a direct link
between the operations management and the collaboration scheme agreed by the firms.
We propose a collaboration scheme that determines the joint operations by mini-
mizing the maximum unit production costs of the partners. We show that even though
this scheme may may reduce the efficiency of the collaboration in comparison to the
global optimization, it is successful in balancing such efficiency and the fairness of
the cost allocation.
Moreover, when the collaboration is carried out under uncertainty, the risk derived
from pooling operation is less than the risk faced by the firms by working in isolation.
In particular, our scheme outperforms other schemes in terms of the risk for the firms.
So, this scheme become more interesting for the firms.
Implementing schemes that take into account the flexibility in transfer payments,
the fairness in the allocation of gains and the effects on the risk of the firms, help
to decision makers to bring to practice theoretical models of collaboration. In other
words, decision makers can utilize our methodology to keep successful partnerships.
We suggest three main branches as future researches derived from our work:
• We consider interesting to extend our work to collaboration in fully-decentralized
systems under asymmetric information. Our work assume that the firms share
the full information about their demands each time they jointly plan operations.
This scenario may corresponds to environments when there is a central decision
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maker or when the firms can collate the demand of each other in the short term.
In other environments the firms may reveal demand information different to the
actual amounts, because they expect to benefit from such distortion. Solving
this type of problem will requires to combine Game Theory and Bilevel Pro-
gramming (first level is related to the decision of revealing demand and in the
second level the firms plan their joint operations based on the reveal demands).
• Extending our methodology to operations pooling between three or more firms
could be interesting from theoretical and practical point of view. The essential
notion of fairness behind our proposed scheme will not vary for that problem,
but elements related to the stability of the agreement should be included in our
models, i.e. the gains obtained in the grand coalition between firms have to
surpass the gains of each sub-coalition. this additional dimension of the problem
will increase the computational time of jointly planning operations.
• Our collaboration scheme could be applied in other settings in which firms can
benefit from the economies of scale resulting from a collaboration. For exam-
ple, it could be interesting to study the potential collaboration in a distribution
network among a set of firms, so that such firms can gain from reducing the cost
associated to their fleet size.
Chapter 3
Pricing and Operations Planning Under
Competition
3.1 Introduction
Offering the right price to the customer is one of the most challenging tasks for a firm.
With this in mind, more firms in the retail or other industries adopt dynamic pricing
strategies. Elmaghraby and Keskinocak (2003) explain this phenomenon by three
facts: (i) an increased availability of demand data, (ii) ease of changing prices due
to new technologies, and (iii) an availability of decision-support tools for analyzing
demand data and for dynamic pricing.
When making pricing decisions, a firm needs a strong coordination between its
marketing and operations department. On the one hand, the marketing department
should measure how the customers value the products offered by the firm, and in par-
ticular, the influence of the price on their demands. On the other hand, the operations
department organizes the production activities such that the firm satisfies the demand
at minimum cost. If the coordination is weak, the firm will carry out operations that
may not provide the quantities requested by the customers, or the marketing depart-
ment may set prices that lead to revenues which may not be enough large to cover the
production costs.
Furthermore, even when a firm is able to coordinate its internal decisions, its per-
formance also depends on the interaction with other agents belonging to its own supply
chain or belonging to different supply chains. Making decisions without taking such
interactions into account may lead to sub-optimal results. In particular, pricing deci-
sions are highly dependent on the interaction between agents belonging to different
supply chains, because the items produced by these agents can have a substitution ef-
fect on each other. This is a classical case of competition, where the pricing decisions
of a group of competitors will arise from the equilibrium between them.
In this work, we study the problem of two competitors making pricing and opera-
tions decisions for similar items. The main assumptions of our work are as follows.
First, we model the operations of the firms as a dynamic lot sizing problem (LSP).
The LSP is a well known production-inventory problem that establishes when and how
much to produce in order to minimize set-up, production and holding costs for a deter-
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mined number of discrete periods (see Wolsey (1995), Karimi et al. (2003), Brahimi
et al. (2006) for an extended literature review of this problem). The presence of setup
costs leads to economies of scale in the production costs, which makes the competi-
tion more intense (Cachon and Harker, 2002). The reason for the strong competition
is explained by two facts: (i) the firms must capture a positive threshold of demand or
else it is not profitable, and (ii) the price competition increases, since reducing prices
may lead to a demand increase, which results in a reduction of the average cost per
unit. Furthermore, the assumption of a LSP for modeling operations has implications
in terms of the complexity for getting equilibria. Given that the LSP is a discrete prob-
lem, determining prices and operations may be a hard task even in the monopolistic
case. Consequently, the computation of an equilibrium between firms could be even
harder.
Second, we assume there is a substitution effect between items produced by the
firms, however, the items are not necessarily perfect substitutes. We model the demand
as a linear function of the prices of both the item itself and the alternative item. The
magnitude of the parameter associated to the opponent’s price determines the degree
of substitution between the items.
Our third assumption is that each of the firms maximizes its profits over a dis-
crete set of prices. Such price simplification responds to the fact that the success of
dynamic pricing depends on how the consumer understands and manages pricing sig-
nals (Bonsall et al., 2007). Also, a reduced set of prices helps in terms of the pricing
transparency, promoting customer satisfaction and its loyalty in the long-term (Mauri,
2007). Lanquepin-Chesnais et al. (2012) describe two of the most common examples
of discrete set of prices: discounts in fashion business are often 70%, 50% or 20%;
and the low-demand, medium-demand and high-demand prices in the power supply
industry.
The assumptions to model operations as a LSP and discrete prices have a direct
impact on how to achieve a price equilibrium between firms. Such assumptions imply
that the pay-off of a firm cannot be expressed as a close function of the opponent’s
decision, hence, achieving a price equilibrium requires computing the pay-off of each
combination of pricing strategies. Furthermore, for a given pricing strategy, calcu-
lating the pay-off of a firm requires estimating the costs of their operations, which
in turn imposes to solve a LSP. Thus, the complexity of computing an equilibrium
may be really large as the number of periods increases, which is explained by both
the complexity of the LSP and the fact that the number of pricing strategies that the
competitors can select increases exponentially with the number of periods considered
in the LSP.
The main objective of this work is to propose an efficient methodology for com-
puting an equilibrium for the pricing and operations decisions between firms whose
products compete in terms of their prices. Our methodology consists of two steps. In
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the first step, we aim to identify dominated pricing strategies, in such way they are
ruled out as a potential equilibrium. We propose a Mixed Integer Programming (MIP)
formulation for identifying dominated strategies. The goal of the second step is to ob-
tain a pure Nash Equilibrium (NE) between the strategies of the firms. This task can
be really challenging, since the number of strategies to be revised can be large and a
NE may not exist. In such case, we assume that the firms randomize their price strate-
gies, thus their pricing decisions will correspond to a Mixed Nash Equilibrium (Nash,
1950a). To this end, we implement the MIP formulation proposed by Sandholm et al.
(2005) for obtaining MNE, and we adapt it for obtaining NE. One of the main advan-
tages of the Sandholm et al. (2005) formulation is the possibility of including some
metrics when achieving an equilibrium (e.g. maximizing the sum of the profits of the
firms). This opens avenues for the accurate analysis of the competition between firms,
because it provides bounds for the individual and joint performance.
The remainder of the Chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we discuss
the literature of joint marketing and production decisions, paying special attention to
problems between competitors. Section 3.3 contains the assumptions and description
of the problem that we study in this work. In Section 3.4 we characterize the pricing
strategies of the firms in order to establish dominance conditions, and in Section 3.5
we explain how to implement efficiently such characterization. We present compu-
tational results and managerial insights in Section 3.6, and we summarize the main
contribution of this work in Section 3.7.
3.2 Literature Review
The need for stronger coordination between the decisions made by production and
marketing departments is studied with special attention in the literature on both op-
erations management and marketing. Upasani and Uzsoy (2007) classify existing re-
search on joint production-marketing into three main streams: (1) joint price-production
quantity determination, (2) promotion planning and coordination, and (3) price, capac-
ity and lead time models. In this work we focus on the first research stream, where
firms decide their price and production quantity subject to both production and mar-
keting constraints.
We classify the works dealing with joint price-production quantity according to
their time modeling: continuous time models and discrete time models.
The early efforts for modeling problems of coordinating pricing and production
decisions assume continuous time. Indeed, the first work that provides a quantitative
solution for the simultaneous production and pricing problem is proposed by Within
(1955), where the pricing decision is included into the traditional Economic Order
Quantity (EOQ) problem, by assuming that demand is price sensitive. In other words,
the objective of the problem is the profit maximization by setting a unit price p and
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the ordering quantity Q. Cheng (1990) and Chen and Min (1994) study the multi-
item EOQ problem, and they provide the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for determining the
optimal solution under conditions of storage space and inventory investment limita-
tions. Lee (1994) extends the problem by including an inventory investment budget
constraint. The authors show that the computational time grows almost linearly with
the problem size. Furthermore, several works propose Geometric Programming ap-
proaches for the single item joint EOQ and pricing problem, e.g. Kim and Lee (1998),
Lee (1993) and Jung and Klein (2006).
Pekelman (1974) also deals with the continuous time problem, but prices and
quantities can vary during the time, i.e. the decision variables are the production rate
q(t) and the optimal price p(t). Vanthienen (1975) and Feichtinger and Hartl (1985)
extend the work of Pekelman (1974) by including capacity constraints and by allowing
backlog, respectively. In a similar context, Chen and Chu (2003) extend the problem
for new products, whose sales rate is highly sensitive to price strategies. In particu-
lar, the authors propose a framework for adapting decisions to the frequent updates of
the market information. Ray et al. (2005) study EOQ with price sensitive demands,
assuming linear and log-linear demand functions. The authors suggest a counterin-
tuitive conclusion: batch size is not necessarily monotone increasing in set-up cost.
In order to include demand uncertainty, Adida and Perakis (2006) extend the nominal
formulation to a robust optimization approach.
A second group of works assumes the horizon as a set of discrete periods. In such
scenario the production decisions can be modeled as a LSP. Thomas (1970) studies
simultaneous dynamic pricing and LSP. The author proposes a characterization of the
problem that reduces the computations for pricing decisions. Several works simplify
the dynamic pricing decision by assuming that a firm sets a constant price for each pe-
riod of the planning horizon. Under such assumption, Kunreuther and Schrage (1973),
Gilbert (1999) study the uncapacitated version of the problem and Gilbert (2000) ex-
tends this problem for multiple items sharing a common capacity. When the prices
are not constant, Bhattacharjee and Ramesh (2000) propose heuristic approaches for
the uncapacitated version of the problem. Martel and Gascon (1998) deal with the
problem of maximizing profits when operations are uncapacitated and the unit in-
ventory holding costs in a period is a function of the procurement decisions made in
previous periods. The authors derive an O(T 2) algorithm which provides a provably
optimal solution of an integer linear programming formulation of the general problem.
For capacitated operations, Deng and Yano (2006) characterize the optimal solution,
and they propose an algorithm whose complexity is slightly higher than the tradi-
tional LSP. The authors show evidence that larger capacity may lead to higher optimal
prices. Haugen et al. (2007) propose a Lagrangian relaxation procedure to solve the
problem for capacitated operations. For the same problem, Gonzalez-Ramirez et al.
(2011) propose a Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition where the capacity constraints are the
3.2. Literature Review 41
linking constraints. Onal and Romeijn (2011) extend the capacitated problem to the
multi-item case. They develop two alternative Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition formu-
lations of the problem, and propose to solve their relaxations using column generation
and the overall problem using branch-and-price. The authors test such formulations
for both dynamic and static pricing strategies. Similar to our assumptions (but as-
suming the decisions of a firm in isolation), Lanquepin-Chesnais et al. (2012) study
a single item problem where a firm maximizes its profit over a discrete set of prices.
The authors propose a Lagrangian relaxation to solve this problem.
Despite the large literature about simultaneous production and pricing decisions,
the discussion of making such decisions in competitive environments has received less
attention. Min (1992), Chen et al. (1995) are among the earliest works that address the
simultaneous production and pricing problem under competition. The authors model
the operations of the firms as an EOQ problem, where sellers of a homogeneous prod-
uct compete within each other for the same buyers. Cachon and Harker (2002) study
the competition between two firms whose production systems are characterized by
economies of scale, such as in the case of the EOQ model. The authors derive gen-
eral conditions under which there exists at most one equilibrium between competitors.
Transchel and Minner (2011) propose an extension of the problem where a firm has an
EOQ cost structure, and its opponent follows a just-in-time policy. Adida and Perakis
(2010) address the problem where two firms compete through dynamic pricing and
inventory control with the presence of demand uncertainty. The authors introduce a
demand base fluid model where the demand is a linear function of the price of the
supplier and of her competitor, the inventory and production costs are quadratic, and
all coefficients are time dependent.
More related to our work, several papers discuss competition in discrete time.
Fredergruen and Meissner (2009) study the competition between firms when their pro-
duction lines are modeled as a capacitated LSP. The authors establish the existence of
a price equilibrium and associated optimal dynamic lot sizing plans, under mild con-
ditions. In contrast to our work, they assume that each firm sets a constant price for
the whole interval of production. The constant price condition is relaxed in Pedroso
and Smeers (2010). The authors propose a fix-point iteration for achieving a duopoly
equilibrium when competitors produce perfect substitute items. The main differences
with our work are the following: we assume that the firms select prices from a discrete
set, we examine the possibility of randomizing price strategies (MNE), and the com-
petition may occur between non-perfect substitutes. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first work including such dimensions for discrete time problems.
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3.3 Problem Description
Consider two self-interested firms, Firm 1 and Firm 2, that manufacture and sell mu-
tually substitute products. Because the existence of a substitution effect, the demands
for these products depend on the price set by both firms. Each firm, therefore, max-
imizes its profit by making pricing decisions, which should take both the cost of the
operations and the opponent’s price into account.
We assume that each firm organizes its production by setting a plan for N consec-
utive periods. The problem of making pricing and production decisions constitutes a
repeated game, such that in each repetition the firms make decisions for N periods.
The dynamics in each repetition of the game are as follows. In our description Firm i
symbolizes any of Firm 1 or Firm 2, and Firm j corresponds to its opponent.
• Before starting the production activities for the next N periods, the firms decide
the unit price of their items for each of such periods. For each period, Firm i can
select a price from the discrete set {Li,Mi,Ui}, where 0< Li <Mi <Ui. These
prices represent aggressive strategies (Li), medium prices (Mi) or conservative
prices (Ui). Let si ∈RN be the vector containing the price decision of firm i such
that si,n ∈ {Li,Mi,Ui}. We call this vector a pure pricing strategy. Further, we
denote Si to the set of all pure pricing strategies of the firm i. Note that, |Si|= 3N ,
then the number of strategies that the firms can select grows exponentially when
the number of periods increases.
• The pure pricing strategies selected by both firms induce their demands for the
next N periods. We denote by di : Si× S j → RN the mapping between prices
and demands of Firm i. We construct this mapping assuming that the demand
is a linear function of the prices, as we show in equation (3.1).
di,n(si,s j) = αi,n−βi,n · si,n+ γi,n · s j,n, ∀i = 1,2, j 6= i, (3.1)
αi,n represents the demand of Firm i when the prices of both firms are equal to
0 in the period n. We can model the seasonality of the demand by assuming
that this parameter is time dependent; βi,n is the sensitivity of the demand of
Firm i to the price of its own product in period n. We assume there is an inverse
relation between prices and demand of the firm; and γi,n is the sensitivity of the
demand of Firm i to the price of the item produced by firm j in period n. As the
products of the firms are substitutes, we establish that γi,n ≥ 0.
• Once the firms made their pricing decisions, they realize their demands for the
next N periods. Based on this information, each firm organizes its operations
with the aim to minimize its costs subject to the demand satisfaction. We model
the operations of each firm in a planning block as a LSP.
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Further, we assume that each firm has perfect information about the set of prices
that its opponent can choose. This implies that the pure pricing strategies that firms
will select constitutes a NE. Nevertheless, given that the set of prices is discrete, a NE
may not exist. In such a case, we assume that firms randomize their pricing decisions,
i.e. firm i will select a pure pricing strategy si ∈ Si with probability a certain prob-
ability. The probabilities that firms assign to each pure pricing strategy constitute a
MNE.
In the remaining part of this section we describe the modeling of the decisions
related to the operations and pricing of the firms, and we formulate NE and MNE as
sets of linear MIP constraints.
3.3.1 Operations Planning
Once the firms choose the pure pricing strategies si ∈ Si and s j ∈ S j, each of them
plan their operations by solving a LSP, in such a way demand is satisfied at minimum
cost. The parameters of the LSP faced by each firm are c, f ,h ∈R2×N and CAP ∈R2,
where:
• ci,n : unit production cost of the item sold by firm i in period n.
• fi,n : set-up cost of the line managed by firm i in period n.
• hi,n : unit holding cost of the item sold by firm i in period n.
• CAPi : production capacity per period of firm i.
• di,n(si,s j) : demand faced by the firm i in period n (see equation (3.1)).
The decisions variables of the LSP are x,y,z ∈ R2×N , such that:
• xi,n : amount of production of item i in period n.
• yi,n : 1 if the line managed by firm i is used in period n, 0 otherwise.
• zi,n : amount of inventory of the item held by firm i at the end of period n.
The set of constraints that ensure that the operations of Firm i satisfies the demand
derived from pure pricing strategies si and s j are as follows:
zi,n = zi,n−1+ xi,n−di,n(si,s j) ∀n ∈ N (3.2)
xi ≤CAPi · yi, (3.3)
xi,zi ≥ 0,yi ∈ {0,1}, (3.4)
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where, constraint (3.2) represents the inventory conservation and demand satisfac-
tion; constraint (3.3) states that production in a period can occur only if the production
in such period is activated; constraint (3.3) also reflects the capacity limitation in each
period; if the problem is uncapacitated we replace CAPi by a big number. We denote
by Xi(si,s j) to the set of all the decisions xi that satisfy the constraints (3.2) - (3.4)
when the firms play the pair of pure pricing strategies (si,s j).
Furthermore, we say that the function Ci(x) provide the total operational cost of
Firm i when the firms play the pair of pure pricing strategies (si,s j), where
Ci(x) = ci · xTi + fi · yTi +h · zTi . (3.5)
3.3.2 Pricing
When making pricing decisions, each firm expects to maximize its profit, which cor-
responds to the difference between its incomes and its operational costs. If the firms
select the pure pricing strategies (si,s j) ∈ Si × S j for the next N periods, we rep-
resent the incomes, operational costs and profit by the function R : Si × S j → R2,
Co : Si× S j → R2 and B : Si× S j → R2, respectively, where Ri(si,s j) = si · di(si,s j),
Coi (si,s j) = minxi
{
Ci(xi)|xi ∈Xi(si,s j)
}
and Bi(si,s j) = Ri(si,s j)−Coi (si,s j).
Here, we describe the problem of selecting pure pricing strategies and the problem
of randomizing pure pricing strategies.
Pure pricing strategies
Taking the pricing decision of its opponent into account, each firm makes its pricing
decision in order to maximize its own profit, i.e.
maxsi Bi(si,s j)
s.t. (si,s j) ∈ Si×S j
(3.6)
Since the pricing decisions of the firms are mutually dependent, the firms should
choose pure pricing strategies that satisfy the condition of a NE. The pair (si,s j) is a
NE if Bi(si,s j) ≥ Bi(s′i,s j),∀s′i ∈ Si and ∀i = 1,2; j 6= i. In other words, a firm does
not have an incentive to change its pure pricing strategy given that the strategy of its
opponent has not changed.
Randomizing pure pricing strategies
When the firms randomize their pure pricing strategies, the decision for each of them
is to assign a probability to each pure pricing strategy, in such way it maximizes its
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own profit. Let pi ∈ [0,1]|Si| be the vector containing the probabilities that Firm i
assigned to its pure pricing strategies in a repetition of the game. We formulate the
pricing problem of the Firm i by model (3.7).
maxpi Epi,p j [Bi(si,s j)]
s.t. (si,s j) ∈ Si×S j
∑
si∈Si
pi(si) = 1
pi ≥ 0 ∀si ∈ Si
(3.7)
Given that the probability assignment are mutually dependent, the solution of the
pricing problem should satisfy the condition of a MNE. (pi, p j) is a MNE if∑si∈Si pi,si ·
∑s j∈S j p j,s j ·Bi(si,s j) ≥ ∑si∈Si p′i,si ·∑s j∈S j p j,s j ·Bi(si,s j),∀p′i and ∀i = 1,2; j 6= i. In
other words, a firm does not have an incentive to change its mixed strategy given that
the mixed strategy of its opponent has not changed. Nash (1950b) proofs that there is
at least one equilibrium for this game.
Nash Equilibrium and Mixed Nash Equilibrium
We characterize the pricing strategies that satisfy the NE and MNE condition by utiliz-
ing MIP formulations. These formulations are based on two facts: in any equilibrium,
every pure strategy is either played with probability 0, or has 0 regret; and, any vec-
tor of mixed strategies for the players where every pure strategy is either played with
probability 0, or has 0 regret, is an equilibrium. Sandholm et al. (2005) propose the
set of MIP constraints of expressions (3.8) - (3.13) to describe a MNE. This formula-
tion utilizes two parameters: pi ∈ R2×|Si|×|S j | such that pii,si,s j = Bi(si,s j) and p¯i ∈ R2,
such that p¯ii = maxsli ,shi ,slj ,shj∈S(pii,shi ,shj − pii,sli ,shl ). Although, the decision variables are
the vector of probabilities pi,∀i = 1,2, the authors utilize additionally the variables
bi,ri ∈ R|Si|, ui ∈ {0,1}|Si| and b¯i ∈ R, where:
• bi,si : expected profit of Firm i when playing strategy si ∈ Si.
• ri,si : expected regret when the firm i when playing the strategy si ∈ Si.
• ui,si : 1 if Firm i plays the strategy si ∈ Si with probability 0; 0 otherwise.
• b¯i : Expected profit of Firm i.
∑
si∈Si
pi,si = 1, ∀i = 1,2, (3.8)
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bi = pii · pTj ∀i = 1,2; j 6= i, (3.9)
ri,si = b¯i−bi,si ∀si ∈ Si;∀i = 1,2, (3.10)
pi,si ≤ 1−ui,si si ∈ Si;∀i = 1,2, (3.11)
ri,si ≤ p¯ii ·ui,si ∀si ∈ Si;∀i = 1,2, (3.12)
pi,bi, b¯i,ri ≥ 0;ui ∈ {0,1} ∀i = 1,2. (3.13)
Constraint (3.8) ensures that pi is a valid probability distribution. Constraints (3.9) -
(3.10) define the regret of a strategy. Constraint (3.11) ensures that ui,s = 1 only if
ps,i = 0. Constraint (3.12) states that the regret of a strategy equals 0, unless the
strategy is played with probability 0.
Even though this formulation aims to characterize a MNE, its extension to to NE
is straightforward. A NE characterization is obtained by including the constraint pi ∈
{0,1},∀i = 1,2 into the previous formulation.
Another strength of this characterization lies on the possibility to combine con-
straints (3.8) - (3.12) with an objective function that represents an specific goal of the
equilibrium between firms. For instance, the objective function max(bi+b j) will lead
to the equilibrium that maximizes the sum of the profit of the firms, on the contrary,
objective function min(bi + b j) will correspond to the equilibrium that minimizes
such sum. Other objective functions can provide the minimization of the profit of
a firm (min(bi)) or the maximization of such profit (max(bi)). Moreover, we can
achieve a pricing equilibrium that leads a balance between the profits of the firms
(maxmin{bi,b j}).
However, achieving a NE or a MNE by this formulation may be intensive in com-
putational requirements. The high complexity arises from the fact that characteriza-
tion (3.8) - (3.12) takes the full payoff matrix B as a parameter, which implies solving
2 · 32N different LSPs. Moreover, such formulation consists of 2 · (3N+1 + 1) con-
tinuous variables and 2 · 3N binary variables, hence, the dimension of the problem
increases exponentially with N.
We propose a methodology to deal with the exponential complexity for computing
an equilibrium between the pricing decisions of the firms. This methodology identifies
and discards dominated strategies from the set of potential equilibria. We can discard
a strategy because a NE or a MNE can be calculated by comparing uniquely the best
responses of the firms. So, achieving a NE or a MNE will requires to compute partially
the pay-off matrices of the firms. In Section 3.4 we describe and analyze the problem
of finding the best response to each strategy of the opponent.
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3.4 Best Response Problem
We start by defining the best response of a firm to a pure pricing strategy of its oppo-
nent.
Definition 3.1. s∗i (s j) ∈ Si is the best response of the firm i to s j ∈ S j, such that
Bi(s∗i (s j),s j)≥ Bi(si,s j),∀si ∈ Si.
Our aim is to provide a MIP formulation for the finding s∗i (s j). With this in mind,
we introduce the decision variable wi ∈ {0,1}3×N , where wi,k,n is 1 if the firm i selects
the price k∈{Li,Mi,Ui} for the period n; 0 otherwise. Thus, we can express any si ∈ Si
as a linear combination of w (as we show in equation (3.14)), and consequently, the
best response problem to any pricing strategy of the opponent can be formulated by
the MIP formulation (3.15) (3.17).
si(wi) = Li ·wi,Li +Mi ·wi,Mi +Ui ·wi,Ui (3.14)
maxw Ri(si(w),s j)−Coi (si(w),s j) (3.15)
s.t. wi,Li,n+wi,Mi,n+wi,Ui,n = 1, ∀n = 1, ...,N, (3.16)
wi,Li,n,wi,Mi,n,wi,Ui,n ∈ {0,1}, ∀n = 1, ...,N. (3.17)
Expression (3.15) states the maximization of the profit of the firm. Note that,
Coi (si(w),s j) is the cost obtained by Firm i when solving the LSP resulting of choosing
strategies si(w) and s j. Constraints (3.16) - (3.17) states that Firm i must select one
and only one price per period.
Alternatively to the full computation of payoff for calculating an equilibrium be-
tween firms, we can compute the payoff of the best responses of the firms based on
model (3.15) - (3.17). Hence, we need to solve only 2 · 3N best response models,
which is less than the 2 ·32·N problems required for a full computation of the payoff.
Moreover, even though model (3.15) - (3.17) consists of 3 · T new binary variables
for each LSP, solving the problem may be faster than the full computation of payoff.
This is because the full computation is an iterative procedure that does not consider
the structure of the problem, but model (3.15) - (3.17) can catch such structure by
implementing simple well known algorithms, such as Branch & Bound or Branch &
Cut.
Furthermore, we can reduce the time for calculating an equilibrium by determin-
ing a priori the characteristics of a firm that lead to prefer a specific pure pricing
strategy as a best response to a strategy of its opponent. This reduction stems from
two observations: first, when calculating the best response to s j, we could establish
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beforehand the pure pricing strategies of Firm i that will not be selected as a best re-
sponse to an opponent’s strategy; second, when we calculate sequentially the elements
of the matrix of payoff of a firm, we can utilize the already calculated equilibrium to
characterize the best response of a firms to its opponent’s strategy, so we reduce the
number of pure pricing strategies to be revised.
Our characterization of s∗i (s j) is obtained by bounding the effects of small vari-
ations of the pure pricing strategies of the opponent on the operations of a firm. In
this characterization, we assume that the unit production cost of a firm does not vary
with the time, i.e., ci,n = ci,∀n = 1, ...,N. Before describing our characterization, we
provide some definitions that facilitate the exposition of our analysis.
Definition 3.2. Given a pure pricing strategy si, δnˆ(si) =
{
s′i|s′i ∈ Si∧ s′i,n = si,n,∀n 6=
nˆ∧ s′i,nˆ ≥ si,nˆ
}
, i.e., δnˆ(si) is the set of pure pricing strategies that increase the price
in period nˆ respect to si.
Definition 3.3. Given the pure pricing strategy s j ∈ S j, λ(s′i,si,s j) is the difference
between the optimal cost of operations of Firm i when it plays the strategies si and s′i,
i.e. λ(s′i,si,s j) =Coi (si,s j)−Coi (s′i,s j).
Definition 3.4. Given the pure pricing strategy si ∈ Si, τ(s′j,si,s j) is the difference
between the optimal cost operations of firm i when firm j plays strategies s j and s′j,
i.e. τ(si,s′j,s j) =Coi (si,s′j)−Coi (si,s j).
Additionally, we will utilize φ(s j,n) =
αi,n+γi,n·s j,n
βi,n
, ∆(s′i,si) = ∑
N
n=1(s
′
i,n− si,n) and
n∗(s j) = min{n|di,n(Ui,s j) > 0}, where φ(s j,n) is the maximum price that Firm i
should set in order to obtain non negative demand in period n, given the opponent’s
strategy s j; ∆(s′i,si) corresponds to the sum of the different of prices between the the
pure pricing strategies s′i and si. Note that, ∆(s′i,si) = s′i,nˆ−si,nˆ if s′i ∈ δnˆ(si); and n∗(s j)
is the earliest period in which we can ensure that the demand of Firm i is non-negative
given the opponent’s strategy s j.
3.4.1 Ex-ante Characterization
Given a certain strategy of the opponent, our characterization aims to determine the
choice of the firm between two of its pure pricing strategies. This choice depends on
the condition (3.18), i.e. Firm i will choose si instead of s′i as a response to s j if the
additional revenues obtained through si is larger than the additional operational costs
associated with such strategy.
Ri(si,s j)−Ri(s′i,s j)> λi(s′i,si,s j). (3.18)
Although writing a closed form expression for the left hand side of equation (3.18)
is straightforward, computing the right hand side implies solving two LSP, thus we
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cannot express such difference by a closed form function. Further, solving the two
LSP problems implies a high complexity as the value of n increases, that we would like
to avoid in our characterization. Hence, we focus on obtaining closed form estimators
for the difference between the costs associated to two pure pricing strategies, in such
a way, we can utilize expression (3.18) to compare such strategies.
Uncapaciated operations
We start our characterization by providing upper and lower bounds for λ(s′i,si,s j)
when s′i ∈ δnˆ(si), as we show in Lemma 3.1.
Lemma 3.1. Given the pure pricing strategies si ∈ Si and s′i ∈ δnˆ(si), λ(s′i,si) and
λ(s′i,si,s j) are a lower bound and an upper bound for λ(s′i,si,s j), respectively, where
λ(s′i,si) = ci ·βi,nˆ ·∆(s′i,si),
λ(s′i,si,s j) =
{
λ(s′i,si)+hi · (nˆ−n∗(s j)) ·β ·∆(s′i,si), if n∗(s j)≤ nˆ
λ(s′i,si)+ fi, otherwise,
and
n∗(s j) = min{n|di,n(Ui,s j)> 0}.
Proof. Given that di,n(s′i,s j) = di,n(si,s j),∀n 6= nˆ and di,nˆ(s′i,s j) ≤ di,nˆ(si,s j), if firm
i plays s′i instead of si, then its total production cost will decrease by at least ci ·
(di,nˆ(si,s j)−di,nˆ(s′i,s j)). By replacing equation (3.1) in the right hand side of the last
expression we obtain λ(s′i,si).
We should also estimate the changes in the total set-up and holding costs. Let
us assume that we know the periods in which Firm i carries out its production in
order to minimize its cost when it plays s′i. In other words we utilized the vector
y∗i (s′i,s j) ∈ {0,1}N which is obtained by minimizing expression (3.5) subject to the
conditions (3.2)-(3.4) for the pair (s′i,s j). We can analyze three scenarios:
• if y∗i,nˆ(s′i,s j) = 1, we can construct an operations plan for si, whose total set-up
and holding costs are equal to the ones obtained for s′i. This corresponds to a
best case scenario, thus λ(s′i,si)≤ λ(s′i,si,s j).
• if y∗i,nˆ(s′i,s j) = 0, we again can construct a feasible operations plan for si based
on y∗i (s′i,si), but the additional demand caused by si has to be produced in the
interval [1, nˆ−1]. When n∗(s j)< nˆ, we certainty know that there is at least one
period of the interval [1, nˆ−1] in which the production is carried out. If the ad-
ditional demand caused by si is satisfied from period n∗(s j), the resulting costs
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will lead an upper bound for λ(s′i,si,s j). Hence, the holding cost is increased in
hi · (nˆ−n∗(s j)) · (di,nˆ(si,s j)−di,nˆ(s′i,s j)), but no additional setup occurs.
• y∗i,nˆ(s′i,s j) = 0 and n∗(s j)> nˆ, we cannot ensure that the demand in the interval
[1, nˆ−1] is different to zero. In this scenario, we can obtain an upper bound for
λ(s′i,si,s j) by activating the production in period nˆ. Hence, an additional set-up
is required, but the total holding does not vary with respect to the operations for
s′i.
We use λ(s′i,si) to determine whether si or s′i is a better response to a certain strat-
egy of the opponent, as we show in Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 3.1. Given the pure pricing strategies si ∈ Si and s′i ∈ δnˆ(si), if si,nˆ + s′i,nˆ <
φ(s j, nˆ)+ ci, then s′i is preferable to si as a response to s j.
Proof. From expression (3.18), s′i is preferable to si as a response to s j if Ri(s′i,s j)−
Ri(si,s j)>−λ(s′i,si,s j). Since the right hand side of the previous expression is upper
bounded by −λ(s′i,si), Ri(s′i,s j)−Ri(si,s j) > −λ(s′i,si) is a sufficient condition for
discarding si as a best response to s j. By replacing equation (3.1) in the previous
expression, we obtain the condition presented in Theorem 3.1.
Form Theorem 3.1 we derive conditions for selecting or discarding prices Ui and
Li as part of a best response strategy, as we show in Corollary 3.1.
Corollary 3.1. Given that Firm j chooses the pure pricing strategy s j ∈ S j,
(a) if Ui+Mi ≤ φ(s j,n)+ ci, then s∗i,n(s j) =Ui,
(b) if Mi+Li ≤ φ(s j,n)+ ci, then s∗i,n(s j) 6= Li.
Proof. We provide a proof for the part (a) of this corollary. The proof for the part
(b) is analogous. We analyze the condition si,nˆ + s′i,nˆ ≤ φ(s j, nˆ) + ci introduced in
Theorem 3.1. Given that the left hand side of such condition increases with the value
of the prices, the maximum of such sum occurs for s′i,nˆ = Ui and si,nˆ = Mi. Thus,
Ui+Mi ≤ φ(s j,n)+ c is a sufficient condition for preferring Ui.
In a similar fashion as Theorem 3.1, we utilize λ(s′i,si,s j) to analyze the conve-
nience of setting a specific price as part of the best response to the opponent’s strategy,
as we show in Theorem 3.2.
Theorem 3.2. Given the pure pricing strategies si ∈ Si and s′i ∈ δnˆ(si), if si,nˆ + s′i,nˆ ≥
λ(s′i,si,s j)
βi,n·∆(s′i,si)
+φ(s j, nˆ), then si is preferable to s′i as a response to s j.
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Proof. From expression (3.18), if Ri(si,s j)−Ri(s′i,s j)≥ λ(s′i,si,s j), then si is prefer-
able to s′i as a response to s j. Given that the right hand side of the previous expression
is upper bounded by λ(s′i,nˆ,si,nˆ,s j, nˆ), Ri(si,s j)−Ri(s′i,s j)≥ λ(s′i,si,s j) is a sufficient
condition for discarding s′i as a best response to s j. By replacing equation (3.1) in the
previous expression, we obtain the condition presented in Theorem 3.2.
Based on Theorem 3.2, we derive additional conditions for selecting or discarding
prices Ui and Li, as we show in Corollary 3.2.
Corollary 3.2. Given that Firm j plays the pure pricing strategy s j ∈ S j,
(a) if n∗(s j) ≤ n ≤ n∗(s j)+ Li+Mi−ci−φ(s j ,n)hi or Li +Mi− ci− φ(s j,n) ≥
fi
βi,n·(Mi−Li) ,
then s∗i,n(s j) = Li,
(b) if n∗(s j) ≤ n ≤ n∗(s j)+ Mi+Ui−ci−φ(s j ,n)hi or Mi +Ui− ci− φ(s j,n) ≥
fi
βi.n·(Ui−Mi) ,
then s∗i,n(s j) 6=Ui.
Proof. We start by proving the part (a) of this corollary. In particular, we are interested
in the condition n∗(s j)≤ n≤ n∗(s j)+ Li+Mi−ci−φ(s j ,n)hi , since the rest of the conditions
introduced in the corollary can be derived in a similar way. If we replace the value
of λ(s′i,si,s j) of Lemma 3.1 in the condition presented in Theorem 3.2, we obtain
si,nˆ+ s′i,nˆ ≥ ci+hi · (nˆ−n∗(s j))+φ(s j, nˆ). Given that the minimum value of si,nˆ+ s′i,nˆ
is Li +Mi and φ(s j, nˆ) is increasing with s j,nˆ, the analyzed expression is a sufficient
condition for preferring Li.
We can utilize the results of Corollary 3.1 and Corollary 3.2 to select and discard
prices from the best response strategy of a firm. In particular, Corollary 3.1 provides
bounds for s∗i,n(s j), that depend only on the demand function and the prices of the
firms. Corollary 3.2 derives upper bounds for s∗i,n(s j), but such bounds are time de-
pendent.
Capacitated operations
As for the uncapacitated operations, we start by providing a closed expression for up-
per and lower bounds of λ(s′i,si,s j). Note that, for capacitated operations we assume
that the capacity per period is larger than or equal to the maximum demand that a firm
can face in a period, i.e. CAPi ≥ αi,n− βi,n · Li + γi,n ·U j. Thus, all demand can be
satisfied on time.
Lemma 3.2. Given the pure pricing strategies si ∈ Si and s′i ∈ δnˆ(si), λ(s′i,si) and
λC(s′i,si,s j) are a lower bound and an upper bound for λ(s′i,si,s j), respectively, where
λC(s′i,si,s j) = λ(s
′
i,si)+hi · (nˆ−1) ·βi,n ·∆(s′i,si)+ fi,
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Proof. If Firm i chooses si instead of s′i, then the total unit production cost will in-
crease in at least ci · (di,nˆ(si,s j)−di,nˆ(s′i,s j)). By replacing equation (3.1) in the right
hand side of the last expression, we obtain λ(s′i,si). In an optimistic case, Firm i will
not incur in additional set-up or holding cost, thus, λ(s′i,si)≤ λ(s′i,si,s j).
To estimate λC(s′i,si,s j) we construct a feasible plan where Firm i satisfies the
additional demand in nˆ by manufacturing in the interval [1, nˆ]. We obtain an upper
bound for the holding costs of satisfying the additional demand by assuming that such
demand is served from the period 1. The worst case in terms of the set-up costs is to
initialize one more period for production. Thus, λC(s′i,si,s j)≥ λ(s′i,si,s j).
Given that λ(s′i,si) = λC(s′i,si), Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.1 are also valid for
capacitated LSP. Nevertheless, we cannot extend directly Corollary 3.2 to capacitated
operations. To this end, we replace λ(s′i,si,s j) by λC(s′i,si,s j) in Theorem 3.2. The
resulting corollary is as follows.
Corollary 3.3. Given the pure pricing strategies si ∈ Si and s′i ∈ δnˆ(si) and Firm j
chooses the pure pricing strategy s j ∈ S j,
(a) if hi · (n−1)≤ Li+Mi− ci−φ(s j,n)− fiβi,n·∆(s′i,si) , then s
∗
i,n(s j) = Li,
(b) if hi · (n−1)≤Mi+Ui− ci−φ(s j,n)− fiβi,n·∆(s′i,si) , then s
∗
i,n(s j) 6=Ui.
3.4.2 Characterization Based on Other Best Responses
Now, we characterize s∗i (s j) based on the best response to another pure pricing strategy
of the opponent. By this characterization we establish conditions for setting the prices
per period of the best response strategies. We provide the conditions for the scenario
in which the firms work under the uncapacitated LSP. So, our objective is to provide
the conditions that ensures that Firm i will prefer the strategy si as a response to
s′j ∈ δnˆ(s j), given that si is the best response to s j. To elucidate such preference, we
start by proposing closed form expressions for upper and lower bounds of τ(s′j,si,s j)
in Lemma 3.3.
Lemma 3.3. Given the pure pricing strategies s j ∈ S j and s′j ∈ δn˜(s j), τ(s′j,s j) and
τ(s′j,si,s j) are a lower and an upper bounds for τ(s′j,si,s j), respectively, where
τ(s′j,s j) = ci · γi,n ·∆(s′j,s j),
τ(s′j,si,s j) = τ(s
′
j,s j)+min
{
hi(si,s j) · γi,n ·∆(s′j,s j), fi
}
,
and
hi(si,s j) = hi · (n˜−maxn=1,...,n˜{n|y∗i,n(si,s j) = 1}),
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Proof. Given that di,n(si,s j) = di,n(si,s′j),∀n 6= n˜ and di,n˜(si,s j) ≤ di,n˜(si,s′j), if the
opponent changes its strategy from s j to s′j, the total unit production cost of Firm i
will increase by at least ci · (di,n˜(si,s′j)− di,n˜(si,s j)). By replacing equation (3.1) in
the right hand side of the last expression we obtain τ(s′j,s j).
In order to estimate the changes in the total set-up and holding costs, we utilize
the information contained in y∗i (si,s j). We analyze three scenarios:
• if y∗i,n˜(si,s j) = 1, firm i can construct an operations plan for s′j whose total set-up
and holding costs do not change with respect to the optimal plan for s j. This is
a best case scenario, thus τ(s′j,s j)≤ τ(si,s′j,s j),
• if there is at least one setup in the interval [1, n˜] when Firm i satisfies the de-
mand derived from (si,s j), then Firm i can manufacture the additional due to s′j
without additional setups. In order to minimize costs, such additional demand
should be served from the last period of the interval [1, n˜] in which the produc-
tion is activated, i.e. maxn=1,...,n˜{n|y∗i,n(si,s j) = 1}. Thus, the total holding cost
increases in hi · γi,nˆ ·∆(s′j,s j), but no additional setup occurs,
• if the optimal operations plan of Firm i related to the pair (si,s j) does not lead
to produce in the interval [1, n˜], Firm i can satisfy the additional demand by
activating the production in n˜. Hence, a new setup cost arises, but no additional
holding cost exists.
The minimum between the values of the last two scenarios provides the upper
bound for τ(si,s′j,s j) proposed in the lemma.
From Lemma 3.3 we can use the price information of s∗i (s j) to characterize s∗i (s′j)
when s j ∈ δn˜(s j). In particular, we obtain upper and lower bounds for the price of the
best response in each period, as we show in Theorem 3.3.
Theorem 3.3. Given the pure pricing strategies s j ∈ S j and s′j ∈ δn˜(s j), and si ∈ Si
such that si,n˜ ≤ s∗i,n˜(s j), if y∗i,n˜(s∗i (s j),s j) = 1, then Firm i prefers s∗i (s j) instead of si
as a response to s′j. In other words, under the condition that the best response to the
opponent’s strategy leads to produce in period nˆ, Firm i will not decrease its price in
nˆ if the opponent increases its price in such period.
Given the pure pricing strategies s j ∈ S j and s′j ∈ δn˜(s j), and si ∈ Si such that si,n˜≥
s∗i,n˜(s′j), if y∗i,n˜(s∗i (s′j),s′j)= 1, then Firm i prefers s∗i (s′j) instead of si as a response to s j.
In other words, under the condition that the best response to the opponent’s strategy
leads to produce in period nˆ, Firm i will not increase its price in nˆ if the opponent
decreases its price in such period, then .
Proof. We provide the proof for the first part of the theorem (we can derive the second
part in a similar fashion). Firm i will prefer s∗i (s j) instead of any si ∈ Si as a response
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to s′j, if condition Bi(s∗i (s j),s′j) ≥ Bi(si,s′j) holds. We can re-write the previous ex-
pression in terms of the incomes and costs related to s j.
Bi(s∗i (s j),s j)+ γi,n˜ ·∆(s′j,s j) · (s∗i,n˜(s−j )− si,n˜)≥
Bi(si,s j)+ τ(s′j,s
∗
i (s j),s j)− τ(s′j,si,s j).
(3.19)
From Definition 3.1 , we certainly know that Bi(s∗i (s j),s j) ≥ Bi(si,s j),∀si ∈ Si.
Hence, the following expression is a sufficient condition for satisfying expression (3.19).
γi,n˜ ·∆(s′j,s j) · (s∗i (s j)− si,n˜)≥ τ(s′j,s∗i (s j),s j)− τ(s′j,si,s j). (3.20)
Moreover, Lemma 3.3 establishes that τ(s′j,s∗i (s j),s j)≥ τ(s′j,s∗i (s j),s j) and τ(s′j,s j)
≤ τ(si(s j),s′j,s j), hence the right hand side of the previous expression is upper bounded
by τ(s′j,s∗i (s j),s j)−τ(s′j,s j). Thus, if the following expression holds, condition (3.20)
is satisfied.
γi,n˜ ·∆(s′j,s j) · (s∗i,n˜(s j)− si,n˜)≥ hi(s∗i (s j),s j) · γi,n˜ ·∆(s′j,s j). (3.21)
By simplifying expression 3.21, we obtain s∗i,n˜(s j)− si,n˜ ≥ hi(s∗i (s j),s j). The right
hand side of this expression is less than 0 for any price larger than s∗i (s j), and conse-
quently, the condition will not hold. Nevertheless, we are interested in prices smaller
than or equal to s∗i (s j), in such cases the condition will hold only if hi(s∗i (s
−
j ),s
−
j ) = 0,
which occurs when y∗i,n˜(si,s j) = 1.
Theorem 3.3 provides upper ad lower bounds for the price that a firm will set in
each period in order to respond to the opponent’s pure pricing strategy. We can utilize
these bounds for fixing the values of some of the variables wi of model (3.15) - (3.17),
so we can reduce the time needed to find a best response strategy.
3.5 Obtaining a Nash Equilibrium
In this section we describe how to utilize the characterizations introduced in Sec-
tion 3.4 in order to reduce the time for constructing the payoff matrices of the best
responses of the firms. We study three approaches for constructing such matrices:
Best Response (Approach BR), Ex-ante (Approach EA) and Full Characterization
(Approach FC). Here, we explain the implementation of each approach:
• Approach BR constructs pay-off matrices through solving the best response
problem for each opponent’s pure pricing strategy. We use model (3.7) for
computing best response strategies.
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• Approach EA is similar to Approach BR, but we implement the conditions in-
troduced in Corollaries 3.1 - 3.3. So, we decrease the number of responses
that should be analyzed for each pure strategy of the opponent. Further, we use
Corollaries 3.1 - 3.3 for identifying pure pricing strategies that the opponent will
not choose as best responses. In this way, we reduce the number of opponent’s
strategies to be revised when constructing payoff matrices.
• Approach FC uses the same conditions of Approach EA, but it takes advan-
tage of the fact that we identify iteratively the best responses to the opponent’s
strategies. If we implement the bounds derived in Section 3.4.2, we may avoid
solving some best response problems.
Implementing the proposed approaches can help to reduce the computational time
required to compute an equilibrium between firms in comparison to the computation
of the full pay-off matrices. The magnitude of such reductions, however, will depend
on how we process the available information. In particular, the computational time as-
sociated to Approach FC depends on the sequence in which the opponent’s strategies
are analyzed. For example, let us consider three pure pricing strategies of the oppo-
nent for N = 3: s1 = (L j,L j,L j), s2 = (M j,L j,L j), s3 = (U j,L j,L j). If we solve the
best response problems by following the sequence s1,s2,s3, once we obtain s∗i (s1) we
may establish lower bounds for s∗i (s2) and s∗i (s3). After obtaining s∗i (s2), the accuracy
of the lower bound for s∗i (s3) may be improved. But the sequence s1,s3,s2 could be
more efficient, because once we obtain s∗i (s1) and s∗i (s3), there may be a lower bound
and an upper bound for s∗i (s2). In this way, solving the problem related to s∗i (s2) may
not be required for computing an equilibrium between firms. Based on this example,
we propose an algorithm for obtaining the best responses of a firm. In Figure 3.1a
we show the dynamic of this algorithm for N = 2. Each cell represents a pure pric-
ing strategy of the opponent, and the number in the cells symbolizes the sequence in
which the opponent’s pure pricing strategies are analyzed. The dashed line represents
the potential lower and upper bounds that we derive from solving the best response
problem to a strategy of the opponent. Further, Figure 3.1b shows the dynamics of
a procedure consisting in solving the best response problem by following an ordinal
sequence of the strategies of the opponent. Clearly, the opportunity of getting upper
and lower bounds for the best response problems is increased by implementing the
proposed sequence.
3.6 Numerical Experiments
In this section we investigate the efficiency in obtaining a NE (or MNE) when imple-
menting the approaches introduced in Section 3.5. Moreover, we aim to get insights
about the following aspect of the LSP under competition:
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(a) Proposed Sequence. (b) Ordinal Sequence.
Figure 3.1: Sequence for exploring pure pricing strategies of the opponent.
• The sensitivity of the computational time when varying the different parameters
of the problem.
• The changes of the price strategy chosen by the firms when varying the different
parameters of the problem.
• The effect of the demand seasonality on the pricing strategy of the firms.
• The effect of implementing a constant price policy on the profits of the firms.
Our analysis provides evidence about the potential interest of dynamic pricing.
• For operations with capacity constraints, we analyse the effects of the produc-
tion capacity of the firms on the profits.
In our analysis we assume identical firms, i.e., we test instances in which the pro-
duction activities, the prices and the demand functions are characterized by identical
parameters for both firms. For each instance, we derive the NE that maximizes the
sum of the profit of the firms, in other words, we maximize max(bi + b j) subject to
the constraints (3.8) - (3.13). If such equilibrium does not exist we assume the firms
randomize their price strategies, i.e., we compute a MNE for such scenarios. Further-
more, we assume that the prices from Li, Mi and Ui ∀i = 1,2 already include the unit
production cost of the items from the final price, thus we set the value of such cost to
0.
Our tests were implemented in the Java language. The computer used was a 6-
Core Intel Xeon 2×2.66 GHz with 48 GB of RAM. MIP problems are solved using
Gurobi 4.6.1 (http://www.gurobi.com/).
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3.6.1 Computational time
We compare the computational time for solving the pricing problem when we utilize
Approach BR, Approach EA and Approach FC. We analyze 1,792 instances, which
are the result of the full factorial combination of the following parameters: N = 2, ...,7;
fi = {2.00,8.00}; βi,n = {0.25,2.00}; γi,n = {0.20 · βi,n,0.80 · βi,n} (it is natural to
assume that γi,n ≤ βi,n since in general the demand for a product is more sensitive to its
own price); hi = {0.20,0.80}; Li = {1.00,4.00} and Mi−Li =Ui−Mi = {0.40,1.60}.
Further, we utilize the parameter d = {0.40,1.60} to define the minimum demand in
each period, where αi,n = d+βi,n ·Ui−γi,n ·Li. This experiment does not consider the
effect of seasonality.
Table 3.1 summarizes the average computational time for calculating payoff ma-
trices through the approaches considered. For Approach EA and Approach FC, we
compute the percentage reduction of the number of best response problems that have
to be solved in comparison to Approach BR. Further, we include the time for comput-
ing the NE based on constraints (3.8) - (3.13).
Approach
BR EA FC NE
N Time Time % red. Time % red. Time
2 0.1 0.0 64.2% 0.0 76.0% 0.0
3 0.2 0.1 69.3% 0.0 85.0% 0.1
4 1.0 0.5 72.4% 0.1 89.4% 0.3
5 4.4 2.2 74.4% 0.3 91.7% 1.3
6 15.8 7.8 75.6% 0.9 93.7% 6.0
7 62.5 27.4 76.5% 3.2 94.1% 24.4
Table 3.1: Average Computational Time for Obtaining a Nash Equilibriul by Different Ap-
proaches (in seconds).
From Table 3.1 we get insights about the relative efficiency of the different ap-
proaches. As we could expect, the computational time associated to Approach BR
increases exponentially with the number of periods. This time is significantly reduced
when implementing Approach FC, because this approach computes the payoff matri-
ces of the firms by solving the best response problem for a part of the whole number
of the opponent’s pure pricing strategies.
Given that the computational time of the approaches considered grows exponen-
tially with N, we modify our analysis for larger instances. Now, we measure the num-
ber of opponent’s strategies revised in 1 minute by the different approaches. Based
on such measure, we estimate the time for computing the set of best responses of the
firms. Note that, this indicator may underestimate the performance of Approach FC,
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because this approach is more efficient in reducing calculations when the number of
strategies increases (the links between pure pricing strategies of Figure 3.1b increase
with N). For this new experiment we analyze instances where fi = 2.00, βi,n = 2.00,
γi,n = {0.20 ·βi,n,0.5 ·βi,n,0.80 ·βi,n}, hi = 0.80, Li = 1.00, Mi−Li =Ui−Mi = 0.40
and d = 0.40. Figure 3.2 summarizes the results.
For large instances, FC Approach computes the sets of best responses in a time
shorter than the other approaches. For instance, Approach BR requires around 100
minutes for obtaining the set of best responses when N = 9, while Approach FC
requires around 1 minute for the same task.
Once the set of best responses is computed, we should obtain a NE between such
sets. The last column of Table 3.1 shows that the computational time for obtaining a
NE increases with the number of periods. This trend is explained by two facts: (i) the
set of best response strategies increases with N and (ii) the LSP that we should solve
for obtaining the payoff between best response strategies becomes more complex for
larger values of N. Nevertheless, the computational time for obtaining a NE is in
general shorter than the time for identifying the set of best responses.
In order to identify the characteristics of the firms that lead to larger computa-
tional times, we analyze the sensitivity of the computational time with respect to
changes in the different parameters of the problem. With this end, we use two in-
dicators: (i) T BR/T FC, the ratio between the computational time for determining the
sets of best responses of the firms when implementing Approach BR and Approach
FC and (ii) T BR/T NE, the ratio between the computational time for the sets of best
responses when using Approach BR and the time for calculating a NE. Large values
of T BR/T FC indicate that implementing Approach FC leads to significant reductions
of the computational time. Large values of T BR/T NE implies that determining the
sets of best responses corresponds to the bottleneck for solving the pricing problem,
therefore, any improvement in this step will reduce the total time for setting prices.
We vary indistinctly the value of the different parameters of the problem based on
the following starting instance: T = 6, f = 5, d = 0.5, βi,n = 1.25, γi,n = 0.5 · βi,n,
hi = 0.5, Li = 2.5, and ∆p = 1. Figure 3.3 summarizes the values of T BR/T FC and
T BR/T NE.
In general, Approach FC reduces by a factor of at least 10 the computational time
for determining the set of best responses in comparison to Approach BR. The conve-
nience of utilizing Approach FC is reinforced by the fact that in most of the instances
considered the ratio T BR/T NE is large. Nevertheless, there are two instances that
constitute exceptions. First, T BR/T NE is close to 1 when ∆p = 1.2 as we observe in
Figure 3.3f, Even though the time for computing a NE is similar to the time of getting
the set of best responses, in this instance the two computational times are negligible.
Second, when γ/β ≥ 0.7 in Figure 3.3d, computing the set of best responses does
not correspond to the bottleneck of the whole pricing problem. Moreover, the com-
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(a) γi,nβi,n = 0.2
(b) γi,nβi,n = 0.5
(c) γi,nβi,n = 0.8
Figure 3.2: Estimated Computational Time for Computing Payoff Matrices by Using Different
Approaches. T = 6, f = 5, d = 0.5, βi,n = 1.25, γi,n = 0.5 ·βi,n, hi = 0.5, Li = 2.5, and ∆p = 1.
putational time for obtaining a NE is significant for this instance, and consequently,
Approach FC helps to reduce the computational time, but its global impact is less
significant.
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(a) Sensitivity to hi. (b) Sensitivity to fi,n.
(c) Sensitivity to βi,n. (d) Sensitivity to γi,n.
(e) Sensitivity to Li. (f) Sensitivity to ∆p.
Figure 3.3: Computational Time for Solving the Pricing Problem of the Firms by Implementing
Different Approaches. T = 6, f = 5, d = 0.5, βi,n = 1.25, γi,n = 0.5 ·βi,n, hi = 0.5, Li = 2.5,
and ∆p = 1.
3.6.2 Price Selection
We conduct experiments to measure how the price that each firm selects for a pe-
riod varies with the parameters of the problem. For these experiments we generate
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instances from the base set of parameters utilized on the sensitivity analysis of the
computational time. Tables 3.2 - 3.7 summarize the results for these experiments.
As we observe from Table 3.2, the total demand accepted by a firm during the
production horizon tends to be stable with respect to the changes in the holding costs.
Nevertheless, the distribution of the prices during the horizon depends on the value
of hi. For instance, when the holding cost is low, a firm tends to manufacture during
the first periods, while it keeps the demand in the last periods low (higher prices). On
the contrary, when the holding cost is higher, the production is more frequent, and the
peaks of demands (low prices) are more disperse in the horizon.
Period
h 1 2 3 4 5 6
0.1 1.5 1.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
0.3 1.5 2.5 2.5 1.5 2.5 2.5
0.5 1.5 2.5 2.5 1.5 2.5 2.5
0.7 1.5 2.5 1.5 2.5 1.5 2.5
0.9 1.5 2.5 1.5 2.5 1.5 2.5
Table 3.2: Price Selection for Different Values of hi. T = 6, f = 5, d = 0.5, βi,n = 1.25,
γi,n = 0.5 ·βi,n, Li = 2.5, and ∆p = 1.
Table 3.3 shows the relation between price strategies and fixed production costs.
The NE leads to higher prices when the value of the set-up cost is more significant.
This phenomenon is explained by two facts. First, when the set-up cost is high, a firm
tends to produce in less periods in order to reduce the number of periods in which the
production is carried out, so this firm has an incentive to increase its prices. Second,
when the set-up cost is high, a firm should increases prices in order to cover such
costs.
Period
f 1 2 3 4 5 6
0.2 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
0.6 1.5 2.5 1.5 2.5 1.5 2.5
1.0 1.5 2.5 2.5 1.5 2.5 2.5
1.4 1.5 2.5 2.5 1.5 2.5 2.5
1.8 1.5 2.5 2.5 1.5 2.5 2.5
Table 3.3: Price Selection for Different Values of fi. T = 6, d = 0.5, βi,n = 1.25, γi,n = 0.5 ·βi,n,
hi = 0.5, Li = 2.5, and ∆p = 1
62 3. Pricing and Operations Planning Under Competition
As we could expect, the firms will choose higher prices when the demand for
a product is less sensitive to its own price (smaller values of βi,n), as we show in
Table 3.4.
Period
β 1 2 3 4 5 6
0.25 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
0.75 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
1.25 1.5 2.5 2.5 1.5 2.5 2.5
1.75 1.5 2.5 1.5 2.5 1.5 2.5
2.25 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
Table 3.4: Price Selection for Different Values of βi,n. T = 6, f = 5, d = 0.5, γi,n = 0.5 ·βi,n,
hi = 0.5, Li = 2.5, and ∆p = 1
In terms of the level of substitution between products, larger values of the ratio
γi,n
βi,n
implies that the demand in each period is less sensitive to the price between firms.
Therefore, the price that firms select for each period is higher when γi,nβi,n increases.
Period
γ
β 1 2 3 4 5 6
0.1 1.5 1.5 2.5 1.5 1.5 2.5
0.3 1.5 2.5 2.5 1.5 2.5 2.5
0.5 1.5 2.5 2.5 1.5 2.5 2.5
0.7 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
0.9 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
Table 3.5: Price Selection for Different Values of γi,nβi,n . T = 6, f = 5, d = 0.5, hi = 0.5, Li = 2.5,
and ∆p = 1.
Now, we focus on the changes of the prices of the firms. Tables 3.6 - 3.7 show
the relation between the prices selected by the firms and changes of the values of
prices and price differences, respectively. We observe that the firms tend to choose
high prices when the part of demands that is independent of the prices is larger (see
Table 3.6) or when the difference between prices is high (see Tables 3.7). Note that,
when the minimum price is large (Li = 3.5 or Li = 4.5 in Table 3.6), the price may not
increase anymore. This is because less price sensitive demand makes the price deci-
sion more independent between periods. Moreover, the income function is concave,
then the discrete price selected by the firms tends to be close to the optimal continuous
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price. The effect is less significant when the NE provides the minimum sum of profits,
given that the firms will not necessarily maximize the mentioned convex function.
Periods
Li Mi Ui 1 2 3 4 5 6
0.5 1.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
1.5 2.5 3.5 2.5 2.5 3.5 2.5 2.5 3.5
2.5 3.5 4.5 2.5 3.5 3.5 2.5 3.5 3.5
3.5 4.5 5.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
4.5 5.5 6.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5
Table 3.6: Price Selection for Different Values of Li. T = 6, f = 5, d = 0.5, βi,n = 1.25,
γi,n = 0.5 ·βi,n, hi = 0.5, and ∆p = 1.
Periods
Li Mi Ui 1 2 3 4 5 6
1.5 1.7 1.9 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
1.5 2.1 2.7 1.5 1.5 2.7 1.5 1.5 2.7
1.5 2.5 3.5 1.5 3.5 3.5 1.5 3.5 3.5
1.5 2.9 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3
1.5 3.3 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1
Table 3.7: Price Selection for Different Values of ∆p. T = 6, f = 5, d = 0.5, βi,n = 1.25,
γi,n = 0.5 ·βi,n, and hi = 0.5.
3.6.3 Impact of Demand Seasonality
We study the changes of the pricing strategies of the firms when seasonality of the
demand arises. In order to model seasonality, we assume that the demand sensitivity
to prices is constant, but the amount of demand that is independent of the prices will
vary with the time, i.e. the value of αi,n depends on n. We study two scenarios of
seasonality: increasing demand (αi,n ≤ αi,n+1) and decreasing demand (αi,n ≥ αi,n+1).
We set the value of αi,n based on the parameter m, such that αi,n = αi,1 + n ·m for
increasing demands and αi,n = αi,N +(N− n) ·m for decreasing demands. The rest
of the parameters corresponds to the base set considered in the sensitivity analysis of
the computational time, but we vary the level of price sensitivity. We summarize the
results in Table 3.8.
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Period
β m 1 2 3 4 5 6
-20% 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
-10% 3.5 3.5 3.5 2.5 3.5 3.5
0.2 0% 2.5 2.5 3.5 2.5 3.5 3.5
10% 2.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
20% 2.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
-20% 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
-10% 2.5 2.5 2.5 1.5 2.5 2.5
0.5 0% 1.5 2.5 2.5 1.5 2.5 2.5
10% 1.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
20% 1.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
-20% 2.5 2.5 1.5 2.5 1.5 2.5
-10% 1.5 2.5 1.5 2.5 1.5 2.5
0.8 0% 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.5 1.5 2.5
10% 1.5 2.5 1.5 2.5 1.5 2.5
20% 1.5 2.5 1.5 2.5 1.5 2.5
Table 3.8: Price per Period for Different Demand Seasonality. T = 6, f = 5, d = 0.5, βi,n =
1.25, γi,n = 0.5 ·βi,n, hi = 0.5, Li = 2.5, and ∆p = 1.
Decreasing demands (m< 0) imply that the part of the demand that is not sensitive
to the prices (αi,n) is relative larger than the sensitive part during the first periods, so a
firm will tend to choose higher prices in these periods, as we can observe in Table 3.8.
When the demand is increasing with the time (m> 0), a firm will set higher prices in
comparison to m= 0, but the increases will not necessarily occur in the last periods in
which the demand is less sensitive to the prices.
3.6.4 Impact of Dynamic Pricing
If each firm sets an unique price for the a production horizon, then the complexity of
the problem may decreased, because the set of space of pure pricing strategies is re-
duced. We measure how firms can gain or loose by setting static prices in comparison
to the dynamic pricing. With this in mind, we compare the profit of a firm for three
scenarios: both firms set dynamic prices, both firms set static prices, a firm set static
prices, but its opponent set dynamic prices. In our experiments we utilize the same
instances considered in Section 3.6.2 The results are summarized in Figure 3.4.
In general the firms can be hurt by setting static pricing in comparison to the dy-
namic pricing. Even so, under certain scenarios playing simultaneously static prices
could be more convenient for the firms (see Figures 3.4d , 3.4b and 3.4d). The firms
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(a) Sensitivity to hi. (b) Sensitivity to fi,n.
(c) Sensitivity to βi,n. (d) Sensitivity to γi,n.
(e) Sensitivity to Li. (f) Sensitivity to ∆p.
Figure 3.4: Profit of a Firm by Static Pricing and Dynamic Pricing. T = 6, f = 5, d = 0.5,
βi,n = 1.25, γi,n = 0.5 ·βi,n, hi = 0.5, Li = 2.5, and ∆p = 1
may utilize this fact as an incentive to choose simultaneously static pricing strategies,
but these simultaneous decisions may not be feasible in practice, because they con-
stitute a collusive practice between competitors. Therefore, our analysis focuses on
the effect of setting unilaterally static prices on the profit of a firm. As we show in
Figures 3.4a , 3.4b and 3.4d, the firms cannot get advantages from such decisions, i.e.
static pricing may reduce the profit of a firm in comparison to dynamic pricing.
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3.6.5 Capacitated Lot Sizing Problem
We analyze the effect of increasing the production capacities of both firms on the sum
of the profits of the firms. Given that larger production capacities lead to reductions
of the production costs of the firms, we could expect that such capacity increase leads
to larger profits. Our numerical experiments, however, provide evidence that the sum
of the profit of the firms may decrease when the capacity increases.
By setting additional capacity, the firms may benefit from the economies of scales
arising on their production activities, so the firms can accept larger demands by set-
ting lower prices. This is favorable for the company if the incomes from the de-
mand increase surpass the reduction of prices. An example of this phenomenon is
γi,n/βi,n = 0.2 in Figure 3.5. Nevertheless, if both firms reduce simultaneously their
prices, the increase of demand will be less significant because the substitution effect
of the products, therefore, the profit of the firms may be reduced. For instance, when
γi,n/βi,n = 0.8 the firms can gain from increasing their capacities from 5.5 to 6.5, but
they will be hurt if they continue increasing their capacities.
Figure 3.5: Sum of the Profits of the Firms for Different level of Production Capacities. T = 6,
f = 5, d = 0.5, hi = 0.5, Li = 2.5, and ∆p = 1
Another interesting discussion is how a firm modifies its profits by increasing uni-
laterally its production capacity. Table 3.9 summarizes the result of these experiments.
Table 3.9 shows that increasing unilaterally the production capacity is not always con-
venient for a firm.
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Cap γβ = 0.2
γ
β = 0.5
γ
β = 0.8
5.5 33.8 41.6 44.0
6.0 34.1 38.5 47.5
6.5 35.0 42.9 48.4
7.0 35.0 43.4 48.4
7.5 35.0 43.4 48.4
8.0 35.0 41.8 48.4
8.5 35.0 41.8 48.4
9.0 35.6 41.8 48.4
9.5 35.6 41.8 48.4
10.0 35.6 44.2 48.5
Table 3.9: Profit of a Firm by Increasing Unillaterally its Capacity. T = 6, f = 5, d = 0.5,
βi,n = 1.25, γi,n = 0.5 ·βi,n, hi = 0.5, Li = 2.5, and ∆p = 1
3.7 Summary and Conclusions
We study the problem of pricing and production of two firms that offer mutually sub-
stitute products. For the pricing decisions, we assume that each firm maximize its
profits by choosing a price from a discrete set of options. Related to the production
decisions, we model the operations of each firm as a LSP. Computing an equilibrium
between the pricing strategies requires the full mapping of the firms pay-off, so this
calculation may be computational demanding when the size of the problem increases.
We propose a methodology for identifying the pricing strategies that will lead the
equilibrium between firms, in such a way that we can discard the computation of the
pay-off for other strategies.
Our methodology consists of two steps. In the first step, we characterize the pric-
ing strategies of a firm that constitute the set of best responses to the opponent’s strate-
gies. Given an opponent’s strategy, we calculate the best response by solving a MIP
formulation. In the second step, we calculate a NE between the strategies between the
strategies arising from the first step. Again, we calculate the NE by solving a MIP
formulation. Through numerical experiments we show that our methodology lead to
significant reduction of time for solving the pricing problem of the firms in compari-
son to a full mapping of the pay-off of the firms.
Although our methodology considers two competitors and three discrete prices, to
extend it to more competitors or more prices is straightforward. Indeed, when more
firms compete or the set of available prices is larger we could expect that our method-
ology will lead to larger reductions of the computational time, because our character-
ization will significantly shrink the space of strategies. Further, although we assume a
linear relation between demand and prices, the way we build our methodology can be
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applied to other type of demand functions.
We also provide managerial insights that can enlighten the actions of decision
makers. We show that two firms that compete between each other can obtain larger
profits by making dynamic pricing decisions in comparison to setting static pricing
strategies. Furthermore, we show that when the operations of the firms have capac-
ity limitations, if the firms increase their capacity, they may be hurt for that action.
Moreover, this counter intuitive phenomenon may also occur when a firm increases its
capacity unilaterally.
We propose to extend our work to the following research avenues:
• To examine the trade-off between the price and the delivery time that firms
promise to customers when working under competition. In practice, the de-
mand of customer depends on the price, but it can also depend on other factors
such as the promised delivery time. In that scenario, promising a shorter time
will bring more demand, however, this will require additional efforts when man-
aging operations.
• Obtaining a NE when the firms have incomplete information about the oppo-
nent’s strategies. The procedure for obtaining such NE have a similar structure
that the problem we study, however, the complexity in reaching the equilibrium
will increase due to the uncertainty. We glimpse two options for the formula-
tion of the operations planning under uncertainty: (i) to model the operations of
each firm as as a Stochastic LSP, (ii) to plan the operations in order to obtain a
plan for operations that is robust with respect to the changes of the opponent’s
strategy (the formulation of the problem is a Robust LSP).
Chapter 4
Planning Operations for Revenue
Maximization Under Lead Time Constraints
4.1 Introduction
This article is motivated by the case of a cast iron manufacturer. This company is
specialized in the production of cast iron pieces for industrial equipments. Most of its
orders are either for the preventive maintenance of installations or for the building of
new facilities. Such projects are scheduled with long lead times, but it is very impor-
tant that the pieces be delivered on time because the plant where the pieces have to be
installed will have to be (at least partially) stopped for the maintenance or installation
activities to take place and obviously the duration of such stoppage should be mini-
mized. A different type of orders received by the company corresponds to corrective
maintenance when a breakdown occurs in a plant, in those cases a new cast iron piece
is needed to restart the facility. Given that production at the customer is stopped be-
cause of the breakdown, a much faster service is required but the company can charge
higher prices for such “emergency” orders. Moreover, the bargaining power of the
customer is much weaker in such circumstances. Given its finite production capacity,
the company cannot always accept all orders and should sometimes forego a regu-
lar order in order to keep some possibility to accept an urgent order later on. This
dilemma is faced by many suppliers confronted with urgent requests that are poten-
tially very profitable but could be very disruptive if not taken into account in their
planning. Typical examples from the service sector include heating ventilation air-
conditioning (HVAC) companies. The installation of new systems is typically a large
project with a relatively long lead time. In contrast, when a system fails it could block
the operations of a customer that is then willing to pay a higher fee for speedy action.
In a very different context, suppliers of the fashion industry are known to combine
orders from large vendors and more profitable orders for high fashion clothes which
often require fast delivery (see e.g. deB Harris and Pinder, 1995, Barut and Sridharan,
2005). The question facing the supplier is how much capacity should be set aside
for the urgent high margin demand, given the inherent unpredictability of this type of
orders.
To address this question, we build a model with a supplier that handles two demand
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classes, that we will refer to as regular and urgent respectively. The regular orders
are typically characterized by longer processing times, longer lead times but lower
margins, while the urgent orders have shorter processing times, shorter lead-times and
higher margins. If the supplier accepts orders without foresight it is likely that at some
point, when an urgent order arrives, the supplier will be unable to accept this order as
her short term capacity is already entirely committed for regular orders (that were
booked earlier with a longer lead time). Given the difference in margin between the
two classes, this situation causes some loss of revenue. On the other hand, rejecting
a regular order in anticipation for potential urgent orders that do not materialize, also
causes some revenue loss.
This tradeoff has clear similarities with other revenue management problems. The
distinct feature is that when an order is accepted the supplier keeps some flexibility.
For example, if a regular order necessitates 10 days of work and the lead time is 20
days, in most cases the customer does not care about the days during which the order
is effectively produced as long as it is finished on time. In revenue management terms,
if we consider that the capacity available during each period is a distinct product, an
order requiring more than one period of work is in fact reserving several products.
But the supplier has some flexibility in assigning the products to the order and does
not need to make a commitment at the time of reservation. Such consideration is rea-
sonable and represent the reality at many firms in which jobs can be interrupted and
resumed in later periods. One can draw a parallelism with the network revenue man-
agement problem but where the supplier can accept a reservation without committing
to specific legs in the network, the only commitment is on the origin and destination
points in the network.
Our contribution are summarized as follows:
• We derive a Markov Decision Process (MDP) formulation of the order accep-
tance problem of two customer classes with lead time constraints. Likewise for
the network revenue management problem, the size of this formulation quickly
excludes the possibility of solving it exactly for larger size instances. We de-
velop a family of approximate formulations parametrizable to range from a
coarse approximation to the original full formulation. This makes it possible
to choose between speed of solution and precision of result. What is of partic-
ular interest is that for each formulation, we can compute an upper and lower
bound on the exact result. This last feature is rather uncommon for revenue
management problems and is particularly interesting to make sure the adequate
level of approximation is chosen in the proposed family of formulations.
• Through a numerical study we show that the proposed heuristics allow to obtain
near-optimal solutions in a tractable time. We also show how the potential bene-
fit of revenue management is commensurate with operational flexibility. In our
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setting operational flexibility consists in the slack between the promised lead
time for an order class and the processing time needed for such order.
The remainder of the Chapter is structured as follows. In Section 4.2 we discuss
related work. In Section 4.3 we provide a detailed description of our problem. In
Section 4.4 we introduce an MDP formulation and discuss its resolution to obtain the
optimal admission policy. In Section 4.5 we propose two heuristic formulations of
the problem based on different levels of state aggregation and report on a numerical
study of our proposed formulations in Section 4.6. Section 4.7 investigates the impact
of operational flexibility on the benefit of revenue management. Finally, Section 4.8
summarizes the main conclusions and identifies future research directions.
4.2 Literature Review
Our work belongs to the growing literature of Perishable Asset Revenue Management
(PARM) which deals with the problem of allocation of scarce resources to different
demand classes. Talluri and van Ryzin (2004) give a comprehensive overview of this
topic. The first applications were for the airline industry by Littlewood (1972), and
extended by Belobaba (1987), Wollmer (1992), and Brumelle and McGill (1993).
In addition to airlines, typical service applications are in hotel management and car
rental (Kimes, 1989, Bertsimas and Sim, 2003, Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004, Bitran
and Mondschein, 1995, Geraghty and Johnson, 1997). Gradually, new applications
appeared for very different environments such as: MTO manufacturing (Balakrishnan
et al., 1996, Barut and Sridharan, 2005, Spengler et al., 2007), project management
(Herbots et al., 2007, 2010) and health care (Gupta and Wang, 2008, Dobson et al.,
2011).
A stream of literature related to lead-times decisions focuses on due-date quota-
tion and scheduling problems in order to allocate the available capacity to incoming
orders (see e.g. Kaminsky and Hochbaum, 2004, Keskinocak and Tayur, 2004, for an
extensive literature review). Most of these works assign dynamically lead times to in-
coming orders depending on the state of the system and sequencing policies (see e.g.
Duenyas, 1995, Duenyas and Hopp, 1995, Kapuscinski and Tayur, 2007). Kapuscinski
and Tayur (2007) propose a dynamic programming approach to address the problem
of lead-time quotation for two demand classes when customers are not equally sen-
sitive to waiting. Lead time quotation is used to ensure that the capacity is allocated
in such a way that all demands can be delivered on time. So, firms can change the
quoted lead time based on the system state. Motivated by the prevalence of static lead
time policies (see e.g. Cheng and Gupta, 1989, Hopp and Sturgis, 2000, Keskinocak
and Tayur, 2004), we consider a different problem in which lead times are constant
and exogenously given. Since the capacity may not be enough to cater all demands,
the decision becomes accepting or rejecting orders depending on the system state.
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Gupta and Wang (2007) consider an order acceptance problem in which the lead
time requirement for regular orders is modelled as a soft operational constraint. It is
assumed that tardiness cost is incurred if regular orders are not filled within their lead
time window while urgent orders must be filled in the current period once accepted.
The authors propose a multi-dimensional MDP whose optimal solution turns out to
be a threshold based policy. This solution property is a consequence of the simplicity
of their model setting, which leads to a well-structured value function. In contrast,
our model is more general, assuming some flexibility in catering urgent orders – the
lead time for urgent order does not necessarily need to be one. The state space in
our problem is defined in a different way as in Gupta and Wang (2007), because their
representation involves tracking the backlogging information for every demand class
and becomes particularly inefficient when there are multiple demand classes, which
greatly limits its application. Our representation ”encodes” in itself the capacity allo-
cation decisions and therefore is more efficient.
The following references focus on acceptance decision problems where the lead
times must be strictly respected, as in our case. Germs and Van Foreest (2011) study
an order acceptance problem with multiple customer classes with a common deadline,
setup times and scheduling constraints. The problem is modelled as a Markov chain
controlled by a threshold policy. The authors provide a numerical study for small
instances which are computationally tractable. In contrast to their work, we provide
efficient alternative methods to treat the state space explosion. Barut and Sridharan
(2005) study an order acceptance problem involving multiple demand classes that
differ in terms of price, lead time and demand pattern. The authors propose a nested
rationing policy which fulfils incoming orders as much as possible while preserving
a certain level of capacity for more profitable future orders. The proposed policy is
computed using a myopic heuristic method, that does not take the evolution of the
capacity into account. Consequently, the efficiency of the heuristic is hurt by the
simplified estimation of the future available capacity. Our formulation keeps track
more accurately of the capacity evolution for this type of problem, leading to highly
efficient policies.
Literature related to development and implementation of different approximate
methods to reduce the computational time required to solve large instances of dy-
namic problems is abundant. Examples of methods developed to solve MDPs include
state aggregation techniques (see e.g. Mendelssohn, 1982, Bean et al., 1987, Aldha-
heri and Khalil, 1991, Hu and Wu, 2000, Zhang and Baras, 2001, Van Roy, 2006,
Jia, 2011), embedding/time aggregation approaches via value and policy iteration (see
e.g. Cao et al., 2002, Leizarowitz and Shwartz, 2008, Sun et al., 2007, Arruda and
Fragoso, 2011, Cheng and Zhang, 2012) and convergence acceleration methods for
value iteration (Almudevar and Arruda, 2012). In this research, we apply state ag-
gregation techniques for a problem of order acceptance when customer classes differ
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in their lead times. There is, however, a difference between the previous works and
our research: they are designed for solving MDP in general forms, while our aggre-
gation method is motivated by the specific characteristics of the problem of interest.
In this sense, our work is in the same spirit with Xu et al. (2007). The authors model
a ticket queue problem with a Markov chain and used state aggregation technique to
reduce the size of the state space based on the structure of the ticket queue. In this re-
search, we implement state aggregation techniques to aggregate some information of
the states of the system within the lead time window of the incoming orders. Thereby,
the infinite horizon problem is solved, and the state space of the problem is reduced.
There are some similarities with the network revenue management problem where
the dimension of the MDP models quickly make it impossible to solve exactly even
small size problems. Consequently, research in this area has concentrated on differ-
ent approximation techniques, notable examples of this stream of investigation in-
clude Bitran and Mondschein (1995), Talluri and van Ryzin (1998), Bertsimas and
Sim (2003), Adelman (2007), Kunnumkal and Topaloglu (2008), Zhang and Adelman
(2009), Zhang (2011). The flexibility aspect present in the problem studied here calls
for different types of approximations.
4.3 Model Description
We consider the order acceptance problem for a firm serving two customer classes
with different profit margins and lead times. The time horizon is infinite and consists
of discrete periods. In each period, the firm is subject to a limited processing capacity,
which is normalized to 1.
We consider that all uncertainty about the processing time is known when the
order is placed. This assumption is motivated by two reasons: on the one hand, in
practice most uncertainty is resolved during the ordering process; on the other hand,
if the remaining uncertainty is too large it is not possible to promise due dates without
either large safety lead times or a low utilization. In the cases that motivated our work,
we observed that the remaining processing time uncertainty after the order is placed
is dealt with using some type of recourse action such as overtime or renegotiation of
the due-date. These recourse actions play only a secondary role in the management of
capacity and are beyond the scope of our investigation.
The two classes of demand will be denominated, urgent and regular orders (in-
dexed by k = {1,2}, respectively). The demand (in terms of processing time) for class
k at time t will be denoted Dkt . We suppose the random variables take integer values
and are iid between time periods and independent between classes. If Dkt = 0 there
is no demand for class k in period t. The profit margin per unit capacity of a class
k customer is rk and its lead time is Lk. Urgent orders are more lucrative but come
with a short lead time, while regular orders are not as profitable, yet have a looser
74 4. Planning Operations for Revenue Maximization Under Lead Time Constraints
lead time. Accordingly, we assume r1 > r2 > 0 and L1 < L2. Figure 4.1 shows the
structure of the problem. We suppose that only a single order of each class can arrive
during any period t, this means that the demand Dkt cannot be partially accepted, the
firm either accepts the order and hence commits to deliver the order before its due
date or declines the order and gets no revenue. On-time delivery positively influences
customer experience and reinforces the long term image of firms. When confirming
orders, firms usually allocate sufficient capacity for processing the orders in a timely
manner. Since the processing capacity is deterministic in our model, it is reasonable
to plan with no tardiness.
Figure 4.1: Partition of Lead Time Window of Regular Demand.
Consequently, the main decision faced by the firm is how many orders to accept
in order to maximize its long-run net profit. However, we restrict our attention to the
order acceptance decisions of regular orders. We assume that regular orders can be
selectively rejected while urgent orders can only be passively rejected as a result of
insufficient available capacity. This is because urgent orders often arise in emergency
circumstances, and thus are granted with priority over regular orders.1
In each period, the sequence of events is as follows. A regular order, if any, arrives
first, and the firm decides whether to accept it or not. Then, an urgent order, if any,
arrives, it will be accepted as long as there is enough available capacity. Finally, the
firm uses the capacity in the current period for processing the order with the earliest
due date. In fact, the sequence of arrivals does not matter; one can assume that the
urgent order arrives before the regular order, or both arrive simultaneously, without
complicating the model.
In the remainder of the Chapter we will assume a somewhat simpler structure for
1The modeling framework in our research is general enough that the option of
rejecting urgent orders can be easily incorporated without substantial modification of
the model.
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the demand. We assume
Dkt =
{
0, with probability 1− pk,
Bk, with probability pk,
and thus the inter-arrival times are geometrically distributed in each demand class.
This simplifies the notations in the following sections and our numerical tests indicate
that the distribution of the demand has no qualitative impact on our results.
4.4 MDP Formulation for the Optimal Steady-State Pol-
icy
The crux of developing the MDP formulation of this problem is to find an efficient
representation of the usage of future capacity. Our representation builds on the idea
that when an order is accepted, some future capacity will be “reserved”. Reservation
refers to provisionally allocating the available capacity of the latest periods to process
an order without incurring tardiness. This gives the maximum flexibility to accept
the future orders. This notion is also used in the model formulation of Kapuscinski
and Tayur (2007). Note that, the allocation is provisional because the firm may start
processing earlier the order if there is no order to deliver before this one. When an
order is (partially) processed before its provisionally allocated time slot, some capacity
is freed to process future orders. For example, when accepting an order with a lead
time of 5 and a size of 2, the capacity of 4th and 5th periods from the current period
shall be reserved (provided that they are available for reservation), if the order will be
processed as soon as possible in the earliest-due-date (EDD) sequence.
To reserve capacity for new orders, the firm needs to calculate the total available
capacity for reservation within the lead time windows of regular and urgent orders.
Since the lead time window of urgent orders is contained within that of the regular
orders, it suffices to calculate the total available capacity within L1 periods, and that
between (L1 + 1)th and L2th periods, i.e. Interval I and Interval II of Figure 4.1,
respectively. However, this aggregate information cannot fully characterize the evolu-
tion of the system. Note that the (L1+1)th period, (i.e., the first period of Interval II),
will be shifted by one period and thus become the L1th period in the next period, (i.e.,
the last period of Interval I). Without the information regarding how the reserved ca-
pacity is distributed in Interval II, it is impossible to know whether the shifted capacity
is reserved or not in order to update the available capacity in Interval I and II in the
next period. Therefore, it is necessary to keep track of the distributional information
in Interval II, but only of aggregate information in Interval I.
We now introduce the notation to be used in our formulation.
• x: is the reservation vector, it keeps track of capacity that has been reserved
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for processing; x[0] ∈ {0,1, . . . ,L1} denotes the total reserved capacity until
the L1th period, (i.e., in Interval I). For j = 1,2, . . . ,L2 − L1, x[ j] = 1 if the
capacity of (L1 + j)th period is reserved, and x[ j] = 0 otherwise. Note that in
a reservation vector we do not distinguish whether the capacity is reserved for
urgent orders or regular orders.
• y: is the cumulative (available capacity) vector2 of x; for j = 0,1, . . . ,L2 −
L1, y[ j] denotes the total available capacity until the (L1 + j)th period, i.e.,
y[ j] = L1 + j−∑ ji=0 x[i]. For a given cumulative vector y, its corresponding
reservation vector x can be calculated as follows: x[0] = L1 − y[0], and for
j = 1,2, . . . ,L2−L1, x[ j] = y[ j−1]−y[ j]+1.
• a: represents the admission decision for regular orders; a = 1 if the firm “ad-
mits” the regular order, and a = 0 otherwise.
• D≡ (D1,D2): is the demand vector in each period.
• R(x,D,a): denotes the profit generated from D for a given admission decision
a, if the reservation vector at the beginning of the current period is x.
We define the system state as the reservation vector x at the beginning of a period,
before the arrival of regular and urgent orders. It is easy to check that x[L2−L1] = 0
for any system state, because the last element of the system state cannot be reserved
by orders that arrived in earlier periods. Thus, the system state space essentially in-
volves L2−L1 variables and its size is (L1 + 1) · 2L2−L1−1. Let x˜ be the reservation
vector updated from x after accepting/rejecting D2. Additionally, let x̂ be the system
state in the next period, this is the reservation vector updated from x˜ after accept-
ing/rejecting D1 and processing, if any, is carried out in the current period. Further,
let y˜ and ŷ be the corresponding cumulative vectors of x˜ and x̂, respectively. Thus,
x̂ and ŷ are functions of x, D and a: x̂ = x̂(x,D,a), ŷ = ŷ(x,D,a). According to the
average reward criteria (Ross, 1983, Bertsekas, 1995, Putermann, 2005), we provide
the dynamic programming formulation as follows,
V (x)+g = ED
{
max
a
{R(x,D,a)+V (x̂(x,D,a))}
}
,∀x, (4.1)
2y is introduced to facilitate the notations related to transitions between system
states, which are composed of reservation vectors. There is a one-to-one correspon-
dence between a reservation vector and its cumulative vector.
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together with the dynamics described by equations (4.2)-(4.7),
y˜[ j] =
{
y[ j]− (D2− (y[L2−L1]−y[ j]))+ , if a = 1 and y[L2−L1]≥ D2,
y[ j], otherwise,
(4.2)
for j = 0,1, , . . . ,L2−L1,
ŷ[ j] =
{
min{y˜[ j+1]−D1,L1+ j} , if y˜[0]≥ D1,
min{y˜[ j+1],L1+ j} , otherwise,
(4.3)
for j = 1,2, . . . ,L2−L1−1,
ŷ[L2−L1] = ŷ[L2−L1−1]+1, (4.4)
R(x,D,a) = R1(x˜,D1)+R2(x,D2,a), (4.5)
R2(x,D2,a) =
{
r2 ·D2, if a = 1 and y[L2−L1]≥ D2,
0, otherwise,
(4.6)
R1(x˜,D1) =
{
r1 ·D1, if y˜[0]≥ D1,
0, otherwise.
(4.7)
In the solution of Equation (4.1), g represents the steady state expected profit per
period. Equations (4.2)-(4.4) characterize the transition between system states x and
x̂, with the help of their corresponding cumulative vectors y and ŷ. Specifically, Equa-
tion (4.2) describes how y is updated to y˜, and Equations (4.3)-(4.4) further describe
how y˜ is updated to ŷ. When updating the system state, all accepted orders are sched-
uled in the reservation vector as late as possible within their lead time windows to
allow for maximal flexibility to process the orders. Equations (4.5)-(4.7) calculate the
profit generated during transitions. Specifically, R1(x˜,D1) represents the profit from
urgent orders and R2(x,D2,a) represents the profit from regular orders.
Example 1. Consider an instance with the following parameters: L1 = 4, L2 = 8,
B1 = 2, B2 = 3. Suppose the reservation vector at the beginning of the current period
is x = [2,0,1,1,0], meaning there are 2 units of capacity reserved in Interval I and 2
units reserved in Interval II, totaling 4 units of available capacity for fulfilling regular
orders. If a regular order arrives (D2 = B2 = 3), and the decision is to accept it, 1
unit of available capacity in Interval I and 2 units in Interval II will be reserved for
processing the order, and the reservation vector will be updated to x˜ = [3,1,1,1,1] or
y˜ = [1,1,1,1,1] (equation (4.2)). However, this leaves with only 1 unit of available
capacity within the lead time window of urgent orders, (i.e., y˜[0] = 1) and therefore,
there is not enough room to accommodate any urgent order (since B1 = 2). Finally,
the capacity of the current period is used to process one unit of order in Interval I, and
one unit of reserved capacity is shifted from Interval II into Interval I. Therefore, the
reservation vector observed at the beginning of next period becomes x̂ = [3,1,1,1,0]
or ŷ = [1,1,1,1,2] (equations (4.3) and (4.4)).
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4.5 State Reduction Heuristics
The formulation described in Section 4.4 leads to an optimal steady-state policy for ac-
cepting/rejecting regular orders. However, the size of the formulation, i.e., the number
of states, increases exponentially in L2−L1. For example, if L1 = 5 and L2 = 25, the
resulting formulation has 3,145,728 states. Thus, we seek to develop more compact
heuristic formulations.
The complexity of the formulation is largely related to keeping track of the dis-
tributional information in Interval II. To reduce the complexity, one plausible idea is
to somehow aggregate the distributional information in Interval II, so that the MDP
formulation can be reduced to involve fewer states. The reduced formulation can then
be used to generate heuristic policies.
We start with the Full Aggregation Heuristic (FAH) that completely ignores the
distributional information in Interval II. Though being extremely compact, the FAH
does not always lead to near-optimal solutions. Consequently, we propose the Par-
tial Aggregation Heuristic (PAH) which keeps the most “important” distributional in-
formation intact while aggregating the rest in Interval II. A major advantage of this
approach is that one can easily control the tradeoff between computation efforts and
optimality.
4.5.1 Full Aggregation Heuristic
We propose a new MDP formulation based on aggregate reservation vectors as op-
posed to reservation vectors in the original formulation. For a reservation vector x, we
define its corresponding aggregate reservation vector as x f = (x f [0],x f [1]), in which
x f [0] = x[0] and x f [1] = ∑L2−L1j=1 x[ j], i.e., x f [0] corresponds to the total reserved ca-
pacity in Interval I, and x f [1] corresponds to that in Interval II. Note that there can
be multiple reservation vectors mapping to the same aggregate reservation vector.
Further, we define y f = (y f [0],y f [1]) as the aggregate cumulative vector, in which
y f [0] = L1−x f [0] and y f [1] = L2−x f [0]−x f [1], i.e., y f [0] (respectively y f [1]) corre-
sponds to the total available capacity in the lead time window of urgent (respectively
regular) demands. The one-to-one mapping between an aggregate reservation vector
and its aggregate cumulative vector still holds.
The new system state is defined as the aggregate reservation vector in the begin-
ning of a period, and therefore only involves two dimensions. One way to think of the
new system state is that each one groups multiple system states in the original formula-
tion into a “super state” (Figure 4.2), resulting in a significantly shrunk state space. In
other words, the size of the aggregated state space is reduced from (L1+1) ·2(L2−L1−1)
to (L1+1) · (L2−L1).
Then we characterize how one new system state transits to another for a given ad-
mission policy a and demand pattern D under the new state space. Note that transitions
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Figure 4.2: The New System States Defined by “Super States”. This illustrative example shows
the states whose first element is 1 for an instance in which L2−L1 = 4.
triggered by accepting/rejecting demands and processing can be easily characterized,
but there is one step of transition that cannot be properly defined due to the aggrega-
tion, that is, how the aggregated reservation vector at the end of one period evolves
to the one at the beginning of the next period. As discussed previously, without dis-
tributional information in Interval II, it is impossible to decide whether the shifted
unit of capacity is reserved or not. To address this issue, we heuristically account for
the transfer of capacity based on assumptions regarding how the reserved capacity is
distributed in Interval II. We consider three scenarios as follows.
• Optimistic scenario. Assuming that all reserved capacity in Interval II (exclud-
ing the last unit) are distributed as late as possible, the shifted unit of capacity
is reserved only if Interval II (excluding the last unit) is “full”, i.e., all the ca-
pacity in this area has been reserved. “Optimistic” refers to the fact that the
assumption results in an overestimation of the available capacity in Interval I.
• Pessimistic scenario. Assuming that all reserved capacity in Interval II (ex-
cluding the last unit) are distributed as early as possible, the shifted unit of
capacity is available only if Interval II (excluding the last unit) is “empty”, i.e.,
none of the capacity in this area has been reserved. “Pessimistic” refers to the
fact that the assumption results in an underestimation of the available capacity
in Interval I.
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• Realistic scenario. Assuming that all reserved capacity in Interval II (excluding
the last unit) are distributed uniformly, the shifted unit of capacity is reserved
with a probability, defined as the proportion of reserved capacity in Interval II
(excluding the last unit).
Among the three scenarios, we regard the realistic scenario to be closest to the
reality. Note that the distribution in Interval II is influenced by two forces: reservation
and updating from one period to the next. Reservation fills the capacity from the end
to the front, while updating from one period to the next shifts the capacity forward by
one period. Hence, we know that the real distribution must be less extreme than the
ones in the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios. Nonetheless, th scenario leading to a
better policy is yet to be examined.
These assumptions do not deal with the last unit of capacity in Interval II, because
whether it is reserved or not can be explicitly characterized without introducing ad-
ditional dimensions: it is always available at the beginning of one period, and it will
become reserved whenever some regular demand is accepted in the current period.
Let x˜ f , x̂ f , y˜ f and ŷ f be the aggregate version of vectors x˜, x̂, y˜ and ŷ, respectively.
In addition, we define y f as the aggregate cumulative vector after accepting/rejecting
urgent orders but before processing is carried out, i.e. y f serves as an intermediary
between y˜ f and ŷ f . We characterize the transition between x f and x̂ f as follows.
Accepting/rejecting a regular order:
(y˜ f [0], y˜ f [1]) =
{
(y f [0]− (D2− (y f [1]−y f [0]))+,y f [1]−D2), if a = 1 and y f [1]≥ D2,
(y f [0],y f [1]), otherwise.
(4.8)
Accepting/rejecting an urgent order:
(y f [0],y f [1]) =
{
(y˜ f [0]−D1, y˜ f [1]−D1), if y˜ f [0]≥ D1,
(y˜ f [0], y˜ f [1]), otherwise.
(4.9)
Processing and updating to the next period:
(ŷ f [0], ŷ f [1]) =
{
(min{y f [0],L1−1},min{y f [1]+1,L2}), with probability pi
(min{y f [0],L1−1}+1,min{y f [1]+1,L2}), with probability 1−pi.
(4.10)
in which the value of pi is contingent on whether the last unit of capacity in Interval
II is reserved or not. Some additional notation follows: let ψ be the total available
capacity in Interval II after processing, i.e., ψ= y f [1]−min{y f [0],L1−1}. Next, we
discuss the value of pi in the different cases.
Case 1: y˜ f = y f (the last unit of capacity in Interval II is available)
• In the optimistic scenario, if ψ= 1, then pi= 1; otherwise, pi= 0.
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• In the pessimistic scenario, if ψ 6= L2−L1, then pi= 1; otherwise, pi= 0.
• In the realistic scenario, pi= 1− ψ−1L2−L1−1 .
Case 2: y˜ f 6= y f (the last unit of capacity in Interval II is reserved)
• In the optimistic scenario, if ψ= 0, then pi= 1; otherwise, pi= 0.
• In the pessimistic scenario, if ψ 6= L2−L1−1, then pi= 1; otherwise, pi= 0.
• In the realistic scenario, pi= 1− ψL2−L1−1 .
Figure 4.3: Transition of Aggregated Reservation Vectors Between Two Periods.
Figure 4.3 shows an example of how an aggregated reservation vector evolves in
different scenarios. In this example, L1 = 2 and L2 = 7, the aggregated reservation
vector at the end of one period, (i.e., the one after accepting/rejecting demands and
processing) is (1,3). Assuming some regular demand is accepted in this period, the
last unit in Interval II is reserved. In the optimistic scenario, the shifted unit of capacity
is available because the Interval II (excluding the last unit) is not full, and thus the ag-
gregated reservation vector at the start of next period is ŷ f = (1,3); in the pessimistic
scenario, the shifted unit is reserved, leading to ŷ f = (2,2); in realistic scenario, with
probability pi= 2/4= 0.5, the shifted unit is reserved, leading to ŷ f = (2,2), and with
probability 1−pi= 0.5, the shifted unit is available, leading to ŷ f = (1,3).
The profit generated in each aggregated state can be defined in a similar fashion
as in (4.5)-(4.7), and a new MDP formulation can be further obtained from optimal-
ity equation (4.1) by replacing the system states with their aggregated versions. For
simplicity, we omit their representations.
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Finally, once an optimal admission policy for the new MDP is obtained, a heuristic
policy can be constructed in the following way: for each aggregate state, apply its
admission decision to all the corresponding states in the original formulation.
4.5.2 Partial Aggregation Heuristic
The lack of accuracy in characterizing the transitions between aggregate states some-
times leads to significant profit gaps in comparison with the optimal profit, as we will
show in the numerical experiments. We wonder whether a more precise characteriza-
tion of the distributional information in Interval II could improve the performance of
the heuristic. We propose a generalized heuristic, the PAH, that partially aggregates
the distributional information in Interval II. Specifically, we split Interval II into two
parts: (i) Sub-Interval II-A, where the distributional information is precisely tracked,
and (ii) Sub-Interval II-B, where the distributional information is fully aggregated.
Figure 4.4 shows an example of reservation vectors for different levels of aggregation.
Figure 4.4: An Example of Reservation Vectors for Different Levels of Aggregation.
However, we face the same issue as in the full aggregation case, that is, how to
account for the transfer of capacity between Sub-Interval II-A and Sub-Interval II-B.
Again, we address this issue by heuristic approaches in which the reserved capacity
in Sub-Interval II-B is distributed according to the pessimistic, realistic and optimistic
scenarios as described in Section 4.5.1. The MDP formulation is derived in the same
way; for simplicity, we omit their presentation.
Let z ∈ {0, . . . ,L2−L1− 1} be the number of periods in Sub-Interval II-A, here-
after referred to as the disaggregation level. This parameter controls the tracking ac-
curacy of the distributional information in Sub-Interval II-A: if z = 0, the resulting
formulation is actually identical to the full aggregation; if z≥ L2−L1−2, the result-
ing formulation coincides with the one without aggregation that provides the optimal
steady-state policy. For a given disaggregation level z, the size of the resulting state
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space is (L1 + 1) · (L2− L1− z) · 2z. Obviously more disaggregation leads to larger
state space. Moreover, we have the following result comparing the optimal profits for
different partially aggregated MDP formulations.
Proposition 4.1. Let g∗o(z), g∗p(z) and g∗r (z) be the optimal expected profit obtained
by solving the partial aggregation model with a level of disaggregation z for the opti-
mistic, pessimistic and realistic scenarios, respectively. We have
g∗p(z)≤ {g∗r (z),g∗} ≤ g∗o(z),∀z,
and g∗o(z) and g∗p(z) are non-increasing and non-decreasing with z, respectively.
Proof. The proof is based on two facts: (i) it is always feasible to shorten the lead
times of the already accepted orders given that there is available capacity in earlier
periods, and (ii) for any aggregate state, the pessimistic scenario implies shorter lead
times for already accepted orders than the realistic scenario, which further implies
shorter lead times than the optimistic scenario. Therefore, any transition between two
aggregate states of scenarios implying shorter lead times can also be achieved with
scenarios implying more relaxed lead times. Consequently, for any sample path for
the formulation of scenarios implying shorter lead times, we can obtain an identical
sample path that provides the same profit with more relaxed scenarios. Thus, the profit
for the formulation of the optimistic scenario is at least as large as the profit for the
formulation of the realistic scenario, which is further at least as large as the profit for
the formulation of the pessimistic scenario. The same logic can be applied for proving
the monotonicity property of g∗o(z) and g∗p(z), i.e., more aggregation implies shorter
(longer) lead times for the pessimistic (optimistic) scenario. 
Proposition 4.1 indicates that g∗p(z) and g∗o(z) are the lower and upper bounds for
g∗r (z) and g∗, but g∗r (z) and g∗ are not directly comparable. It also shows that the
proposed bounds get tighter as the level of disaggregation z increases.
4.6 Numerical Results
In this section we investigate the actual performance of the policies presented above,
more specifically we analyze:
• the computational time required to obtain an acceptance policy with the differ-
ent formulations.
• the relative profits obtained with the FAH, the PAH, the optimal steady-state
policy and two benchmark policies often cited in the literature: the First-Come-
First-Served (FCFS) policy and the protection level based (PLB) policy (see
Section 4.6.3 for a detailed description of this policy).
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• the tightness of the bounds on the profit derived for the FAH and the PAH.
In order to answer those questions, we first compute the heuristic acceptance poli-
cies and the optimal policy for the instances small enough to do so. We then simulate
the different heuristic policies in order to determine their performance in terms of
average gain per period. Indeed, although the gains g∗o(z) and g∗p(z) computed for
the optimistic and pessimistic policies constitute upper and lower bounds on the opti-
mal gain, the actual gains achieved by those policies – as well as the other policies –
cannot be directly derived from the solution of the Markov Decision Process with an
aggregate state description.
We simulate the long-run net profit for an acceptance policy by generating demand
realizations. The simulation consists of an initial warm-up interval of 100,000 periods.
Afterwards, the simulation incorporates an additional 100,000 periods for which the
accumulated net profit is recorded. We repeat the process until the simulated net profit
converges with a precision of 0.001%. We denote gˆ f and gˆm the simulated long-run
net profit achieved by the FCFS and the PLB policies, and gˆo(z), gˆp(z) and gˆr(z)
the simulated long-run net profit achieved by the PAH with a disaggregation level z
assuming the optimistic, pessimistic and realistic scenarios, respectively. Note that the
gain of the optimal steady-state policy is given directly by the solution of the Markov
Decision Process, its value is equal to g∗.
Throughout the experiments, we will use linear programming (LP) to solve all
MDP formulations (Ross, 1983, Bertsekas, 1995, Putermann, 2005). Among other
tools, we have iteration based methods such as value iteration and policy iteration.
They are efficient in finding near-optimal solutions in a short time frame. However,
when serving as benchmarks one needs to specify parameters such as number of it-
erations and optimality gap, which is a nontrivial task. Thus, in order to compare
different MDP formulations in terms of their computational time on a fair basis, we
choose LP instead.
The acceptance policy simulation routine was implemented in the Java language.
The computer used was a 6-Core Intel Xeon 2× 2.66 GHz with 48 GB of RAM. LP
are solved using Gurobi 4.6.1 (http://www.gurobi.com/).
In the following subsections we introduce certain characteristics of the demand
classes that we used to generate instances of the problem (Section 4.6.1). Afterwards,
we describe the results of three studies: (1) the computational time for the construction
of an acceptance policy for different instances (Section 4.6.2); (2) the profits achieved
by the optimal steady-state policy, the FCFS and the PLB policies, and the aggregation
heuristics (see Section 4.6.3 and Section 4.6.4 for the FAH and the PAH, respectively);
(3) the profits of the FAH and the PAH for large instances where the optimal steady-
state policy cannot be computed (Section 4.6.5).
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4.6.1 Experiment Settings
The instances we generated are characterized by the following attributes:
Profit structure (ρ). It represents the ratio between the net profits of both demand
classes, i.e. ρ = r2/r1. Without loss of generality, the value of r1 is normalized to
1, so the value of r2 is obtained directly from ρ. In our experiment we explore high,
moderate and low differences in the profit structure, respectively (see Table 4.1).
Lead-time structure L1 and L2. We investigate two aspects of our model that
depend on the values of L1 and L2. On the one hand, it is clear from the formulation
of our model that the computational complexity is closely related to the difference
between L1 and L2. On the other hand we will see that L1 influences the performance
of the different policies.
Order size structure B1 and B2. The sizes of the orders determine the operational
flexibility when an order is accepted. We also did some tests with stochastic order
sizes, we do not report on this here as the results do not really differ from the de-
terministic case. The only difference is larger computational times, as a result the
computation of the optimal policy is restricted to even smaller instances.
Demand structure (β). It is defined as the ratio between the expected demand
rates of both classes, i.e. β= (p1 ·B1)/(p2 ·B2). We study how this ratio impacts the
performance of the proposed formulations. We chose the values of β such that the
expected demand of one class is 100% or 50% greater than the other, or the expected
demand rates of both classes are equal (see Table 4.1).
Global demand rate (τ). It corresponds to the total expected demand for both
classes per period i.e. τ = p1 ·B1 + p2 ·B2. We focus on scenarios in which τ > 1,
inasmuch as in these scenarios the acceptance decision is most meaningful as some
demand will have to be refused. If τ < 1, the decision to not accept a demand is not
very relevant.
Profit structure, order size structure and global demand rate are common experi-
mental conditions for main numerical experiments we performed. For these parame-
ters, we perform a full factorial experiment based on the values presented in the first
part of Table 4.1. Lead times and order sizes are set depending on the objectives of
different numerical experiments performed: analysis of the computational time and
the profit comparison of the proposed heuristics with respect to the optimal policy and
its bounds. Values of these parameters for each experiment are presented in the second
and the third part of Table 4.1, respectively. Note that, p1 and p2 are functions of β, τ,
B1 and B2. Their values will be derived from these parameters.
4.6.2 Computational Times
In this section, we compare the average CPU times needed to calculate the optimal
steady-state policy and the heuristic policies. We analyze the FAH and the PAH for
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Common Experimental Computational Time Profit Comparison
Conditions Experiment Experiment
Attributes Values Attributes Values Attributes Values
ρ {0.25,0.50,0.75} L1,B1 {1,3,5,7},1 L1,B1 3,{1,3}
β {1/2,2/3,1,3/2,2/1} L2,B2 {13,15,17,19},1 7,{1,3,5,7}
τ {1.2,1.6,2.0} L2,B2 {15,29},{3,5,7,9}
Table 4.1: Setting Values of the Parameters.
the so-called realistic scenario, which is the most demanding in terms of computa-
tional time among the three scenarios considered. Note that, the PAH is tested for
different values for the disaggregation level (z ∈ {2,4,6}). In addition to the common
experimental conditions (see Table 4.1), in this experiment, we fix the order sizes to 1
because this leads to the longest computational times. Similar insights can be obtained
for any other combination of values of B1 and B2. As already explained, the difference
between lead times and their combinations have a direct impact on the size of the state
space of the system and, thus, the computational time. To explore this dependency we
test a wide range of values of L1 and L2 shown in Table 4.1. In total this experiment
consists of 342 instances (when discarding the combinations of values of parameters
that result in p1, p2 > 1).
Table 4.2 shows the average CPU times and the size of the system state space
for each combination of L1 and L2. We observe that the time needed to find the
optimal steady-state policy increases very quickly when the difference between L2
and L1 increases. In fact, for L2−L1 ≥ 15 we could not determine the optimal order
acceptance policy.
4.6.3 Efficiency of the FAH
We compare the efficiency of the FAH with the optimal steady-state policy, the FCFS
and the PLB policies by measuring their relative profits. We also compare the quality
of the FAH under each of the three scenarios. In order to compare the efficiencies
we compute the optimality gap of an acceptance policy constructed by the heuristic
i as follows Gapi = (g∗− gˆi)/g∗× 100%. Note that the FAH is represented by i =
{o(0), p(0),r(0)} and the FCFS and PLB policy by i = { f ,m}, respectively.
The protection level based (PLB) policy applied in this research is an adaptation
of the well-known revenue management approaches that divide the available capac-
ity into two portions: protected (reserved for the high net-profit class) and unprotected
(used for both classes). These approaches are commonly applied for the finite-horizon
problems. If they are directly implemented over an infinite horizon, the construction
of the policy is computationally as intensive as the construction of the optimal steady-
state policy. Therefore, in order to reduce the complexity of the existing approaches
while at the same time capturing their essence we implement a myopic method which
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Table 4.2: Average CPU Time and Dimension of the State Space of the System for the Optimal
Steady-State Policy, the FAH and the PAH Under the Realistic Scenario.
Average CPU (seconds) Size
PAH PAH
L2 L1 Optimal FAH z = 2 z = 4 z = 6 Optimal z = 6
13 1 2.55 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.17 4,096 768
13 3 2.99 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.38 2,048 1,024
13 5 0.26 0.00 0.01 0.06 − 768 768
13 7 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.03 − 256 256
15 1 194 0,00 0.01 0.03 0.30 16,384 1,024
15 3 22 0.00 0.01 0.10 1.02 8,192 1,536
15 5 10 0.00 0.02 0.14 1.20 3,072 1,536
15 7 0.4 0.01 0.02 0.12 − 1,024 1024
17 1 ∗ 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.51 65,536 1,280
17 3 ∗ 0.00 0.02 0.16 2.11 32,768 2,048
17 5 105 0.01 0.03 0.28 1.72 12,288 2,304
17 7 8 0.01 0.03 0.29 3.03 4,096 2,048
19 1 ∗ 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.73 262,144 1,536
19 3 ∗ 0.00 0.02 0.24 2.45 131,072 2,560
19 5 ∗ 0.01 0.04 0.44 3.24 49,152 3,072
19 7 1,015 0.01 0.05 0.54 3.52 16,384 3,072
“∗” symbolizes instances for which the optimal steady-state policy cannot be
obtained in 1 hour and “−” represents the cases where the PAH is equivalent to
the optimal policy because z≥ L2−L1−2.
determines the amount of protected capacity q that maximizes the expected net profit
within L2. This corresponds to the approximations used in the literature see e.g. Barut
and Sridharan (2005). The expected net profit within L2 is computed with the follow-
ing expression: r1 ·E[min(D¯1,max(q,y[L2]− D¯2))]+r2 ·E[min(D¯2,y[L2]−q)], where
the random variable D¯i represents the amount of demand of class i during L2 peri-
ods. The PLB policy consists in protecting the capacity q that maximizes the previous
expression.
In order to evaluate the efficiency of the proposed policies with respect to the
optimal steady-state policy, we fix L2 = 15 and L1 ∈ {3,7}. Under this setting the
optimal steady-state policy can be obtained within a tractable time. In order to capture
the full essence of different degrees of heterogeneity in demand classes, we consider
the different values of order sizes presented in the third part of Table 4.1. The values
of other parameters belong to common experimental conditions. In this experiment,
our analysis is based on 984 instances (the instances with p1, p2 ≥ 1 are discarded).
Table 4.3 reports on the average optimality gaps for the two values of L1. The
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average optimality gap of the FAH is lower than that of the FCFS and the PLB policies.
There is also a significant difference between the different implementations of the
FAH (realistic, pessimistic and optimistic).
The lowest average optimality gap of the FAH is achieved with the realistic sce-
nario. The strength of the realistic scenario lies in the balance between the excess
of protection of capacity for high profitability orders (pessimistic scenario) and the
assumption of maximum flexibility for processing incoming orders (optimistic sce-
nario). The results also reveal that the PLB and FAH tend to perform a bit better when
L1 is larger.
Table 4.3: Average Optimality Gap of the FCFS, the PLB Policy and the FAH Under the Three
Scenarios for the Two Values of L1.
FAH
FCFS PLB Optimistic Pessimistic Realistic
L1 = 3 12.92% 7.27% 5.00% 1.90% 0.45%
L1 = 7 13.52% 5.13% 4.98% 0.57% 0.36%
Overall 13.33% 5.81% 4.99% 0.99% 0.39%
We also study the reliability of the different policies when the values of the param-
eters vary. Figure 4.5 shows the dispersion of the optimality gap of the analyzed meth-
ods. The limits of each box represent the first and third quartiles of the measured gaps.
The central line corresponds to the mean result. Finally, the bottom and top whiskers
represent the fifth and the ninety-fifth percentiles of the optimality gaps. In addition
to the advantages achieved in terms of the average optimality gap, the implementation
of the FAH with the realistic scenario provides the most reliable performance. Fig-
ure 4.6 provides more details about the optimality gap of the analysed instances when
utilizing the FAH with the realistic scenario. In particular, the histogram presented
in Figure 4.6 shows that the first three categories for which Gapr < 1% cover around
90% of the analyzed instances.
The relative advantage of the realistic scenario is born from its accuracy in repre-
senting the actual distribution of the reserved capacity in Interval II. Specifically, we
expect the assumed distributional scenario leads to a good estimation of the transi-
tion of reserved capacity from Interval II to Interval I. With this in mind, we compare
the value pi for the different distributional scenarios with the observed frequency that
such transition occurs. We obtain the observed frequency by simulating the transi-
tion between element x[1] and x[0] when implementing the optimal policy. Figure 4.7
provides examples of the observed frequency for different values of B2 and the as-
sumed values of pi when the policy is obtained by the FAH with the realistic scenario.
When the value of order size of regular orders is small with respect to its lead time
4.6. Numerical Results 89
Figure 4.5: Dispersion of the Optimality Gap of Different Heuristic Methods and Distributional
Scenarios for the FAH.
Figure 4.6: Dispersion of the Optimality Gap of the Realistic Scenarios for the FAH.
(i.e., B2 = 2 in Figure 4.7), the values of pi under the realistic scenario are the closest
to the observations. Nevertheless, when the value of B2 increases (i.e., B2 = 4) the
pessimistic scenario seems to be a better assumption for low reserved capacity in In-
terval II (we remind the reader that under the pessimistic scenario pi= 1 for x f [1]> 0).
However, such states are not likely to occur, as we see in Figure 4.7 (probabilities of
being in a state for the two values of B2 are presented by dashed lines with markers).
In fact, the realistic scenario estimates pi better than the pessimistic scenario for the
states where the reserved capacity is equal to 4, which are also the states most likely to
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occur. Moreover, the sum of the square of the errors of the estimation of the realistic
and pessimistic scenario provides more evidence about the advantage of assuming a
uniform distribution. In particular, for the case B2 = 4, such sum is 0.019 and 0.013
for the pessimistic and realistic scenarios, respectively.
Figure 4.7: Observed Values and Estimated Values (when the FAH under the Realistic Scenario
is Implemented) of pi. Results for L1 = 4, L2 = 11, p1 = 0.1, p2 = 0.5, r2 = 0.5 and B1 = 1.
Our numerical results allow us to get a glimpse of the structure of the heuristic pol-
icy obtained through the FAH with the realistic scenario. This structure corresponds
to a threshold in the values of x f [0] and x f [1]. In other words, if we fix the value
of x f [1] incoming regular orders are accepted up to a certain value of the amount of
orders in the first interval. Analogously, if we fix the value of x f [0] incoming regular
orders are accepted if the reserved capacity in the second interval is smaller than or
equal to some threshold. Figure 4.8 shows an example of this type of policy.
We analyse the sensitivity of the threshold value obtained through the FAH with
the realistic scenario to changes on some parameters of the problem, as we show in
Figure 4.9a - Figure 4.9d. We can observe that the threshold values for the first and
second intervals decrease with the value of B2. This is because accepting regular
orders with larger order sizes will imply less available capacity for processing the
future arrivals of urgent orders. Also, the threshold values have an inverse relation
with the values of the probabilities p1 and p2, since larger values of such probabilities
lead to a reduction of the probability of having idle capacity in the incoming periods,
therefore rejecting regular orders could be convenient in order to make some capacity
available for urgent orders. The opposite is true for the threshold values and r2, given
that the reduction of the difference between the revenues of the order classes, make
regular orders more attractive.”
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Figure 4.8: Acceptance/Rejection Policy of the FAH with Realistic Scenario for each Aggre-
gated State. L1 = 4, L2 = 11, p1 = 0.1, p2 = 0.5, r2 = 0.1, B1 = 1 and B2 = 2.
(a) Sensitivity to B2. p1 = 0.5, p2 = 0.5, r2 = 0.5. (b) Sensitivity to r2. p1 = 0.5, p2 = 0.5, B2 = 2.
(c) Sensitivity to p1. p2 = 0.5, r2 = 0.5, B2 = 2. (d) Sensitivity to p2. p1 = 0.5, r2 = 0.5, B2 = 2.
Figure 4.9: Threshold Values of the FAH with Realistic Scenario. L1 = 4, L2 = 11 and B1 = 1.
4.6.4 Efficiency of the PAH
Despite the excellent overall performance of the FAH with the realistic scenario, the
optimality gap remains significant for 9.76% of the instances generated (Gapr(0) ≥
1%), as we observe in Figure 4.6. For these instances, we study how the system-
atic disaggregation of information related to already accepted orders can improve
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the quality of the acceptance policies found. For this, we calculate Gapr(z) for
z ∈ {1,2, . . . ,6}. The average values of Gapr(z) are displayed in Figure 4.10. The
optimality gap of the PAH with the realistic scenario decreases rapidly as the value
of z grows. In particular, we note from Figure 4.10 that when z increases from 0 to
4, the average gap decreases from 1.54% to 0.73% when L1 = 3 and from 2.05% to
0.17% when L1 = 7. Thus, the optimality gap of the FAH is greatly reduced while the
computational time remains small (see Table 4.2). We remark that for the remaining
90.24% of the instances studied, the average optimality gap is also improved when the
value of z increases.
Figure 4.10: Average Optimality Gap of the Acceptance Policies Under the Realistic Scenario
for the Instances with Gapr(0)≥ 1% for Different Values of z and L1.
4.6.5 Efficiency of the PAH and FAH for Large Lead Times
As shown in Table 4.2 an advantage of the FAH and the PAH is to construct the poli-
cies in tractable time even for instances for which the optimal steady-state policies
cannot be obtained. In order to evaluate the efficiency of the studied heuristics for
these instances, we fix the value of L2 to be large i.e. L2 = 29 while the other param-
eters take the same values as in Section 4.6.3. As a result our experiments include
again 984 instances. We also compute the upper and lower bounds obtained from
Proposition 4.1.
The average net profits of the different policies are plotted as a function of z in
Figure 4.11a and Figure 4.11b for L1 = 3 and L1 = 7, respectively. We observe the
following: first, the FAH and the PAH with the realistic scenario significantly out-
perform the PLB policy. Second, the effect of increasing z seems much stronger on
the quality of the bounds than on the performance of the realistic policy. For a vast
majority of instances the disaggregation does not bring any significant improvement.
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However, in a very similar fashion to Section 4.6.4, we observe that for the 10% of in-
stances with the worst performance for the FAH, the profit increased by at least 0.5%
between the PAH heuristic with z = 0 and z = 6. The average improvement for these
instances is 0.781%. This seems to indicate that the main usefulness of the PAH is to
give the possibility of controlling the quality of the proposed solution.
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Figure 4.11: Effect of Disaggregation of the Information on the Average Long-Run Net Profits
Achieved with Different Policies for the Large Lead Time of Regular Orders.
4.7 Operational Flexibility
In the previous section, we illustrated the efficiency of the proposed algorithms for a
large set of instances. Here, we try to gain some further insight into the circumstances
where revenue management would have the most significant impact. We will focus on
instances following the pattern of the cases that motivated our work (namely, a class
of urgent orders with relatively low demand and a class of regular orders with longer
lead times and lower revenues).
As expected, the benefit of revenue management is strongly correlated with the
94 4. Planning Operations for Revenue Maximization Under Lead Time Constraints
intensity of demand as shown in Figure 4.12. We observe that the potential benefit
of revenue management compared to the FCFS policy increases with the difference
between L2 and B2. This means that the advantage of revenue management is larger
when there is more flexibility in processing regular orders. Note that, the effect of the
flexibility for urgent orders is more limited.
Figure 4.12: Benefits of the Proposed Revenue Management Approach (RM) Compared to the
FCFS Policy for Different Characteristics of the Demand Streams. Results for L1 = 6, L2 = 12,
ρ = 0.50 and β = 0.50. ∆i = Li−Bi where i = 1,2. The Benefits of RM are Computed by
(g∗− gˆ f )/gˆ f ×100%.
In order to gain more insights into the impact of revenue management on the op-
erations we compare the acceptance rates of both classes with and without revenue
management. Table 4.4 shows the proportion of accepted orders for each demand
class. The results illustrate how the revenue management technique is giving gradu-
ally higher priority to the urgent orders when ρ (the relative margin of regular orders)
is decreasing. We also observe again that the operational flexibility once an order is
accepted plays an important role, in this experiment when B2 = 10 the impact of rev-
enue management is minimal, and more generally the smaller B2 (for a fixed value of
L2) the larger the impact. Of particular interest is the case where B1 = 5 and B2 = 10,
that is there is hardly any flexibility for both classes. In that case we observe that for
ρ = 0.75 or 0.5 the optimal policy is essentially FCFS, while for ρ = 0.25 the pol-
icy is to accept only the high revenue class. In other words, given the small amount
of operational flexibility there is an abrupt switch in the acceptance policy from ac-
cept all orders (whenever feasible) to accept only high margin urgent orders when the
difference in margin is high enough.
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Table 4.4: Acceptance Rate Under the FCFS and the Optimal Policy and the Benefits of RM
for Different Order Sizes and Revenues.
FCFS Optimal, ρ= 0.75 Optimal, ρ= 0.50 Optimal, ρ= 0.25
B1 B2 µ1 µ2 µ1 µ2 b µ1 µ2 b µ1 µ2 b
1 2 55.6% 91.8% 96.6% 70.8% 4.9% 99.3% 68.9% 14.1% 99.9% 67.7% 31.8%
1 6 77.1% 70.7% 85.1% 65.8% 0.3% 93.4% 59.8% 3.6% 97.6% 55.2% 11.4%
1 10 85.0% 52.4% 85.1% 52.3% 0.0% 85.1% 52.3% 0.0% 90.2% 45.6% 1.6%
3 2 44.8% 95.4% 80.4% 75.2% 2.8% 87.3% 70.3% 12.5% 92.4% 62.3% 33.6%
3 6 57.7% 74.2% 57.8% 74.2% 0.0% 80.5% 57.4% 4.4% 88.5% 45.6% 17.5%
3 10 60.4% 56.5% 60.4% 56.5% 0.0% 60.4% 56.5% 0.1% 97.1% 0.0% 9.6%
5 2 36.1% 97.1% 66.0% 79.3% 1.8% 66.0% 79.3% 9.1% 71.9% 70.1% 26.4%
5 6 40.4% 77.1% 40.4% 77.1% 0.0% 53.4% 66.1% 1.8% 71.0% 48.4% 20.6%
5 10 44.4% 56.8% 44.4% 56.8% 0.0% 44.4% 56.8% 0.0% 79.6% 0.0% 9.3%
Results for L1 = 6, L2 = 12, τ= 1.25 and β= 0.50. Note that, µi is the service level of demand stream
i and b is the benefit of RM compared to the FCFS.
4.8 Summary and Conclusions
In this Chapter we studied the order acceptance problem for a firm serving two classes
of demand that differ in net profit and lead time over an infinite horizon. We ob-
tained the optimal order acceptance policy by formulating the problem as a multi-
dimensional Markov Decision Process. However the resolution for the optimal policy
can require high computational requirements. To overcome this difficulty, we pro-
posed an efficient heuristic consisting in a parametric aggregation of the state space.
The parameter makes it possible to find the best trade-off between the computational
time and the quality of the solution. We propose several variants based on different
assumptions about the dynamics of the aggregate state. The variant which assumes
that all reserved capacity is distributed uniformly in the aggregation interval gives sig-
nificantly better solutions than the other approaches studied in the extant literature.
The other variants give lower and upper bounds that make it possible to obtain a guar-
antee about the quality of the solution and the possible gap with respect to the optimal
solution. Finally, the computational time remains very short even for instances with
large order lead times.
We showed that the amount of operational flexibility (in our case this means how
much slack there is between the promised lead time and the effective processing time
needed) has a large impact on the performance of revenue management. The more
flexibility there is the larger the potential benefit of implementing a revenue manage-
ment based order acceptance policy. The study of the potential benefits of revenue
management associated with flexibility in other contexts is an interesting avenue for
further research. In the airline industry for example, the hub and spoke organization is
widespread. The major airlines have several hubs and for a journey that is not starting
or ending in a hub, it might be interesting to keep some flexibility in terms of the legs
traveled by a passenger (i.e. through which hub) as long as a time-slot is respected
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for the departure and arrival times at the origin and destination respectively. It would
be interesting to investigate how the state aggregation policy presented in this article
could be extended for the more general network structure of airline operations.
Another direction for future work is the exploration of some properties of the value
functions in the MDP formulation. Based on the concept of L\-convexity, some recent
works (see e.g. Zipkin, 2008, Pang et al., 2012) partially characterize the optimal
policies for inventory problems with lead time issues. We conjecture that similar
properties exist in the context of our problem. If so, it might be possible to develop
more efficient computational methods.
Chapter 5
Conclusions
In this thesis we model analytically the linkage of a firm with its own supply chain
(SC) and with firms belonging to other supply chains (SCs). We classify the linkages
between entities belonging to the same supply chain as vertical relationships, and the
linkages between entities belonging to different supply chains as horizontal relation-
ships. When planning operations taking into account vertical and horizontal relation-
ships, a firm can get significant benefits (cost and risk reduction, increasing profits,
capacity utilization, production flexibility, etc.), however, decision makers face new
challenges associated to modeling operations. We propose quantitative approaches for
planning operations that combine Microeconomic models (bargaining models, game
theory, profit maximization), for representing the linkages between firms, and Opera-
tions Management techniques (Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP), Revenue
Management, Markov decision process (MDP), etc.) for optimizing production activ-
ities. In this chapter, we discuss theoretical and practical implications of this thesis
and future research directions.
5.1 Implications
We analyze the implications of the planning the operations of the firms adequately
when considering different types of relationships in SCs.
When a horizontal relationship represents a collaborative alliance between firms,
an opportunity arises for improving the performance of such firms. Nevertheless, a
collaborative alliance may impose that firms compete for using shared resources, so
the objectives of the firms create opposition between them. Thus, implementing col-
laborative initiatives should be successful in addressing two dimensions of the prob-
lem: the first dimension is related to the global performance of the partners, however,
the globally optimal solution may not be enough to satisfy the individual expecta-
tions; the second dimension is related to the perception of fairness that partners have
about the results of the alliance. Indeed, the fairness dimension of the problem is
the crux of the sustainability of the agreement through time, because it determines
the willingness of the firms to continue working together. We suggest that designing
collaborative alliances should be based on two principles: (i) the performance of the
collaboration should be measured in terms of the unit costs for the firms and (ii) firms
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can achieve a good balance between global optimization and fairness by minimizing
the maximum unit costs of the firms. As we show in our results, the implementation
of these principles may also have a significant impact on the risk associated to the
collaboration.
From a managerial point of view, the opportunities arising from horizontal col-
laboration can lead to competitive advantages for the partners. This may be key for
the success of firms in the future, when more competitive environments will demand
higher efficiency in utilizing resources. In particular, medium and small-size firms can
gain from collaboration initiatives, because by working together they can compete in
better conditions with larger firms, so that they can reach similar economies of scale,
capacity flexibility, coverage, etc.
Even when the firms do not establish collaborations between each other, other
horizontal relationships impose that the internal actions of a firm are highly dependent
on the decisions made by others. Such is the case of horizontal competition. In such
case the challenge for a firm is to coordinate its internal decisions, such as planning
operations and pricing, in order to take into account external influences (opponents’
prices) and make its products more competitive in the market. Our numerical results
show that firms can get higher profits when facing horizontal competition by utilizing
a dynamic pricing strategy. Such strategy helps to control the amount of demand
in each production period such that a firm will have the available capacity to satisfy
demand. Also, we state that the Operations Department should debate its decisions
with other bodies of the firm. For example, by increasing the production capacity, a
firm may be hurt because the reduction of operational costs associated to such action
may impose a higher competition with its opponent, so the the equilibrium prices may
reduce the incomes of the firm.
The models and insights that we propose for horizontal competitions may consti-
tute a guide for decision makers. This idea becomes stronger because the number of
firms in different markets and industries grows constantly. Even though the problem
of competition between firms is latent since many years, only a few works focuses
on including operations that requires more complex computations. Thus, our work
is getting closer to practice and gives a strong motivation for the implementation of
practical decision aid tools taking into account theoretical models of competition and
well-known production-inventory problems. Thus, firms can utilize our work as a tool
for competing adequately in their markets, and also, to coordinate the decisions of its
Marketing department and Operations department.
In addition to the horizontal relationships, we also study the influence of the char-
acteristics of a SC on the planning of operations of a firm. In this frame, we ana-
lyze how a firm should selectively accept customer orders and schedule its production
in order to benefit from the different characteristics of customers downstream in the
same SC. This constitutes an example of a vertical relationship in a SC. We propose a
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methodology that selects customer orders based on the profit per unit of accepting an
order and the resources required for satisfying such order. So, the firms can maximize
their profits by setting a policy that discerns whether to accept or to reject an order.
Given the stochasticity of the demand of the customers, we model the dynamics in
the operations of the firm as a Markov Decision Process (MDP). Although a firm can
utilize this formulation to set an acceptance policy that maximizes its expected profits,
such formulation may become intensive in consuming computational resources. We
propose aggregation heuristics that simplify the space of our MDP representation by
considering partially the information of the due date of the already accepted orders.
Through making simple assumptions about the omitted information we propose highly
efficient policies, which are obtained in a shorter time. Further, by numerical results
we show that there is a link between the acceptance policy of the firm and the capacity
tightness.
Our analysis of vertical relationships in a SC can be useful for decision makers.
Given that the customer are becoming more demanding, the firms should plan oper-
ations in order to be able to satisfy the customer requests. But the existence of more
competitive environments imposes that firms go further than the demand satisfaction.
The firms should be able to meet their promises to customers, in such a way that they
can build long term vertical relationships. In that sense, our methodology can be uti-
lized to ensure lead time promised to customers while maximizing the profits of a
firm. Also, our approach can be utilized in real applications different to manufactur-
ing. For example, airlines could consider our approach for offering flexible flights to
customers, so the airline will respect the time-slot for the departure and arrival time at
the origin and destination, but the legs traveled by the passenger can be modified.
5.2 Research Directions
In addition to the future research proposals already described in Sections 2.7 , 3.7 and 4.8
, here we discuss new avenues for research that combine the different topics analyzed
in this thesis.
5.2.1 Horizontal collaboration and horizontal competition
Given that horizontal collaborations become attractive when there are similarities in
the operations of the partners, we could assume that partners offer products that com-
pete for the same customers. Thus, we propose to study how to combine the method-
ologies for addressing horizontal competition and horizontal collaboration. In addition
to the challenges discussed in this thesis, the firms will have to face new theoretical
and practical issues. From a theoretical point of view, jointly planning of operations
of the firms while computing the pricing equilibrium constitutes a problem whose so-
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lution will involve a high computational effort. So, improving the computational time
of solving the joint operations planning may be the crux of the methodology. From a
managerial point of view, any approach dealing with simultaneous collaboration and
competition should address the legal constraints regarding collusion practices, e.g. the
agreement cannot reduce the welfare of the customers.
5.2.2 Horizontal collaboration and vertical relationships
Manufacturers that selectively choose orders from different demand streams may also
discuss the possibility of a collaborative alliance with similar firms belonging to other
SCs. So, an interesting extension of our work consists in including horizontal col-
laborations in the problem of accepting/rejecting orders. Researchers could consider
collaborations in which two or more manufacturers pool their production lines; hence
the challenge for the manufacturers is to agree on a scheme of collaboration by which
they jointly decide when the production can be transferred from one production line
to another one. Implementing this type of initiative will lead to higher rates of de-
mand satisfaction due to the flexibility of using exchangeable production lines of the
partners. The computation requirements for designing an acceptance policy will be
high, because both the size of the instance will grow with the number of partners and
fairness constraints should be incorporated in the models. Thus, our approximation
heuristics will be essential to decrease the computational complexity.
5.2.3 Horizontal competition and vertical relationships
We suggest investigating the effects of horizontal competition on the acceptance/rejection
decisions problem. Here, we could expect that the pricing and lead time decisions of
a set of manufacturers may influence the demand of each other. Thus, the challenge
for a manufacturer is to offer a combination of prices and lead times to the retailers
that allow him to compete with his opponents. Again, the complexity of computing
an equilibrium between manufacturers may be high, so the proposed heuristics for ac-
ceptance/rejection decisions could be utilized as a subroutine required for computing
a market equilibrium.
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